47 changed the law by defining a new crime of misdemeanor shoplifting and, in effect,
'carving out' this 'lesser crime' from the 'preexisting felony' [of burglary]." (People v.
Colbert (2019) 6 Cal.5th 596, 602 (Colbert), quoting People v. Martinez (2018) 4 Cal.5th
647, 651.) "Through its various provisions, Proposition 47 made clear that certain types
of criminal conduct once punishable as felonies now constitute only misdemeanors."
(Martinez, at p. 651.) The Legislative Analyst explained in the Proposition 47 voter
pamphlet: "Under current law, shoplifting property worth $950 or less (a type of petty
theft) is often a misdemeanor. However, such crimes can also be charged as burglary,
which is a wobbler. Under [Proposition 47], shoplifting property worth $950 or less
would always be a misdemeanor and could not be charged as burglary." (Voter
Information Guide, Gen. Elect. (Nov. 4, 2014) analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis. Analyst, p.
35, quoted in Gonzales, at pp. 869-870.) Therefore, section 459.5 shoplifting is " 'always'
. . . classified as [a] misdemeanor[] when the value of property [is] $950 or less."
(Gonzales, at p. 870.)
6
New section 459.5, enacted by Proposition 47, provides:
"(a) Notwithstanding Section 459, shoplifting is defined as entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950). Any other entry into a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny is burglary. Shoplifting shall be punished as a misdemeanor . . . .
"(b) Any act of shoplifting as defined in subdivision (a) shall be charged as shoplifting. No person who is charged with shoplifting may also be charged with burglary or theft of the same property."
The new misdemeanor crime of shoplifting "covers conduct that previously would have
been classified as a burglary." (E.P., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 797.)
Section 459 defines the offense of burglary, providing in pertinent part that a
"person who enters any . . . store . . . with the intent to commit grand or petit larceny or
any felony is guilty of burglary." However, on its enactment in 2014, "section 459.5
amended section 459 to exclude certain wrongful conduct which previously was second
degree burglary." (E.P., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 798.) Therefore, a defendant now
cannot "simultaneously commit shoplifting and second degree burglary." (E.P., at p.
798.)
E.P. stated: "Because a person cannot commit burglary if he actually committed
shoplifting, a prosecutor who wishes to convict a defendant of burglary must prove the
defendant did not commit shoplifting. [Citations.] Evidence the defendant committed
shoplifting disproves the elements of the charged commercial burglary. Under these
circumstances, the court must instruct the jury the prosecution has the burden to disprove
the element(s) of shoplifting beyond a reasonable doubt to secure a burglary conviction."
7
(E.P., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 798.) Alternatively stated, to prove that a defendant
committed section 459 burglary based on a theory of intent to commit larceny when
entering a commercial establishment that is open during regular business hours, "the
prosecution [has] the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant]
did not commit shoplifting." (Id. at p. 799.)
II
Insufficient Evidence to Support Count 3 Burglary Conviction
Jennings contends the prosecution was required, in the circumstances of this case,
to prove that he intended to take property with a value that exceeded $950 to prove his
guilt on the count 3 burglary charge. He further contends that the prosecution did not
meet that burden of proof (i.e., there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that he
intended to take property with a value exceeding $950) and therefore his count 3 burglary
conviction must be reversed. We agree.
A
When a conviction is challenged on appeal for insufficient evidence to support it,
we apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th
830, 869; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) In so doing, we review the
whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether there is
substantial evidence to support the conviction. (Vines, at p. 869; Johnson, at p. 578.)
Substantial evidence is evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that
a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People
v. Killebrew (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 644, 660.) We do not reweigh the evidence, resolve
8
conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. (People v. Cochran
(2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 13.)
B
Contrary to the People's assertion, the language and legislative intent of section
459.5 and the cases interpreting that statute support Jennings's assertion that section
459.5 shoplifting is a separate and distinct offense from section 459 burglary. In defining
the new offense of shoplifting, section 459.5, subdivision (a) begins with the introductory
phrase "[n]otwithstanding [s]ection 459," thereby expressly excluding its shoplifting
offense from the section 459 offense of burglary. Section 459.5, subdivision (a) further
provides: "Any other entry into a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny
is burglary." (Italics added.) If shoplifting and burglary were coextensive offenses, that
statutory language would be superfluous and redundant. (E.P., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at
p. 798.) Whenever reasonably possible, we must interpret statutes to avoid redundancy
and give significance to each word and phrase. (Pacific Legal Foundation v.
Proposition 47's voter pamphlet expressed the intent that under new section 459.5,
"shoplifting property worth $950 or less would always be a misdemeanor and could not
be charged as burglary." (Voter Information Guide, supra, analysis of Prop. 47 by Legis.
Analyst, p. 35.) Colbert concluded that section 459.5 "in effect, 'carv[ed] out' [the] 'lesser
crime' [of shoplifting] from the 'preexisting felony' [of burglary]." (Colbert, supra, 6
Cal.5th at p. 602.) Therefore, conduct that violates section 459.5 always constitutes
misdemeanor shoplifting and cannot be punished as section 459 felony burglary. (People
9
v. Martinez, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 651; Gonzales, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 870; E.P., supra,
35 Cal.App.5th at p. 797.) Colbert stated: "[T]he whole point of section 459.5 is to
redefine a class of burglary offenses as shoplifting." (Colbert, at p. 606.) Accordingly,
contrary to the People's assertion, a defendant now cannot "simultaneously commit
shoplifting and second degree burglary." (E.P., at p. 798.)
Furthermore, because section 459.5 shoplifting and section 459 burglary are
separate and distinct offenses, when the prosecution has charged a defendant with section
459 burglary in circumstances involving an alleged entry of a commercial establishment
with intent to commit larceny, the prosecution not only has the burden to prove each of
the elements of section 459 burglary, but it also has the burden to disprove that the
defendant committed section 459.5 shoplifting. (E.P., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 799.)
In particular, in such cases, the prosecutor must prove either: (1) the defendant did not
enter the commercial establishment when it was open during regular business hours; or
(2) the value of the property taken or intended to be taken exceeded $950. (§ 459.5,
subd. (a); E.P., at p. 801 ["the prosecution could have negated a finding of shoplifting by
proving either that the stolen property was worth more than $950 or that [the defendant]
did not enter the locker room when it was 'open during regular business hours' "].) As
Jennings asserts, section 459.5, in effect, made the value of the property that he allegedly
intended to take an element of section 459 burglary in this case and therefore the
prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to take
10
property worth more than $950 when he entered the store.4 (Cf. People v. Gutierrez
(2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 847, 855 ["to obtain a felony conviction for vehicle theft [under
Veh. Code, § 10851], the People were required to prove as an element of the crime that
the rental car he took was worth more than $950 [as required by § 490.2, subd. (a),
enacted by Proposition 47]."].)
C
Jennings asserts that because the prosecution did not present any evidence
showing that the value of the property he allegedly intended to take on his entry into the
hobby store exceeded $950, his count 3 burglary conviction must be reversed for
insufficiency of evidence to support it. We agree. The People have not cited, and our
review of the record has not revealed, any evidence that would support a reasonable
inference Jennings intended to take property worth more than $950. Weaver, the store's
owner, testified that he thought the man who entered his store (who Jennings later
admitted was him) "wanted to get rid of [the drone]." Weaver stated that Jennings "sort
of got the impression I probably didn't want to buy [the drone], but he did mention that
maybe he could trade [it] for a model truck. You know, we sell radio-controlled trucks
also. But, again, I wasn't interested in [the drone]." Weaver later testified that Jennings
"mentioned that . . . maybe we could trade [the drone] for an RC car or a truck, actually."
Weaver elaborated: "The only thing I recall was that he was interested in an RC truck. I
4 Jennings does not dispute that he entered the hobby store while it was open during regular business hours.
11
think he wanted to trade [the drone] for an RC truck." Weaver also testified that Jennings
did not seem familiar with the kind of drone model he had.
Jennings testified that he knew the drone was stolen and "just want[ed] to get rid
of it." He testified that at the time "[his] thought was, when I went there [i.e., to the
hobby store], if I could get something for -- because my intent was to get a small RC or
something for my neighbor. Because I have a neighbor that has four kids. I wanted to
get something for them to play with." Jennings admitted he was going to take the stolen
drone "to get an RC car for [his] neighbor." However, he did not obtain an RC car for his
neighbor and left the store with the drone. Jennings testified that a couple of days later,
he traded the two drones for a car someone was trying to sell on Facebook. He testified
that before the trade he did not know if the two drones "were valuable enough. I didn't
know what they were worth." After the car owner "looked at them and . . . wanted them,"
the car owner agreed to trade the car for the drones.
The evidence discussed above does not support a reasonable inference that
Jennings intended to take property worth more than $950 when he entered the hobby
store. First, Weaver did not testify that Jennings was interested in a specific RC car or
truck, much less one that had a stated price exceeding $950. In fact, Weaver did not
testify regarding the price range of the RC cars and trucks that his store had for sale at the
time. Absent any evidence that Jennings was interested in trading the drone for a specific
RC car or truck with a price in excess of $950, there is insufficient evidence to support a
reasonable inference that he intended to take property worth more than $950 when he
entered the store with the drone.
12
Second, contrary to the People's assertion, the testimony by Joshua Wells, Planck
Aero Systems's chief executive officer, regarding the retail prices of the two drones (i.e.,
between $19,000 and $25,000 each) or their hardware values (between $2,000 and
$5,000) without their expensive installed software, did not show either that Jennings
knew the drones' true value or that he intended to trade one of the drones for an RC car or
truck worth more than $950. In fact, the value of the property Jennings intended to trade
for an RC car or truck (i.e., the drone) was essentially irrelevant to the issue of the value
of the property that he intended to trade it for (i.e., an RC car or truck).5 (Cf. People v.
Pak (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1120 ["[C]onsidering the value of stolen goods brought
into a pawn shop is not consistent with the plain language of the shoplifting statute. Such
property is neither 'taken' nor 'intended to be taken' from the victim pawn shop. It is
already in the defendant's possession. . . . Under the circumstances of this case, the only
property that possibly could be 'taken' or 'intended to be taken' was money from the pawn
shop. Once that money was taken, the relevant value for purposes of the shoplifting
statute became the amount [the defendant] took."].) Therefore, although there was
evidence showing the true value of each drone exceeded $950, that evidence did not
show that Jennings intended to trade the drone for an RC car or truck worth more than
$950. (Ibid.)
5 Likewise, contrary to the People's assertion, Jennings's statements to a police detective made five months after the alleged burglary that he knew the drones were "high end" and "custom-made" do not show that Jennings intended to trade one of the drones for property worth more than $950.
13
Likewise, contrary to the People's assertion, evidence of Jennings's subsequent
trade of the two drones for a car did not support a reasonable inference that when he
previously entered the hobby store he intended to trade one of the drones for an RC car or
truck worth more than $950. Neither the value of the two drones, as presumably shown
by their market equivalency in a trade for the car, nor the value of that car shows that
Jennings intended to trade one of the drones for an RC car or truck worth more than $950
when he entered the hobby store a couple of days earlier. (Cf. People v. Pak, supra, 3
Cal.App.5th at p. 1120.) In any event, there was no testimony showing the market value
of the car or how that value would be divided between the two drones or, in particular,
the value attributed to the drone Jennings sought to trade for an RC car or truck.
Furthermore, Jennings testified that before the trade for the car he did not know if the two
drones "were valuable enough. I didn't know what they were worth."
Therefore, we conclude there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that
when Jennings entered the hobby store he intended to trade the drone for property (i.e., an
RC car or truck) worth more than $950.6 (People v. Vines, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 869
[substantial evidence standard of review]; People v. Killebrew, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at
6 To the extent the People argue the prosecution had discretion whether to charge count 3 as a section 459 burglary or a section 459.5 shoplifting offense, that argument is irrelevant to the questions of whether the $950 value of the property Jennings allegedly intended to take is an element of the count 3 burglary charged in this case and whether there is substantial evidence to support a finding that that element was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In any event, because the prosecution clearly lacked any evidence to prove that value element, it should have exercised its discretion to charge count 3 as a section 459.5 shoplifting offense and not a section 459 burglary. (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 134 [regarding prosecution's charging discretion generally].)
14
p. 660 [same].) Because the prosecution did not prove that element of burglary and
thereby disprove that Jennings committed section 459.5 shoplifting in the circumstances
of this case, his count 3 burglary conviction must be reversed.
III
Jury Instruction Error
Jennings alternatively contends that if his count 3 burglary conviction is not
reversed for insufficiency of evidence to support it, the trial court prejudicially erred by
not instructing sua sponte on count 3 burglary that the prosecution had the burden to
prove he intended to take property worth more than $950 when he entered the hobby
store. Although we are not required to address this contention in light of our conclusion
above that there is insufficient evidence to support Jennings's count 3 burglary
conviction, we nevertheless elect to address this issue to provide trial courts with
guidance in future similar cases.
A
The trial court instructed the jury with the standard CALCRIM No. 1700
instruction on burglary, as follows:
"The defendant is charged in Counts 1 through 5 with burglary, and count 6 with attempted burglary, in violation of Penal Code section 459.
"To prove that the defendant is guilty of burglary, the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant entered a building, room within a building, or structure; [¶] AND [¶] 2. When he entered a building, room within a building, or structure, he intended to commit theft.
"To decide whether the defendant intended to commit theft, please refer to the separate instructions that I will give you on the crime.
15
"A burglary was committed if the defendant entered with the intent to commit theft. The defendant does not need to have actually committed theft as long as he entered with the intent to do so. The People do not have to prove that the defendant actually committed theft."
However, the court's instruction on count 3 burglary did not include the additional
language recommended when the evidence in a case supports "a defense theory" that the
crime was instead section 459.5 shoplifting. (Com. to CALCRIM No. 1700.) That
omitted language would have added one of the following elements, or proof
requirements, to the two general elements in the standard CALCRIM No. 1700
instruction:
"[AND] [¶] [3A. The value of the property taken or intended to be taken was more than $950](;/.)] [¶] [OR] [3B. The structure that the defendant entered was a noncommercial establishment(;/.)] [¶] [OR] [3C. The structure was a commercial establishment that the defendant entered during non-business hours.]" (CALCRIM No. 1700, italics added.)
In the circumstances of this case, the italicized language in paragraph 3A, quoted above,
would have been the appropriate language for the trial court to add to correctly instruct
the jury that the prosecution had the burden to prove the value of the property Jennings
intended to take when he entered the hobby store exceeded $950.
B
"The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the essential elements
of the charged offense. [Citation.] [Not instructing on the elements of a charged offense]
is, indeed, very serious constitutional error because it threatens the right to a jury trial that
both the United States and California Constitutions guarantee. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.;
16
Cal. Const., art. I, § 16.) All criminal defendants have the right to 'a jury determination
that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged,
beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824 (Merritt).)
Furthermore, "[i]t is settled that, even in the absence of a request, a trial court must
instruct on general principles of law that are commonly or closely and openly connected
to the facts before the court and that are necessary for the jury's understanding of the
case. [Citations.] The trial court is [also] charged with instructing upon every theory of
the case supported by substantial evidence, including defenses that are not inconsistent
with the defendant's theory of the case." (People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027, 1047
(Montoya).) Alternatively stated, "a trial court's duty to instruct, sua sponte, or on its own
initiative, on particular defenses is more limited [than its duty to instruct on lesser
included offenses], arising 'only if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a
defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is
not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case.' " (People v. Barton (1995) 12
Cal.4th 186, 195, italics added (Barton).)
C
Jennings asserts that because the prosecution had the burden to disprove that he
committed shoplifting to prove that he committed burglary in the circumstances of this
case, the trial court erred by not sua sponte instructing with a modified version of
CALCRIM No. 1700 that would have included paragraph 3A, quoted above, instructing
the jury that the prosecution had the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
17
value of the property he intended to take when he entered the commercial establishment
(i.e., the hobby store) was more than $950. We agree.
As quoted in part I above, E.P. concluded: "Evidence the defendant committed
shoplifting disproves the elements of the charged commercial burglary. Under these
circumstances, the court must instruct the jury the prosecution has the burden to disprove
the element(s) of shoplifting beyond a reasonable doubt to secure a burglary conviction."
(E.P., supra, 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 798.) Alternatively stated, to prove that a defendant
committed section 459 burglary based on a theory of intent to commit larceny, "the
prosecution [has] the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant]
did not commit shoplifting." (Id. at p. 799.)
Furthermore, as we stated in part II(B) above, because section 459.5 shoplifting
and section 459 burglary are separate and distinct offenses, when the prosecution has
charged a defendant with section 459 burglary in circumstances involving entry of a
commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny, the prosecution not only has the
burden to prove each of the elements of section 459 burglary, but it also has the burden to
disprove that the defendant committed section 459.5 shoplifting. (E.P., supra, 35
Cal.App.5th at p. 799.) In particular, in such cases, the prosecutor must prove either: (1)
the defendant did not enter the commercial establishment when it was open during
regular business hours; or (2) the value of the property taken or intended to be taken
exceeded $950. (§ 459.5, subd. (a); E.P., at p. 801.) Accordingly, section 459.5, in
effect, made the value of the property Jennings allegedly intended to take an element of
section 459 burglary in this case and therefore the prosecution was required to prove
18
beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended to take property worth more than $950 when
he entered the store.
Because we have concluded a finding that the value of the property Jennings
intended to take when he entered the hobby store exceeded $950 is an element of section
459 burglary in the circumstances of this case, the court was required to sua sponte
instruct on that element, along with the other elements of burglary. (Merritt, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 824.) In any event, assuming arguendo that the value of the property
Jennings intended to take is not an element of the charged burglary offense, the court was
nevertheless required to sua sponte instruct on that factual question as a "general
principle[] of law that [was] commonly or closely and openly connected to the facts
before the court and that [was] necessary for the jury's understanding of the case."
(Montoya, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1047.) Furthermore, to the extent the $950 value of the
property Jennings intended to take was merely a defense to the burglary charge, the court
nevertheless had a duty to sua sponte instruct on that shoplifting defense theory because it
was supported by substantial evidence and not inconsistent with Jennings's theory of the
case. (Ibid.; Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 195; cf. Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975) 421 U.S.
684, 704 ["Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation"]; People v. Banks (1976)
67 Cal.App.3d 379, 384 [because "prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
absence of justification, herein self-defense," court erred by giving contrary instruction].)
Because, as we concluded above, there is no substantial evidence to support a finding that
Jennings intended to trade the drone for an RC car or truck worth more than $950, there
19
necessarily is substantial evidence to support a shoplifting theory (i.e., that the property
he intended to take was worth $950 or less). Also, the shoplifting theory was not
inconsistent with any defense theory presented by Jennings at trial. Based on our review
of the record, we conclude the shoplifting theory was consistent with Jennings's defense.
Therefore, under any of the above instructional principles, the trial court had a duty to sua
sponte instruct that the prosecution had the duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
when Jennings entered the commercial establishment (i.e., the hobby store) he intended
to take property worth more than $950. Contrary to the People's assertion, because the
trial court had a sua sponte duty to give that instruction, Jennings was not required to
request that instruction and did not forfeit that instructional error by not requesting it.
(Cf. People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409 (Mil) ["[I]t is well settled that no objection
is required to preserve a claim for appellate review that the jury instructions omitted an
essential element of the charge."].)
D
We further conclude, as Jennings asserts, that the trial court's instructional error
was prejudicial and requires reversal of his count 3 burglary conviction. "Not instructing
on [the] elements of [an offense] is constitutional error." (Merritt, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p.
824.) "[T]he omission of one or more elements of a charged offense . . . is amenable to
review for harmless error under the state and federal Constitutions . . . ." (Mil, supra, 53
Cal.4th at p. 415.) "A trial court's failure to instruct the jury on all of the essential
elements of the charged offense is reviewed for harmless error according to the standard
set out in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705
20
(Chapman)." (People v. Atkins (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 963, 980-981 (Atkins).) Under the
Chapman standard, an error is prejudicial and requires reversal of the conviction unless it
appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained." (Chapman, at p. 24.) Accordingly, the error "will be deemed harmless
only in unusual circumstances, such as where each element was undisputed, the defense
was not prevented from contesting any [or all] of the omitted elements, and
overwhelming evidence supports the omitted element." (Merritt, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p.
828, italics added.) Alternatively stated, we must review the record to determine whether
it contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the
omitted element. (Mil, at p. 417.)
Based on our review of the record in this case, we cannot conclude the court's
instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S.
at p. 24.) As discussed above, there was no evidence presented on the value of the
property (i.e., an RC car or truck) that Jennings allegedly intended to take on his entry
into the hobby store. Therefore, there was no evidence, much less "overwhelming
evidence," to support a finding that he intended to take property worth more than $950
when he entered the store. (Merritt, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 828.) Likewise, because
neither the prosecution nor the court informed Jennings that the property's $950 value
was an element of the burglary alleged in count 3, he presumably was not, as a self-
represented defendant, aware of that element. Therefore, that element cannot be deemed
to have been "undisputed" by him, nor can we conclude he "was not prevented from
contesting [that] omitted element[]." (Ibid.) Furthermore, because there was no evidence
21
that the property Jennings allegedly intended to take on his entry into the store was worth
more than $950, the record would support a rational finding that the omitted element was
not shown beyond a reasonable doubt (i.e., a finding that the property was worth $950 or
less). (Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 417.) Accordingly, the court's error in omitting an
essential element on the burglary charged in count 3 was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt and therefore requires reversal of Jennings's conviction on count 3.
(Chapman, at p. 24; Atkins, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at pp. 980-981.)
Assuming arguendo that the court's instructional error did not involve the omission
of an element of the charged burglary offense and instead involved only a failure to sua
sponte instruct on a general principle of law commonly or closely and openly connected
to the facts before the court and necessary for the jury's understanding of the case
(Montoya, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1047) or a failure to sua sponte instruct on the
shoplifting defense theory (ibid.), we nevertheless conclude that error was prejudicial
under either the Chapman standard, discussed above, or under the more lenient state
standard for harmless error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. Under
the Watson standard, an error is deemed harmless if it is not reasonably probable the
defendant would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of the error. (Ibid.)
However, because our review of the record shows there is no evidence to support a
reasonable finding that the value of the property Jennings allegedly intended to take on
his entry into the hobby store was worth more than $950, the court's error in omitting that
general principle of law or defense theory from its instructions on count 3 burglary was
prejudicial under the Watson standard (i.e., it is reasonably probable he would have
22
obtained a more favorable verdict on count 3 had the court correctly instructed on that
count). (Watson, at p. 836.) Furthermore, because of the absence of evidence that the
property he allegedly intended to take (i.e., an RC car or truck) was worth more than
$950, we likewise conclude that instructional error was also prejudicial under the
Chapman standard. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) Accordingly, regardless of the
classification of the court's instructional error, that error was prejudicial under both the
Chapman and Watson standards and therefore Jennings's conviction on count 3 must be
reversed. (Chapman, at p. 24; Watson, at p. 836.)
IV
Senate Bill No. 136
In his supplemental letter brief, Jennings contends, and the People agree, that
Senate Bill No. 136, which was enacted on October 8, 2019, and becomes effective on
January 1, 2020, applies retroactively to his case pursuant to the Estrada rule. We agree.
A
Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5, subdivision (b) required trial courts to
impose a one-year sentence enhancement for each true finding on an allegation the
defendant had served a separate prior prison term and had not remained free of custody
for at least five years. (§ 667.5, subd. (b).) Courts nevertheless had discretion to strike
that enhancement pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a). (People v. Bradley (1998) 64
Cal.App.4th 386, 392-395.) Effective as of January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 amends
section 667.5, subdivision (b) to limit its prior prison term enhancement to only prior
prison terms for sexually violent offenses, as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code
23
section 6600, subdivision (b). (Sen. Bill No. 136, § 1; Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c);
Gov. Code, § 9600, subd. (a); People v. Camba (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 857, 865 [statute
enacted at regular session of Legislature generally becomes effective on January 1 of year
following its enactment].)
B
In Estrada, the California Supreme Court held that a statute that reduces the
punishment for an offense will generally apply retroactively to any case in which the
judgment is not yet final before the effective date of the statute. (Estrada, supra, 63
Cal.2d at pp. 742, 744-745.) Estrada stated: "When the Legislature amends a statute so
as to lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly determined that its former penalty
was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper as punishment for the commission
of the prohibited act. It is an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended
that the new statute imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should
apply to every case to which it constitutionally could apply. The amendatory act
imposing the lighter punishment can be applied constitutionally to acts committed before
its passage provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is not final." (Id. at
p. 745.) Estrada stated: "[W]here the amendatory statute mitigates punishment and there
is no saving clause, the rule is that the amendment will operate retroactively so that the
lighter punishment is imposed." (Estrada, at p. 748; see People v. Hajek and Vo (2014)
58 Cal.4th 1144, 1195.) "Estrada represents 'an important, contextually specific
qualification to the ordinary presumption that statutes operate prospectively: When the
Legislature has amended a statute to reduce the punishment for a particular criminal
24
offense, we will assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that the Legislature intended the
amended statute to apply to all defendants whose judgments are not yet final on the
statute's operative date.' " (People v. Hajek and Vo, at pp. 1195-1196.) The Estrada rule
also applies to statutory amendments reducing the penalty for, or allowing a court to
strike, an enhancement. (Cf. People v. Jones (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 267, 272-273;
People v. Valenzuela (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 82, 87-88; People v. Chavez (2018) 22
Cal.App.5th 663, 708-712.) For purposes of the Estrada rule, a judgment is not final so
long as courts may provide a remedy on direct review. (In re Pine (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d
593, 594.)
C
By eliminating section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements for all prior prison
terms except those for sexually violent offenses, the Legislature clearly expressed its
intent in Senate Bill No. 136 to reduce or mitigate the punishment for prior prison terms
for offenses other than sexually violent offenses. (Cf. Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp.
742, 744-745.) Therefore, we conclude, and the parties agree, that under the Estrada
rule, Senate Bill No. 136's amendment to section 667.5, subdivision (b) applies
retroactively to all cases not yet final as of its January 1, 2020, effective date. Because
Jennings's case will not be final as of that date, he is entitled to the ameliorative benefit of
Senate Bill No. 136's amendment to section 667.5, subdivision (b). Therefore, we
reverse the one-year section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancement, which
the court imposed and executed for a prior prison term for an offense other than a
sexually violent offense.
25
Because we reverse Jennings's count 3 conviction and his one-year section 667.5,
subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancement, we remand the matter for resentencing to
allow the court to exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.
(Cf. People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) We take no position on how the court
should exercise its discretion on remand.
DISPOSITION
The defendant's burglary conviction on count 3 and one-year section 667.5,
subdivision (b), prior prison term enhancement are reversed. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed. The matter is remanded for resentencing consistent with this
opinion.
HALLER, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
GUERRERO, J.
26
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that Proposition 47 requires the prosecution to prove that a defendant intended to take property exceeding $950 to secure a burglary conviction for entering a commercial establishment during business hours. Because the prosecution failed to provide evidence of such intent, the burglary conviction was reversed.
Issues
Whether the prosecution must prove the intended property value exceeded $950 to sustain a burglary conviction under Penal Code section 459 for a commercial entry.
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant's burglary conviction.
Whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the $950 property value requirement.
Whether Senate Bill No. 136 applies retroactively to the defendant's prior prison term enhancement.
Disposition. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Proposition 47 changed the definition of burglary to exclude from that offense an entry of a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny of property with a value of $950 or less while that establishment is open during regular business hours”
“we conclude there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that Jennings intended to take property with a value exceeding $950 when he entered the commercial establishment in count 3.”
“the trial court prejudicially erred by not instructing sua sponte on the $950 property value requirement for the count 3 burglary charge.”