Section 245(a)(1) punishes assaults committed "with a deadly weapon or
instrument other than a firearm." 2 Whether or not the victim is injured is immaterial
because the statute focuses on use of a deadly weapon or instrument. (People v. Aguilar
2 Section 254(a)(1) provides in full: "Any person who commits an assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years, or in a county jail for not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both the fine and imprisonment." 12
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028 (Aguilar); see People v. Rocha (1971) 3 Cal.3d 893, 899
[noting that assault with a deadly weapon is a general intent crime and the "intent to
cause any particular injury [citation], to severely injure another, or to injure in the sense
of inflicting bodily harm is not necessary" (fns. omitted)].) A " 'deadly weapon' " within
the meaning of section 245(a)(1) is " 'any object, instrument, or weapon which is used in
such a manner as to be capable of producing and likely to produce, death or great bodily
injury.' " (Aguilar, at pp. 1028–1029.)
"[F]or an object to qualify as a deadly weapon based on how it was used, the
defendant must have used the object in a manner not only capable of producing but also
likely to produce death or great bodily injury." (In re B.M. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 528, 530
(B.M.).) "Analysis of whether the defendant's manner of using the object was likely to
produce death or great bodily injury necessarily calls for an assessment of potential harm
in light of the evidence. . . . . [A] mere possibility of serious injury is not enough. But
the evidence may show that serious injury was likely, even if it did not come to pass."
(Id. at p. 535.)
Whether an object is a deadly weapon is a question of fact. (People v. Moran
(1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 724, 730.) "In determining whether an object not inherently
deadly or dangerous is used as such, the trier of fact may consider the nature of the
object, the manner in which it is used, and all other facts relevant to the issue." (Aguilar,
supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1029.)
Our analysis on this issue is guided by our high court's recent decision of B.M.,
supra, 6 Cal.5th 528. There, 17-year-old B.M. found herself locked out of her family's
13
home. B.M. entered the home through a window and angrily confronted her sister Sophia
about why the locks had been changed. At some point, B.M. grabbed a "butter knife" 3
from the kitchen and went to Sophia's bedroom. When she saw B.M. approach with the
butter knife, Sophia covered herself with a blanket. From a distance of about three feet
B.M. made several downward slicing motions with the butter knife near Sophia's legs.
Although the butter knife hit Sophia's legs a few times, it did not pierce the blanket and
she suffered no injury. (Id. at p. 531.)
The juvenile court found that B.M.'s use of the butter knife violated section
245(a)(1), which finding was affirmed on appeal. In reversing, our high court determined
there was insufficient evidence to sustain the finding that the butter knife was used as a
deadly weapon. (B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 530.) In so doing, the B.M. court
recognized that, for an "object to qualify as a deadly weapon based on how it was used,
the defendant must have used the object in a manner not only capable of producing but
also likely to produce death or great bodily injury. The extent of any damage done to the
object and the extent of any bodily injuries caused by the object are appropriate
considerations in the fact-specific inquiry required by section 245(a)(1). But speculation
without record support as to how the object could have been used or what injury might
have been inflicted if the object had been used differently is not appropriate." (B.M., at
p. 530.)
3 Both B.M. and Sophia described the knife, which was about six inches long with a three-inch blade, a dull tip, and a slightly serrated edge, as a "butter knife." (B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at pp. 530–531.) 14
B.M. thus teaches that the "object alleged to be a deadly weapon must be used in a
manner that is not only 'capable of producing' but also ' "likely to produce death or great
bodily injury" ' " (B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 533); that "likely" in this context "refers to
situations in which ' " 'the probability of serious injury is great' " ' " (ibid); that "[a]n
increase in likelihood from impossible to unlikely, for example, does not show that the
object was likely to cause serious harm" (id. at p. 534); and that the "use of an object in a
manner 'likely to produce' death or great bodily injury [citation] requires more than a
mere possibility that serious injury could have resulted from the way the object was used"
(ibid.).
B.M. also teaches that the "determination of whether an object is a deadly weapon
under section 245(a)(1) must rest on evidence of how the defendant actually 'used' the
object" rather than on conjecture as to how the object could have been used (B.M., supra,
6 Cal.5th at p. 534); and that, while a " 'conviction for assault with a deadly weapon does
not require proof of an injury or even physical contact' [citation]" (ibid), a "limited injury
or lack of injury may suggest that the nature of the object or the way it was used was not
capable of producing or likely to produce death or serious harm" (ibid.).
C. Analysis
We conclude a jury could reasonable conclude that defendant's willful act of
cutting the brake lines on Alex's vehicle was one that, by its nature, was not only
" 'capable of producing' but also 'likely to produce death or great bodily injury' " (see
B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 533), inasmuch as driving a vehicle without the ability to stop
it creates a situation in which " ' " 'the probability of serious injury is great.' " ' " (Ibid.)
15
That Alex discovered the severed brake lines before he drove the vehicle, and thus was
not injured by defendant's act, is of no consequence for purposes of the offense of assault
with a deadly weapon. (See also People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779, 787
(Williams) [noting "assault criminalizes conduct based on what might have happened —
and not what actually happened"]; People v. White (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 881, 884
[citing Williams in noting that an assault does not "require a specific intent to injure the
victims or a substantial certainty that an application of physical force will result"]; People
v. Craig (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 644 (Craig) [finding the defendant was properly
convicted under (former) section 245(a)(1) of assault with a deadly weapon or by means
of force likely to produce great bodily injury as a result of his cutting the brake lines of
the victim's car, even though the victim, like Alex here, never started or drove the car
because she realized its brakes were not working properly]; People v. Valdez (1985) 175
Cal.App.3d 103, 108 [finding that shooting a firearm at a victim who is protected by
bulletproof glass constitutes assault with a deadly weapon].)
Defendant nonetheless argues that a vehicle with severed brake lines is not a
deadly weapon because he neither drove the car at Alex or, "more importantly, [he] did
not use the car as a deadly weapon." We disagree. That defendant did not control or
possess Alex's vehicle does not mean the vehicle was not a dangerous weapon under
section 245(a)(1). The case of People v. Russell (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 776 (Russell)
informs our analysis on this issue.
In Russell, the court decided an issue of first impression when it ruled that a
defendant who willfully pushed another person into the path of an oncoming vehicle had
16
"used" that vehicle as a deadly weapon for purposes of (former) section 245(a)(1).
(Russell, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 778.) The defendant in Russell argued he did not
" 'use' the oncoming car as an instrument to cause great bodily injury to the victim
because he did not have any control or operational use of the car at the time of the
incident." (Id. at p. 782.)
In rejecting this argument, the Russell court declined to "distinguish between the
actions of one who, while driving or controlling a car, intentionally runs down a victim,
and one who opportunistically utilizes, for the purpose of injuring a victim, the force of a
moving car driven by an unwitting third party." (Russell, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p.
782.) The court analyzed the issue in part as follows:
"Several jurisdictions have addressed the issue of whether a defendant can be
charged for assault with a deadly weapon when the defendant did not possess or control
the instrumentality at the time of the assault. Often this situation arises when a defendant
intentionally strikes a part of the victim's body against a stationary object such as a wall
or building fixture, or when an assailant adds to his human strength by utilizing the force
of another object. We find these cases helpful because they involve an assailant
intentionally 'taking advantage' of an object's intrinsic qualities in a way likely to cause
the victim great bodily harm, but without taking possession or control of that object."
(Russell, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at pp. 782–783.)
After reviewing several cases in which a defendant had "used" an instrumentality
to commit offenses despite the fact such instrumentalities were not under the defendants'
direct control, the Russell court stated, "We agree with the above rulings, and fail to see a
17
relevant difference between one who wields a dangerous object and one who
intentionally utilizes the deadly properties of a stationary or moving object for purposes
of committing an assault under [former] section [245(a)(1)]." (Russell, supra, 129
Cal.App.4th at p. 785.) The court thus went on to find that pushing a victim into the path
of an oncoming motor vehicle represented the " 'use' of a deadly weapon" (ibid), noting
an "automobile weighing several thousand pounds and underway on a street is capable of
seriously injuring and often killing any person it strikes." (Ibid.)
Similarly, defendant in the instant case "used" Alex's own vehicle as a deadly
weapon when defendant purposely severed both of its brake lines. Like the Russell court,
we decline to distinguish between one who controls or drives a vehicle in such a manner
that the vehicle constitutes a deadly weapon for purposes of section 245(a)(1), and one
who "intentionally utilizes" a vehicle's potential deadly properties in a way likely to cause
the victim great bodily harm, despite not taking possession or control of the vehicle him-
or herself. (See Russell, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at pp. 782–785.) Clearly, a moving
vehicle weighing "several thousand pounds and underway on a street" (id., at p. 785),
which is unable to stop because of an intentional act caused by a defendant, constitutes a
"deadly weapon" within the meaning of sections 245(a)(1) and 1192.7(c)(23) that is "
' "likely to produce death or great bodily injury" ' " to the driver. (See B.M., supra, 6
Cal.5th at p. 533.)
18
II
Instructional Error
Defendant next contends his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon must be
reversed because CALCRIM No. 875 and/or CALCRIM No. 3145 included two
alternatives for establishing a deadly weapon. Specifically, he contends that it was
reversible error for the court in this case to include in these instructions that a "deadly
weapon other than a firearm" could be an object that is "inherently deadly," as opposed to
one that "is used in such a way that it is capable of causing [and] likely to cause death or
great bodily injury," because it provided jurors with two legal theories, one of which was
valid (the latter) and one of which was not (the former).
We review an assertion of instructional error de novo. (People v. Hernandez
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 559, 568.) Unlike our respected colleague, we conclude that a
vehicle with severed break lines, such as Alex's Cherokee in the instant case, is not an
inherently deadly weapon; thus, while the court's instructions were correct statements of
the law (see People v. Velasquez (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1176 (Velasquez)), the
inclusion of reference to an inherently deadly weapon was error. At issue is whether the
error is legal in nature or factual in nature and what prejudice standard applies.
An instruction contains a legal error if it includes an incorrect statement of law; a
factual error exists if an otherwise valid legal theory is not supported by the facts or
evidence in a case. (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1125.) An object may be
either inherently deadly or deadly as used. (Velasquez, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p.
1176.) Some objects, like dirks and blackjacks, have been found inherently deadly as a
19
matter of law. (Aguilar, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1029.) Other objects, like knives and box
cutters, have been found not inherently dangerous as a matter of law. (People v. Kersey
(1957) 154 Cal.App.2d 364, 366 [knives]; People v. McCoy (1944) 25 Cal.2d 177, 188
[box cutters] (McCoy).) Because a motor vehicle is an object "commonly used for a
nonviolent purpose" (see People v. King (2006) 38 Cal.4th 617, 624) that could qualify as
dangerous when the surrounding circumstances indicate the possessor "used" it in such a
manner that it was likely to cause death or great bodily injury (B.M., supra, 6 Cal.5th at
p. 533), it did not qualify as inherently deadly weapon. (See People v. Perez (2018) 4
Cal.5th 1055, 1065.) Thus, the inclusion of both alternatives was legal, not factual, error.
(See, e.g., People v. Stutelberg (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 314, 318 (Stutelberg); People v.
Although the portion of the jury instructions referencing inherently deadly objects
was erroneous, we conclude that error was not prejudicial under the circumstances of the
instant case. In so finding, we decline defendant's invitation to adopt the standard for
harmlessness employed in Aledamat, which requires reversal when "there is no basis in
the record for concluding that the jury relied on the alternative definition of 'deadly
4 Our high court granted review in Aledamat to address the standard for evaluating prejudice resulting from a legal error. While we agree with Aledamat that this type of error is legal in nature, as noted, we disagree on the appropriate standard for prejudice, and we cite Aledamat solely for its persuasive value. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(e)(1).) 20
weapon' (that is, the definition looking to how a noninherently dangerous weapon was
actually used)." (Aledamat, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1154, rev. granted.)
Our high court recently found that an error in instructions on the elements of a
crime is harmless "so long as the error does not vitiate all of the jury's findings" (People
v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 829, 831), meaning it would be harmless error if it were
"clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have rendered the same
verdict absent the error." (Ibid.) It also found that offering an instruction on an invalid
legal theory may be harmless when " 'other aspects of the verdict or the evidence leave no
reasonable doubt that the jury made findings necessary' " to convict the defendant under
the alternative, valid legal theory. (In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216, 1226, quoting
People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1205.) Thus, "we apply the Chapman [v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman)] standard to evaluate an instruction that
improperly defines an element of a charged offense." (Stutelberg, supra, 29 Cal.App.5th
at p. 319; Chapman, at p. 24.) Under that standard, an instructional error must result in
reversal unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to
the verdict. (Stutelberg, at p. 319.)
Turning to the instant case, we have carefully reviewed the record including the
closing arguments of counsel. It shows the prosecutor only presented the theory that
Alex's vehicle was a deadly weapon due to its manner of "use," namely defendant's
21
intentional act of severing the vehicle's brake lines. 5 Because we have concluded that a
motor vehicle that has had its brake lines severed qualifies as a "deadly weapon other
than a firearm"; and because neither the evidence nor the prosecutor's argument invited
the jury to reach a guilty verdict on the theory that the motor vehicle, in that condition,
was inherently dangerous, we conclude it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury
would have reached the same verdict absent the legal error. (See Chapman, supra, 386
U.S. at p. 24.) 6
III
Counsel's Alleged Concession of Guilt on Count 2
Finally, defendant contends his conviction on count 2 must be reversed because
his counsel's concession at the beginning of closing argument that defendant was guilty
of this vandalism charge was tantamount to a guilty plea on that count. In support of this
contention, defendant relies almost exclusively on People v. Lopez (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th
758 (Lopez I). Following briefing in the instant case, the court vacated Lopez I, after
granting the respondent's petition for rehearing and after receiving additional briefing on
the issue and found on "reexamination of this issue . . . defense counsel's statements
5 In stark contrast to the instant case, in Aledamat the prosecutor argued the weapon, a box cutter, was both inherently dangerous, contrary to case law (see McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.2d at p. 188), and deadly because it was used in a way capable of and likely to cause great bodily injury. (Aledamat, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 1152, rev. granted.)
6 In light of our decision, we deem it unnecessary to reach the People's alternate contention that defendant on appeal forfeited this claim of error by failing to request a pinpoint instruction on the "proper legal characterization of the vehicle or to define the phrase 'inherently deadly.' " 22
during argument were not tantamount to a guilty plea." (See People v. Lopez (2019) 31
Cal.App.5th 55, 58 (Lopez II).
As correctly noted by the Lopez II court (31 Cal.App.5th at p. 63), our high court
has rejected the nearly identical argument the defendant made in Lopez I and our
defendant makes in the instant case—that a partial concession of guilt was the equivalent
of a guilty plea. (See People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 39 (Cain), overruled on another
ground as stated in People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 17.)
Lopez II discussed the issue as follows: "In Cain, defense counsel told the jury
during argument that the defendant was guilty of burglary and multiple felony murder.
([Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th] at pp. 29–30.) On appeal, the defendant argued that these
statements were the equivalent of a guilty plea on those charges, and therefore that the
trial court was required to obtain a plea waiver. (Id. at p. 30.) The court rejected this
argument, holding that 'trial counsel's decision not to contest, and even expressly to
concede, guilt on one or more charges at the guilt phase of a capital trial is not
tantamount to a guilty plea.' (Ibid.) The Supreme Court has reiterated this holding in
numerous cases. [Citations.]" (Lopez II, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at pp. 63–64 7; compare
People v. Farwell (2018) 5 Cal.5th 295, 299 [noting a stipulation of the parties entered
into during the defendant's trial, in which the defendant admitted all the elements of a
misdemeanor charge for driving with a suspended license while still facing the more
7 Although noting these supreme court cases were capital cases, the Lopez II court found "no basis to limit the holding to capital cases, nor has appellant suggested any." (Lopez II, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 64, fn. 7.) 23
serious gross vehicular manslaughter charge, was invalid to establish guilt on the
misdemeanor because the court neither advised the defendant of the constitutional rights
implicated by the stipulation nor sought a "personal waiver" of such rights from the
defendant].)
Here, as was the case in Lopez II, there was no stipulation admitting the elements
of count 2 "as an evidentiary matter. Instead, the jury was instructed that the prosecution
had to prove guilt on all counts beyond a reasonable doubt and that statements by counsel
were not evidence. Thus, the prosecution was still required to present 'competent,
admissible evidence establishing the essential elements' of each charge. (Florida v.
Nixon (2004) 543 U.S. 175, 188.)." (Lopez II, supra, 31 Cal.App.5th at p. 64.) Thus,
defense counsel's alleged concession of guilt on count 2 did not change the prosecutor's
burden of proof, or otherwise "limit the scope of the jury's role" in the instant case. (See
ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
I CONCUR:
NARES, J.
24
Aaron, J., Concurring.
Marsh intentionally severed the brake lines of the intended victim's vehicle, with
the apparent intention that the victim drive the vehicle in that condition. Marsh contends
that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for assault with a deadly
weapon because there is no substantial evidence that he used the vehicle in a manner
likely to produce great bodily injury, and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury
on the meaning of the phrase "deadly weapon" by telling the jury that a "deadly weapon
other than a firearm" could be an object that is "inherently deadly" (as opposed to one
that "is used in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great
bodily injury"). The majority concludes that there is sufficient evidence to support
Marsh's conviction for assault with a deadly weapon because, as in People v. Russell
(2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 776, in which the defendant pushed another person into the path
of an oncoming vehicle, Marsh used the victim's vehicle as a deadly weapon. The
majority further concludes that because vehicles are not inherently deadly, the trial court
erred in instructing the jury that a "deadly weapon" could be an object that is "inherently
deadly," but deems this instructional error harmless.
I would conclude instead that an automobile that has had its brake lines severed
constitutes an inherently deadly weapon and, on that basis, I would reject Marsh's
contentions on appeal. 1
1 I specifically disagree with the majority's rejection of the standard of harmlessness set forth in People v. Aledamat (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1149, 1154, review granted July 5, 2018, S248105, which requires reversal when "there is no basis in the record for
I therefore concur in parts I and III of the majority opinion, and I concur in the
result in part II.
AARON, J.
concluding that the jury relied on the alternative definition of 'deadly weapon' (that is, the definition looking to how a noninherently dangerous weapon was actually used)." However, that standard would have no application in a situation in which, because of its condition, the vehicle was inherently dangerous. 2
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a defendant who intentionally severs a vehicle's brake lines commits assault with a deadly weapon, as the vehicle becomes an instrument capable of and likely to cause great bodily injury, regardless of whether the victim drives the car or is injured.
Issues
Whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon when the victim discovered the severed brake lines before driving the vehicle.
Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the definition of a 'deadly weapon.'
Whether defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by allegedly conceding guilt for vandalism during closing argument.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“That Alex discovered the severed brake lines before he drove the vehicle, and thus was not injured by defendant's act, is of no consequence for purposes of the offense of assault with a deadly weapon.”