Longview Internat., Inc. v. Stirling

Filed 5/31/19

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

LONGVIEW INTERNATIONAL, INC., H044905 (Santa Clara County Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 2012-1-CV-228043 )

v.

KYLE STIRLING et al.,

Defendants;

ANNE CATAMBAY,

Intervener and Appellant.

Anne Catambay appeals the denial of her motion to expunge a judgment lien on real property. She contends that because the judgment creditor is a corporation that was suspended at the time the lien was created, the lien is void. We conclude that recording an abstract of judgment is a procedural act that is retroactively validated once a suspended corporation’s powers are reinstated. The trial court therefore correctly denied the motion, and we will affirm the order. I. BACKGROUND Anne Catambay’s husband was sued in Santa Clara County for embezzlement. That lawsuit resulted in a judgment against him for over one million dollars. A corporation––Longview International, Inc.––is the judgment creditor. Longview International recorded an abstract of judgment in San Mateo County, creating a judgment lien on real property owned by Catambay’s husband in that county (a house in Redwood City). Two days later, Catambay’s husband conveyed the Redwood City house to her as part of a marital settlement agreement in their then-pending dissolution proceeding.

Catambay discovered that at the time Longview International recorded the abstract of judgment its corporate powers had been suspended. (The Delaware corporation had failed to provide an annual statement of information and pay a $25 fee to the state of Delaware.) She filed a motion in the Santa Clara County embezzlement case, asking to intervene in the action and seeking to expunge the judgment lien from the Redwood City property. Longview International opposed the motion. It argued that its corporate powers had been reinstated, which retroactively validated any actions it took while suspended, including recording the abstract of judgment. The trial court denied Catambay’s request to intervene and her request to expunge the lien. II. DISCUSSION Since the operative facts are not in dispute, whether the motion to expunge the judgment lien was properly denied is a legal question we review de novo. (Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799.) We first note that Catambay’s motion to expunge the judgment lien is not authorized by any statute and may not even be the appropriate vehicle to secure the relief she sought. (See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Charlton (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1070.) But even if we assume the trial court had authority to grant the motion, denial was proper because there is no basis for removing the lien. A judgment lien on real property is created by recording an abstract of a money judgment with the county recorder. (Code Civ. Proc., § 697.310, subd. (a).) Upon recording, the lien automatically attaches to all real property the judgment debtor owns within that county. (Id., § 697.340, subd. (a).) The effect of the lien is to secure the debt: it allows the judgment to be satisfied from the proceeds of a sale of the property. (Laubisch v. Roberdo (1954) 43 Cal.2d 702, 707.) The lien remains until the judgment creditor files an acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment or agrees to release the lien. (Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Charlton, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1070.) For a judgment lien to be valid, an abstract of judgment must be properly recorded and contain