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County of Riverside v. Estabrook (2019) · DecisionDepot
/ California Court of Appeal County of Riverside v. Estabrook Published Filed 1/8/19
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, Plaintiff and Appellant, E068516
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIK1503845)
MICHAEL LEE ESTABROOK, OPINION Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Eric V. Isaac,
Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Reversed.
Bruce Wagner, Chief Attorney, and Hirbod Rashidi for Plaintiff and Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent. 1
Plaintiff and appellant Riverside County Department of Child Support Services
(the County) filed a complaint against defendant and respondent Michael Lee Estabrook
(Father) seeking $288 per month in child support, as well as any healthcare expenses,
for J.L., Father’s alleged daughter, whose mother, J.L.1 (Mother), was receiving public
assistance. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11457, subd. (a).) Father requested a judgment of
1
non-paternity. (Fam. Code, § 7636.) The family court entered a judgment of non-
paternity and dismissed the County’s complaint with prejudice.
The County raises four issues on appeal. First, the County contends the family
More from California Court of Appeal Source: opinion data from the Free Law Project / CourtListener (public-domain court records). DecisionDepot is for informational use only and is not legal advice — verify against the official reporter before relying on any text or AI-generated summary.
court erred by not ordering genetic testing. (Fam. Code, § 7551.)1 Second, the County
asserts the family court’s decision to apply the marital presumption (§ 7540) is not
supported by substantial evidence. Third, the County contends the family court erred by
permitting Father to assert the marital presumption (§ 7540) because the presumption
may only be raised by the spouses who are in the marriage. Fourth, the County
contends the family court’s finding of non-paternity (§ 7636) is not supported by
substantial evidence. We reverse the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY The County filed a complaint against Father, seeking $288 per month in child
support, as well as any healthcare expenses for J.L., due to Mother receiving public
assistance. Father filed a verified answer. Father wrote, “This is a child born to
[Mother’s] current marriage. [D.L. (Husband)] signed a voluntary declaration of
paternity as well as the birth certificate. I do not believe I am the father. [Husband] is
presumed the father as the minor child was born to their marriage.” The County filed a
motion for judgment on the issues of parentage, child support, and healthcare expenses.
Father filed a motion to join Husband in the proceedings. Father contended the
court needed “to determine parentage prior to making any child support orders.”
1 All subsequent statutory references will be to the Family Code unless otherwise indicated.
Father’s attorney’s declaration was included with the motion for joinder. In the
declaration, Father’s attorney declared Husband was married to Mother during the
conception and birth of J.L.; Husband was present during J.L.’s birth; Husband is
named on J.L.’s birth certificate; Husband signed J.L.’s birth certificate; and Husband
and Mother were cohabitating at the time J.L. was conceived.
Father filed a request for a judgement of non-paternity. Father attached his own
declaration to the request. Father declared he was not J.L.’s father. Father asserted J.L.
was born “during marriage,” and that Husband held J.L. out as Husband’s child.
Further, Father declared, “Mother . . . unequivocally stated that her husband whom she
was married to and living with when the child was born is the father of the minor child.”
The County filed a request for genetic testing, as well as an opposition to
Father’s request for a judgment of non-paternity. The County argued that Father could
not use the marital presumption to shield himself from financially supporting J.L. The
County contended only Husband and Mother could assert the marital presumption—not
Father. The County contended genetic testing was mandated by section 7551, and that
it would be premature to enter a judgment of non-paternity prior to receiving the results
Father filed a reply. Father asserted that Husband was presumed to be J.L.’s
father because Husband was married to Mother. Father contended the marital
presumption had to be overcome before the court could order genetic testing. Father
contended it was not his burden “to overcome the conclusive presumption” that
Husband was J.L.’s father. Father contended genetic testing was not mandated by
section 7551 because parentage was not an issue in the case, due to Husband being
The trial court held a hearing in the matter. The County asserted (1) genetic
testing was mandatory upon the County’s request for such tests; (2) there was no
evidence supporting Father’s assertion that the marital presumption applied to Husband
and Mother; (3) only Husband and Mother could assert the marital presumption; and
(4) Mother’s public assistance application named Father as J.L.’s father. Father argued
that Mother had been served with Father’s request for a judgment of non-paternity, and
she had not opposed his request.
The family court said that, because “[M]other was married at the time of the
conception of this child, . . . the marriage presumption is already there,” and therefore
Father did not have to assert the presumption nor prove the presumption applied. The
County asserted (1) there was no evidence to support a finding that Husband and
Mother were married when J.L. was conceived; (2) Father could not assert the marriage
presumption as a defense in a child support case; and (3) under section 7551, genetic
testing was mandatory upon the County’s request.
Father asserted the only evidence in the case had been provided by Father, and it
reflected that J.L. was born during Mother and Husband’s marriage. Father asserted it
was now Mother’s burden to disprove the marital presumption, but Mother was not
participating in the case. Father contended the family court could not order genetic
testing due to the marital presumption causing Husband to be J.L.’s presumed father.
The family court said, “If the mother was married to [Husband] at the time of the
conception of the child, the presumption kicks in automatically. He doesn’t have to
raise it. The child is born during the marriage, the presumption kicks in automatically.
He’s not raising it.” The court explained that the County failed to provide evidence that
Father had an affair with Mother. The County asserted that Mother named Father on
her public assistance application, which caused the County to request genetic testing of
Father, and upon the County’s request genetic testing was mandatory.
The family court said, “I don’t agree with what you said, that the Court shall
order genetic testing in this case. I don’t agree with that.” The court did not provide its
interpretation of section 7551. The court concluded, “I would dismiss this with
prejudice and grant the judgment for non-paternity. That’s the order of the Court.”
DISCUSSION
A. MANDATORY TESTING The County contends the family court erred by not ordering genetic testing
because such testing is mandatory upon the County’s request.
“ ‘ “When interpreting statutes, we begin with the plain, commonsense meaning
of the language used by the Legislature. [Citation.] If the language is unambiguous, the
plain meaning controls.” ’ ” (Riverside County Sheriff’s Dept. v. Stiglitz (2014) 60
Section 7551 provides, in relevant part, “In a civil action or proceeding in which
paternity is a relevant fact, the court may upon its own initiative or upon suggestion
made by or on behalf of any person who is involved, and shall upon motion of any party
to the action or proceeding made at a time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly,
order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to genetic tests.”
The first portion of the statute provides, “In a civil action or proceeding in which
paternity is a relevant fact.” We understand this plain language as reflecting that an
element of ordering genetic tests is that paternity is a relevant fact in the case. The
second portion of the statute provides, “the court may upon its own initiative or upon
suggestion made by or on behalf of any person who is involved . . . order the mother,
child, and alleged father to submit to genetic tests.” We understand this second portion
of the statute as giving the family court discretion to order a mother, child, and alleged
father to submit to genetic tests either on the court’s own motion or when requested by
“any person who is involved.”
The third portion of section 7551 provides, “and shall upon motion of any party
to the action or proceeding made at a time so as not to delay the proceedings unduly,
order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to genetic tests.” The third portion
of the statute requires the family court to order genetic testing of a child, mother, and
alleged father, when presented with a timely motion by a party.
In sum, the first and third portions of section 7551 come together to make an
order for genetic testing mandatory when the following elements are met: (1) there is a
civil proceeding; (2) wherein paternity is a relevant fact; (3) a timely motion for genetic
testing has been filed; (4) by a party; and (5) the testing would be for the child, mother,
It is the second element that is at issue in this case. Accordingly, we examine
whether paternity was a relevant fact in this child support case. We determine the issues
in the case by looking at the pleadings and the relevant law. (Joseph E. Di Loreto, Inc.
v. O’Neill (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 149, 156; see also Rocks v. Hamburger (1948) 89
The County filed a complaint seeking child support from Father for J.L. In 1975,
the United States Congress enacted Title IV-D of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.,
§§ 651-660), which required the states to establish a comprehensive program for both
child support enforcement and determination of paternity. (In re Marriage of Shore
(1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 290, 295.) Federal law requires that, under that program, parent
recipients of public assistance assign to the state, as a condition of receiving benefits,
any rights to support that they or their children may have. (City and County of San
Francisco v. Thompson (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 652, 656.)
In compliance with federal law, California enacted Welfare and Institutions Code
section 11477, which requires applicants for public assistance to “assign to the county
any rights to support from any other person the applicant or recipient may have on his or
her own behalf, or on behalf of any other family member for whom the applicant or
recipient is applying for or receiving aid.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11477, subd.
(a)(1)(B).) The statute provides that receipt of public assistance operates as an
assignment by operation of law. (Ibid.)
Another provision enacted to ensure compliance with federal law is Welfare and
Institutions Code section 11457, which provides, in relevant part, “Money from
noncustodial parents for child or spousal support with respect to whom an assignment
under Section 11477 has been made shall be paid directly to the local child support
agency and shall not be paid directly to the family.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11457,
In sum, the County is seeking to collect child support from Father. In order to
collect child support from Father, the County needs to prove that Father is a
noncustodial parent. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11457, subd. (a).) In the County’s
complaint, it marked the box indicating that Father’s parentage of J.L. needed to be
established. Father’s answer to the County’s complaint reads, “I request a genetic test
to determine parentage be done for all children for whom I have checked a ‘No’ box
above.” Father marked the “No” box next to J.L.’s name. In addition to Father’s
request for genetic testing, the County filed a request for genetic testing, in which it
“request[ed] that genetic testing be ordered so that paternity can be established.” Thus,
the pleadings reflect that (1) the County wanted Father’s parentage of J.L. to be
established, and requested genetic testing; and (2) Father requested genetic testing
regarding his parentage of J.L.
In sum, (A) this is a civil proceeding; (B) paternity is a relevant fact in the case,
as established by the law and pleadings; (C) the County and Father are parties; (D) the
County requested parentage be established, and Father requested genetic testing be
conducted; and (E) the testing would be for Father and J.L. Accordingly, the elements
of section 7551 have been met. The family court erred by not ordering genetic testing.
B. MARRIAGE PRESUMPTION The County contends (1) the family court’s finding that the marital presumption
applies in this case is not supported by substantial evidence, and (2) the family court
erred by permitting a non-spouse to assert the marital presumption.
“ ‘ “ ‘When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is
challenged on appeal, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial
evidence, that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value to support
the conclusion of the trier of fact. [Citation.] In making this determination, all conflicts
[in the evidence and in reasonable inferences from the evidence] are to be resolved in
favor of the prevailing party, and issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier
of fact. [Citation.]’ ” [Citation.] While substantial evidence may consist of inferences,
such inferences must rest on the evidence; inferences that are the result of speculation or
conjecture cannot support a finding.’ ” (In re Anthony G. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1060,
Section 7540 provides, “Except as provided in Section 7541, the child of a wife
cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to
be a child of the marriage.” “Under sections 7540 and 7541, a husband who was
cohabitating with his wife at the time of conception is presumed to be the father of his
wife’s child. The statute itself provides two means of rebutting the presumption: a
husband may dispute paternity by requesting blood tests within two years of the child’s
birth (§ 7541, subd. (b)) and, at any time, by proving he was impotent or sterile at the
time of conception. (§ 7540.)” (In re Marriage of Freeman (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th
1437, 1444.) In sum, the marital presumption applies when the mother is married and
cohabitating with her husband at the time of conception, unless it has been shown that
an exception applies. (Brian C. v. Ginger K. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1203-1205.)
Father provided his declaration, in which he wrote, “The child was born during
marriage under Family Code § 7540 whereby there is a conclusive presumption that the
child of a wife who is cohabitating with her husband, (who is not impotent or sterile) is
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage. In this case, the mother of the
child’s husband is holding out that the child as his own under Family Code §§ 7541 and
7611.” (Boldface omitted.)
The first sentence in the foregoing quote is not informative. “The child was born
during marriage” does not indicate to whom Mother was married when J.L. was born.
The second sentence in the foregoing quote is not informative because it too fails to
identify Mother’s husband. Further, it reflects the legal conclusion that Mother’s
husband held the child out as his own (§ 7611, subd. (d) [“holds out the child as his or
her natural child”]). (See In re Marriage of Heggie (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 28, 30, fn. 3
[“We recognize that it is very common for family law practitioners to include argument
in their declarations . . . but it is a sloppy practice which should stop”].)
Father’s declaration does not provide the necessary facts from which one could
conclude the marriage presumption applies, e.g., Mother and Husband were married in
2000, J.L. was born in 2005, Mother and Husband have not divorced; Mother and
Husband are both living; and Mother and Husband have resided together in the same
house from 2000 to the present day without interruption. (§ 7540.)
The final sentence in Father’s declaration reads, “Mother has since,
unequivocally stated that her husband whom she was married to and living with when
the child was born is the father of the minor child.” Father’s declaration is problematic
because Father does not identify to whom Mother made the foregoing statement. As a
result, one cannot know how Father came to have personal knowledge of Mother’s
statement. (Evid. Code, § 702 [“the testimony of a witness concerning a particular
matter is inadmissible unless he has personal knowledge of the matter”]; Evid. Code
§ 403, subd. (a)(2) [“The proponent of the proffered evidence has the burden of
producing evidence as to the existence of the preliminary fact, and the proffered
evidence is inadmissible unless the court finds that there is evidence sufficient to sustain
a finding of the existence of the preliminary fact, when: [¶] . . . [¶] The preliminary
fact is the personal knowledge of a witness concerning the subject matter of his
Father also filed the declaration of Father’s attorney in support of his motion for
joinder. The attorney’s declaration reads, “[Husband] was married to the other parent
during the conception and birth of the minor child. Additionally, [Husband] was
present during the birth, named on the birth certificate as the father, and signed the birth
certificate acknowledging he is the father (See exhibit ‘1’ attached hereto). Pursuant to
Family Code section 7540, the Husband is presumed the father as the parties were
married and cohabitating at the time of conception.” (All caps. omitted.)
Father’s attorney did not explain how he gained personal knowledge of the
foregoing facts. (Evid. Code, §§ 403, subd. (a)(2), 702; see also City of Santa Cruz v.
Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 87 [“an affidavit is normally presumed to state
matters personally known to the affiant and lacks evidentiary value, in a variety of civil
contexts, when based on information and belief, or hearsay”].) The birth certificate
attached to the declaration reads “void copy void copy” throughout the background of
the document. Husband is named as J.L.’s father on the birth certificate; however, he
does not appear to have signed the document. There is nothing authenticating the birth
certificate. (Evid. Code, §§ 1400, 1401, subd. (a).)
Father filed a verified answer to the County’s complaint. In the answer, Father
wrote, “This is a child born to [Mother’s] current marriage. [Husband] signed a
voluntary declaration of paternity as well as the birth certificate. I do not believe I am
the father. [Husband] is presumed the father as the minor child was born to their
Father did not explain how he has personal knowledge of the foregoing facts.
(Evid. Code, §§ 403, subd. (a)(2), 702; see also City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court,
supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 87 [“an affidavit is normally presumed to state matters personally
known to the affiant and lacks evidentiary value, in a variety of civil contexts, when
based on information and belief, or hearsay”].) Copies of an authenticated marriage
certificate, an authenticated birth certificate, and an authenticated declaration of
paternity are not attached to the answer. (Evid. Code, §§ 1400, 1401, subd. (a).)
During the hearing in the family court, the County argued, “[I]f the [H]usband
and [Mother] are still indeed together, which is something that they’re alleging. All that
stuff is just an allegation and hearsay. We don’t have any of those facts in evidence.
We have no facts on their side in evidence.”
As the hearing continued, Father’s attorney asserted that a deputy county counsel
who previously handled the instant case, Mr. Lorenzi, said that Mother told Mr.
Lorenzi, “ ‘He’s not the father.’ ” The County responded to Father’s attorney, saying,
“That’s all hearsay and double hearsay.” Father’s attorney conceded, “And, yes, it’s
hearsay and, yes, it’s probably even a second level of hearsay.”
There is no evidence of solid value reflecting Mother was married to Husband.
In the evidence provided, Father and Father’s attorney failed to explain how they were
personally aware that Mother was married to Husband. Additionally, there is no
evidence of solid value reflecting Mother and Husband were cohabitating at the time
J.L. was conceived. In the evidence provided, Father and Father’s attorney failed to
explain how they were personally aware of Mother’s and Husband’s past living
arrangements. In sum, there is not substantial evidence that Mother and Husband were
married or that Mother and Husband were cohabitating at the time J.L. was conceived.
Accordingly, we conclude substantial evidence does not support the family court’s
application of the marital presumption. (§ 7540.)
The next issue is whether a non-spouse may assert the marital presumption
(§ 7540) as an affirmative defense in a child support case, or in support of a request for
a judgment of non-paternity (§ 7636). We have concluded ante, that the family court’s
application of the marital presumption is not supported by substantial evidence. Our
conclusion ante means we can provide no further relief concerning the marital
presumption issue. As a result, the issue concerning Father’s standing to raise the
marital presumption is moot. (In re David B. (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 633, 644 [issue is
moot when no effective relief can be granted].)
D. JUDGMENT OF NON-PATERNITY The County contends the family court’s judgment, reflecting Father is not J.L.’s
parent (§ 7636), is not supported by substantial evidence.
Our Supreme Court has explained, “A declaration of presumed fatherhood
entitles the presumed father to [greater rights than a natural father], but does not itself
terminate the biological father’s parental relationship with the child.” (In re Jesusa V.
(2014) 32 Cal.4th 588, 610.) In other words, the presence of a presumed father does not
render a biological/natural father a legal stranger to the child. (Ibid. [“Paul’s presumed
fatherhood has [not] rendered Heriberto a legal stranger to the child”].)
Father’s request for a judgment of non-paternity was based upon Father’s theory
that Husband is J.L.’s presumed father, and therefore Father cannot be J.L.’s father. As
set forth ante, the family court’s decision to apply the marital presumption (§ 7540) is
not supported by substantial evidence. As a result, the theory supporting the judgment
of non-paternity is not supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, if Husband is
J.L.’s presumed father, that relationship would not automatically render Father a legal
stranger to J.L., if Father is J.L.’s biological father. (In re Jesusa V., supra, 32 Cal.4th
at p. 610.) Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment.
E. CONCLUSION In sum, the family court erred by not ordering genetic testing (§ 7551); the
family court’s decision to apply the marital presumption is not supported by substantial
evidence (§ 7540); and the family court’s judgment of non-paternity is not supported by
substantial evidence (§ 7636).
DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed. Appellant is awarded its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
MILLER J.
RAMIREZ P. J.
SLOUGH J. AI-generated · verify before citing Holding. The court held that the family court erred by failing to order mandatory genetic testing under Family Code section 7551 and by entering a judgment of non-paternity based on the marital presumption without substantial evidence.
Issues
Whether the family court erred by failing to order genetic testing under Family Code section 7551. Whether substantial evidence supported the application of the marital presumption under Family Code section 7540. Whether the family court's judgment of non-paternity under Family Code section 7636 was supported by substantial evidence. Disposition. reversed
“The third portion of the statute requires the family court to order genetic testing of a child, mother, and alleged father, when presented with a timely motion by a party.” “In sum, there is not substantial evidence that Mother and Husband were married or that Mother and Husband were cohabitating at the time J.L. was conceived.”