trial on Nissan's request to move with the child to Israel, and tentatively granted the
request on August 10, 2018. Upon Lief's motion for reconsideration, the family court
reopened the hearing to consider additional evidence and argument. The court ultimately
entered a judgment granting Nissan's move-away request on November 7, 2018.
After receiving notice from Nissan that she intended to depart for Israel with the
child on November 22, 2018, Lief filed an ex parte application with the family court for
an order preventing the move-away until after December 7, when the 30-day stay of the
judgment granting the move-away request would expire. (Code Civ. Proc., § 917.7.) The
court ruled its August 10, 2018 order tentatively granting Nissan's move-away request
started the stay period running, denied Lief's application on November 21, and ordered
Lief to turn over the child to Nissan that evening.
Lief petitioned us for a writ of mandate and requested an immediate stay of the ex
parte order purporting to allow Nissan to move to Israel with the child on November 22,
2018. Lief argued Nissan could not then take the child to Israel because the stay of the
judgment provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7 would not expire until
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December 7. We stayed the family court's order, advised the parties we were considering
issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance, and invited Nissan to file a response to the
petition. (See Palma v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 180.) In
her response, Nissan conceded Lief is entitled to relief and agreed not to leave the state
until after December 7.
DISCUSSION
The family court erred when it ruled the 30-day statutory stay commenced with its
decision of August 10, 2018, tentatively granting Nissan's move-away request. A
judgment or order of the family court allowing removal of a minor child from this state is
stayed "for a period of 30 calendar days from the entry of judgment or order." (Code
Civ. Proc., § 917.7, italics added.) The court's oral statement of its decision at the end of
the August 10 hearing was not a judgment or order. The statement contained several
conditions, including the drafting of a visitation plan by Lief's attorney, which had to be
met before Nissan could move away with the child. Furthermore, in the family court's
written statement of decision, filed after the court reopened the custody and visitation
trial to consider additional evidence and argument, the court acknowledged it "had not
entered judgment and its decision remained tentative pending the final statement of
decision." A "tentative decision does not constitute a judgment and is not binding on the
court." (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1590(b).) Thus, the August 10 tentative decision did
not commence the 30-day statutory stay period. Rather, the period began to run when the
family court filed the judgment granting Nissan's move-away request on November 7.
(Id., rule 8.104(c)(1) [entry date of judgment is date of filing].)
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To correct the family court's error in ruling the stay began to run on August 10,
2018, issuance of a peremptory writ in the first instance is appropriate. The material facts
are not in dispute, the applicable law is settled, Nissan concedes Lief is entitled to relief,
the need for final resolution of the child's custody is urgent, and no useful purpose would
be served by plenary consideration of the issue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1088; Lewis v.
Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1240-1241; Jane J. v. Superior Court (2015) 237
Cal.App.4th 894, 909-910.)
DISPOSITION
Let a writ issue commanding respondent, immediately upon receipt of the writ, to
vacate its November 21, 2018 order denying petitioner's ex parte application for an order
preventing real party in interest from removing the child from this state, and to enter a
new order granting the application. The stay previously issued by this court is dissolved.
This opinion shall be final as to this court upon filing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules
8.490(b)(2)(A).) Petitioner is entitled to costs. (Id., rule 8.493(a)(1)(B).)
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
AARON, Acting P. J.
DATO, J.
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Filed 1/2/19
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
YARON LIEF, D074947
Petitioner, (San Diego County Super. Ct. No. 17FL003120C) v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION FOR DIEGO COUNTY, PUBLICATION
Respondent;
PNINA NISSAN,
Real Party in Interest.
THE COURT:
The opinion in this case filed December 6, 2018, was not certified for publication. It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), the request pursuant to rule 8.1120(a) for publication is GRANTED.
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and ORDERED that the words "Not to Be Published in the Official Reports" appearing on page one of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be published in the Official Reports.
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AARON, Acting P. J.
Copies to: All parties
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the 30-day statutory stay of a judgment allowing the removal of a minor child from California, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7, commences upon the entry of the final judgment, not upon a tentative decision.
Issues
Does a tentative decision regarding a child's removal from the state trigger the 30-day statutory stay under Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7?
When does the 30-day statutory stay period for a move-away order begin to run?
Disposition. Petition granted.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“the August 10 tentative decision did not commence the 30-day statutory stay period. Rather, the period began to run when the family court filed the judgment granting Nissan's move-away request on November 7.”