spotlighted defendant with his police car, "all but ran directly at him," and "ask[ed]
defendant about his legal status as he did so"]; People v. Jones (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d
519, 523 [pedestrian seized when police car drove toward him, parked 10 feet away and
13
diagonally against traffic, and police officer said, "Stop. Would you please stop."];
People v. Wilkins (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 804, 809 [occupants of station wagon seized
when police officer stopped his car behind the station wagon, preventing them from
exiting the vehicle].) None of these authorities involved completed, nonconfrontational
traffic stops where the defendant had been told he was free to go.
In sum, Arebalos has not shown he was detained at the time Adelmann asked for
his consent to search the tractor-trailer. We therefore need not decide whether any such
detention would be illegal, e.g., as an unconstitutional extension of the traffic stop. (See
Rodriguez v. United States (2015) __ U.S. __ [135 S.Ct. 1609, 1615-1616].) Arebalos
has not presented any other argument why his consent to the search of his tractor-trailer
was invalid. He has not shown the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress.
II
Second Motion to Suppress
A. Additional Background
Arebalos next contends the trial court erred by denying his second motion to
suppress following his first trial and hung jury. At the time, Arebalos's case had been
joined with a codefendant, Michael Farias.2 At Farias's preliminary hearing, Adelmann
testified about the circumstances of the traffic stop involving Arebalos. He said
Arebalos's tractor-trailer had been pointed out to him by members of the regional
2 Farias later pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 182, 211) and conspiracy to transport methamphetamines (id., § 182; Health & Saf. Code, § 11379). He was not part of Arebalos's trial or retrial. 14
narcotics suppression program. A member of the suppression program confirmed at the
same hearing that they surveilled Arebalos's tractor-trailer.
In the second motion, Arebalos argued that Adelmann's testimony at Farias's
preliminary hearing contradicted his testimony at the prior suppression hearing.
Arebalos's counsel stated, "[T]his is new evidence, this is different evidence, this is
different testimony, and it goes to the very heart of the credibility of Officer Adelmann,
and that if in fact it turns out that the true reason for the stop was that that stop was going
to happen regardless of whether there was a violation of law, that that's all information
that the Court should be able to take into consideration." He claimed the only reason they
were aware of the connection to the regional narcotics suppression program was because
of Farias's preliminary hearing. In response, the prosecutor represented that he had
provided Arebalos's prior counsel with discovery regarding the suppression program's
surveillance before the initial suppression hearing. Arebalos's counsel did not dispute
that the discovery had been provided to prior counsel.
The court denied Arebalos's second motion. It explained, "The evidence that's
been provided, based on review of the transcript, the Court doesn't find it's really newly-
discovered evidence or raises issues of the officer's credibility since the officer was
merely answering questions as directed to him by counsel, and whatever reason there was
for the objections at this time, there isn't really sufficient information to state that it was
the officer who was for some reason being less credible by not disclosing this
information. [¶] So the Court is going to rule as follows: That as to [Arebalos], there
was a previous 1538.5 motion where the court heard the motion on the merits, that the
15
counsel was aware of the information regarding the surveillance of the defendant prior to
that motion, did not raise that as an alternative theory, but simply brought in an issue
about the illegal detention and search."
B. Analysis
"As a general rule, a defendant is allowed only one pretrial suppression motion
under section 1538.5 in the superior court, and that court is without jurisdiction to hear a
second motion." (People v. Nelson (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 978, 981; accord, Madril v.
Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 73, 77-78.) "Thus, a defendant is required to raise all
available grounds in support of his motion at the initial pretrial hearing in the superior
court. As observed by the California Supreme Court in the context of raising new
grounds on appeal, 'To allow a reopening of the question on the basis of new legal
theories to support or contest the admissibility of the evidence would defeat the purpose
of Penal Code section 1538.5 and discourage parties from presenting all arguments
relative to the question when the issue of admissibility of evidence is initially raised.'
[Citation.] That observation is equally valid in the context of pretrial proceedings, where
allowing a defendant to raise each of the grounds for suppression at a separate hearing
would result in inefficient use of court time, potentially duplicative presentation of
evidence, and the possibility of a delayed trial." (Nelson, at pp. 981-982.)
As Arebalos notes, however, certain authorities have found an exception to this
general rule where a defendant has not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his
motion to suppress. (See People v. Brooks (1980) 26 Cal.3d 471; People v. Smith (2002)
95 Cal.App.4th 283.) In Brooks, the trial court initially granted a defendant's motion to
16
suppress based on one ground and did not consider an alternate ground. (Brooks, at
p. 474.) When that ruling was later reversed, the trial court considered the alternate
ground in a renewed suppression hearing and granted the motion again. (Id. at
pp. 474-475.) The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly considered the
alternate ground on remand: "[D]efendant was deprived of an opportunity for a full
hearing on the merits of his entire motion to suppress as initially made. Consequently the
renewed hearing amounted to neither consideration of a second section 1538.5 motion
nor a relitigation of his original motion, but rather a completion of the full hearing to
which he was entitled." (Id. at p. 481.) In Smith, the trial court limited the issues in a
motion to suppress based on a local procedural rule. (Smith, at p. 290.) When the
defendant attempted to supplement his motion to raise the excluded issues, the trial court
denied defendant's request for lack of jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 292-293.) On appeal, this
court held that the trial court erred by limiting the issues in the first motion to suppress.
(Id. at pp. 302-303.) This court also held that the trial court erred by refusing the
defendant's effort to supplement his motion: "Like the defendant in Brooks, Smith 'was
deprived of an opportunity for a full hearing on the merits of his entire motion to
suppress.' [Citation.] . . . Because Smith was entitled to fully litigate the adequacy of
the prosecution's inventory search justification, the trial court erred by denying Smith's
supplemental section 1538.5 motion that specifically set forth this infringement of his
right to a full hearing." (Smith, at p. 305.)
In contrast to Brooks and Smith, the trial court here did not deprive Arebalos of the
opportunity for a full hearing on the merits of his entire motion to suppress. The court
17
did not limit Arebalos to a certain legal ground to the exclusion of others. Indeed, aside
from the merits of the court's ruling (see pt. I, ante), Arebalos does not claim the trial
court erred in its conduct of the first suppression hearing. The court therefore had
nothing to correct or complete at a second, supplemental suppression hearing.
Arebalos argues that he was entitled to a second suppression hearing based on new
evidence of the regional narcotics suppression program's surveillance of Arebalos's
tractor-trailer. He cites People v. Superior Court (Edmonds) (1971) 4 Cal.3d 605, 611,
for the proposition that a defendant may make a new suppression motion "based upon
grounds either unavailable or unknown to defendant at the time his prior motion was
denied." Such grounds might include "an intervening change in the applicable law or the
discovery of new evidence in support of suppression." (Ibid.) But, as the Attorney
General points out, Edmonds specifically contemplated a new suppression motion at
trial, and the statute is correspondingly limited. (§ 1538.5, subd. (h); see People v. Young
(1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 49, 51-52.) It does not allow serial pretrial motions based on new
law or evidence. (See People v. Williams (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 40, 59-60.)
In any event, even considering the substance of Arebalos's argument, he has not
shown error. Whether Arebalos's proffered evidence was new appears to be a factual
issue that we review for substantial evidence. (See Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 979;
People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 844-845.) Here, the trial court explicitly found
that Arebalos's proffered evidence was not new. There was no "newly-discovered
evidence" bearing on Adelmann's credibility, and "[defense] counsel was aware of the
18
information regarding the surveillance of the defendant prior to [the first] motion." The
evidence supports the trial court's findings.
As to Adelmann's credibility, we conclude the court could reasonably find that
Adelmann's testimony at Farias's preliminary hearing did not contradict his prior
testimony at the suppression hearing and no credibility issue was raised. Adelmann's
testimony at the suppression hearing regarding his first contact with Arebalos's tractor-
trailer properly responded to the framing of the prosecutor's foundational questions. He
was not called upon to testify regarding the circumstances that led to that contact or his
communications with the surveillance team.
As to the surveillance evidence, we conclude the court could likewise reasonably
find that Arebalos's counsel was aware of at least the essential facts regarding the
surveillance of Arebalos's tractor-trailer prior to the first suppression hearing. It appears
undisputed that Arebalos was provided discovery before the first suppression hearing
describing that surveillance. Indeed, Arebalos's counsel showed his knowledge by asking
Adelmann a leading question about the reason for his focus on Arebalos's tractor-trailer
("Had you been notified prior to the stopping of this vehicle that this vehicle was carrying
contraband?"). When the court asked Arebalos's counsel to explain the relevance of the
question, he abandoned the inquiry.
Arebalos asserts he was unaware at the first hearing of "extensive evidence
regarding the regional narcotics task force surveillance" of him. But, beyond speculation,
Arebalos does not explain—and nothing in the record shows—what this evidence was,
what was allegedly new about it, and how it was material to the suppression motion.
19
Without such details, Arebalos's claim fails. Arebalos focuses on Adelmann's motivation
for stopping Arebalos's tractor-trailer, but the trial court could reasonably find that
Arebalos's counsel knew prior to the first suppression hearing that Adelmann's motivation
was to investigate Arebalos for drug trafficking. Arebalos's counsel therefore knew
enough to articulate the potential relevance of his leading question, which Arebalos
asserts was to explain the reasons for the stop, and pursue it and similar topics at the first
suppression hearing.3 He therefore had the opportunity to present these arguments at the
time of that hearing; he simply did not do so.
In sum, Arebalos had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the grounds of his
motion at the first suppression hearing, and he has not substantiated his claim that he
discovered new evidence after that hearing that was material to the issues in the motion.
He therefore has not shown the court erred by denying his second suppression motion.
3 Even if such testimony had been pursued, we note that a police officer's subjective motivation for initiating a traffic stop is irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment where the stop is supported by probable cause. (Whren, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 813.) Similarly, "[t]he officer's uncommunicated state of mind and the individual citizen's subjective belief are irrelevant in assessing whether a seizure triggering Fourth Amendment scrutiny has occurred." (Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821.) 20
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GUERRERO, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
DATO, J.
21
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the defendant was not detained at the time he consented to the search of his tractor-trailer because the officer had returned his documents and informed him he was free to leave, rendering the encounter consensual. Furthermore, the court held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear a second motion to suppress because the defendant had already received a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue.
Issues
Whether the defendant was illegally detained at the time he consented to a search of his vehicle.
Whether the trial court erred in denying a second motion to suppress evidence on jurisdictional grounds.
Disposition. affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude Arebalos was not detained at the time of his consent.”
“As a general rule, a defendant is allowed only one pretrial suppression motion under section 1538.5 in the superior court, and that court is without jurisdiction to hear a second motion.”