and 65860. Kennedy also cited Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. Relying on
Government Code section 65454, it alleged that a specific plan, which here was the
amended BECSP, could not be adopted unless it was consistent with the general plan.
The housing element in the general plan complied with the RHNA; the amended BECSP
was not consistent and reduced the number of low income housing units. Kennedy
alleged Kennedy had standing because it was “directly and beneficially” interested in
City’s compliance with all applicable provisions of law. There was no other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy.
The second cause of action relied upon sections 65581, 65583, 65587 and 65588.
Kennedy sought a writ of mandate for the failure to implement the approved housing
element. It sought an order from the court requiring City to implement its housing
element as written. The third and fourth causes of action were based on Article XI,
section 7 of the California Constitution. The amended BECSP conflicted with state law
and was therefore preempted. Further, the amended BECSP violated due process. The
fifth cause of action alleged unlawful housing discrimination under section 12900.
Failing to provide low income housing had a discriminatory effect.
The sixth cause of action was for a violation of section 65008. Kennedy alleged
that it “believed” that persons who need affordable housing in Huntington Beach were
disproportionately racial and ethnic minorities. The amended BECSP had a
discriminatory purpose and effect on the production of affordable housing.
7
On August 18, 2015, the case was transferred to Los Angeles Superior Court.
On October 20, 2015, Kennedy filed a memorandum of points and authorities in
support of the Petition. Kennedy argued it brought the Petition to invalidate the amended
BECSP because it violated the housing element and state housing law. The amended
BECSP should be voided and City ordered to comply with its existing housing element
already approved by the HCD.
Kennedy submitted a declaration from Glen Campora, who was employed by the
HCD. On November 12, 2013, the housing element for City was approved as compliant
with state law. It specifically mentioned the adoption of the BECSP to develop
meaningful housing. On May 1, 2015, the HCD notified City that if it adopted the
amended BECSP it would reduce the number of units to 2,100. City would need to
amend its housing element immediately to identify how current and projected housing
needs would be met with the elimination of the units in the BECSP. City was warned
that under section 65863 it could not reduce the maximum allowable units unless it
provided how the RHNA was going to be met.
On June 23, 2015, City was notified by the HCD that it no longer complied with
state housing laws. It was advised, “The City must submit an amended element to the
Department for a determination that City changes to the housing element meet statutory
requirements.” It also was advised, “Local government decisions that change substantive
provisions of the housing element in which the Department relies on in determining
compliance necessitate amending the housing element.” City was advised to
“immediately” submit an amended housing element.
8
On September 4, 2015, Kennedy filed a request to expedite the hearing on the
Petition in accordance with section 65753, subdivision (a). City objected as it needed
time to prepare the administrative record and was working to amend the housing element.
City also argued that the expedited hearing under section 65753 only applied to a
challenge to the general plan, not a specific plan. The trial court granted the expedited
hearing date on the Petition.
B. OPPOSITION TO PETITION
City filed its opposition to the Petition on October 29, 2015 (Opposition). City
argued it was actively working to amend the housing element to meet RHNA goals. It
argued the HCD instructed City to amend its housing element, not to rescind the amended
BECSP. An extraordinary writ was unnecessary. City prepared the amended BECSP
because of rapid development in the BECSP and concern from citizens. Relying on
section 65754, 2 City argued that the only remedy was to allow it to amend its housing
element. It was not necessary to void the amended BECSP because consistency could be
achieved by amendment of the housing element. City was not arguing that the amended
BECSP was an implied amendment to the housing element. City also argued that the
claims were moot because it was amending the housing element.
City attached a letter sent to Kennedy by City on September 14, 2015, which
advised Kennedy it was releasing a draft of the amended housing element. The open
2 Section 65754 requires that if a housing element in a general plan of any city does not comply with section 65300 et. seq., City will have an opportunity to amend its housing element.
9
comment on the amendment would extend until October 14, 2015. The draft was sent to
Kennedy on September 17, 2015.
City submitted a declaration from Jennifer Villasenor, who was a planning
manager employed by City. In early May 2015, immediately following the approval of
the amended BECSP, City retained an outside housing element expert to amend the
housing element; specifically, to identify additional sites for affordable housing. City
was in contact with the HCD in June and August 2015 to discuss amendments to the
housing element so that City could meet the RHNA requirements. On September 15,
2015, the proposed amendment to the housing element was submitted to the HCD and
included a list of all the sites for affordable housing. The HCD suggested changes, and
on October 26, 2015, City submitted a new amendment of the housing element for review
by the HCD. It identified affordable housing sites all outside the BECSP area. City
requested the HCD comment on the draft by November 10, 2015.
Also attached was a copy of the public notice sent advising residents of
Huntington Beach that the housing element was going to be amended. It sought
comments until October 14, 2015.
Moreover, City attached a map of the potential affordable housing sites. Each
individual site was identified and the number of units that could be placed on the sites
was provided. A copy of the amendment drafted September 14, 2015, was also attached,
which detailed the additional vacant or underdeveloped sites throughout Huntington
Beach that could accommodate for the loss of units in the BECSP.
10
On September 16, 2015, the HCD received a draft amendment to the housing
element from City. It had not been approved as of the filing of the Opposition. An
amendment drafted on October 26, 2015, was included with the Opposition. An
inventory of available sites outside the BECSP was provided with the amendment to the
housing element.
C. REPLY TO OPPOSITION
Kennedy filed a reply to the Opposition (Reply). Kennedy noted that in the
Opposition, City conceded it was out of compliance with state law in that the amended
BECSP did not comply with the housing element. The amended BECSP was invalid.
Kennedy was concerned that City would not amend the housing element in a timely
fashion or that the new proposed affordable housing areas would not provide the lost
units in the BECSP. Kennedy sought to have no new building permits issued in the
BECSP area because it would take the place of affordable housing. Kennedy relied on
section 65454 that the amended BECSP was inconsistent with the housing element. City
had to accommodate affordable housing throughout the planning period. Kennedy sought
to have the amended BECSP voided.
D. RULING
The matter was called on November 12, 2015. The trial court adopted its tentative
ruling without a hearing. The trial court set forth the facts in the tentative ruling as
follows: City adopted its current housing element for the 2014 through 2021 planning
period on September 16, 2013. It was approved by the Department of Housing in
November 2013. City’s share of the RHNA was 1,353 units. The allocation of very low
11
or low income households was 533 units. The BECSP was identified in the housing
element as providing for a majority of the low income housing. The amended BECSP
reduced the number of units to be developed from 4,500 to 2,100. Of those, all but 28
dwelling units were already being developed. As a result of the amended BECSP, City
was unable to meet its fair share of the RHNA, particularly as to low income housing. It
lowered the density in the BECSP and increased fees to developers. City could only offer
115 sites for low income housing. City was notified by Kennedy and the HCD that the
housing element no longer complied with state law. City issued two drafts of the
amended housing element on September 14, 2015, and October 26, 2015. It was awaiting
approval by the HCD.
The trial court found, “Once a jurisdiction adopts a general plan including a
housing element and obtains approval from HCD, the jurisdiction is prohibited from
adopting a specific plan that is inconsistent with the general plan, including its housing
element. Govt. Code, §§ 65454, 65860.” It noted that Kennedy sought a writ declaring
the amended BESCP void and directing City to implement the housing element as
written.
The trial court first noted that Kennedy had gained priority for the case by arguing
it was challenging the housing element under section 65751. City argued that Kennedy
was limited to argument under that section and that the only remedy was in section
65754, which gave it time to amend the housing element. The trial court noted that
Kennedy’s argument was that the amended BECSP was inconsistent with the housing
element not that the housing element was improper. The trial court concluded, “A
12
challenge to a specific plan on the grounds of inconsistency with the general plan is made
under Govt. Code section 65860(b), and is not entitled to any preference. Petitioners
have unlawfully ‘line jumped’ by arguing for preference. Nonetheless, it is not
appropriate to treat a challenge to a specific plan as governed by the remedies for a
successful challenge to a general plan.”
The trial court then addressed the merits. It noted that under California law, a
“municipality may not amend a specific plan unless the amendment is consistent with the
general plan. Govt. Code, § 65454.” The trial court noted that despite the fact City was
actively working to amend the housing element, the amended BECSP was inconsistent
with the general plan at the time it was passed and was therefore void as of the time it
was passed. It noted, “Despite the [C]ity’s attempts to amend the general plan to provide
consistency with the ordinance, the Supreme Court held that the zoning ordinance was
invalid when it was passed. It is the preemptive effect of state law (Govt. Code, § 65860)
which invalidates the ordinance.” The trial court refused to address anything regarding
City amending its housing element as that issue was not raised by Kennedy.
The court concluded, “The petition for writ of mandate is granted. The BECSP
Amendment is void ab initio. A writ shall issue directing the City to cease enforcing,
administering, or implementing the BECSP Amendment. The writ will not include any
relief compelling the City to implement the 2013 housing element, the BECSP, or
BECSP’s Policies and Programs committing the City to accommodate its RHNA.”
Kennedy prepared an order, but City refused to sign it arguing the case was not
complete because the remaining causes of action needed to be resolved either by
13
dismissal or transfer to a trial court. Kennedy responded that it did not believe that the
court’s ruling granting “the writ demanded in Count One” mooted the other pending
causes of action or foreclosed the issuance of a writ of mandate. Despite this argument,
on January 13, 2016, Kennedy moved to dismiss causes of action in three through six
after the trial court indicated it would not issue the writ of mandate until the case was
finished. The dismissal that was signed and filed on January 15, 2016, dismissed causes
of action three through six without prejudice. 3
On January 20, 2016, the trial court issued a writ of mandate commanding City to
cease enforcing, administering or implementing the amended BECSP including the
amended BECSP “Amendment’s Maximum Amount of New Development, Conditional
Use Permit, Zoning Text Amendment, Environmental Assessment, and the height,
parking, setback and use restrictions, and to otherwise cease utilizing or relying” on the
amended BECSP in planning.
3 The trial court’s tentative ruling was not entirely clear as to whether it was deciding the second cause of action by using the language “[t]he writ will not include any relief” or if it was denying relief. However, Kennedy agreed to dismiss causes of action three through six, and Kennedy did not appeal the second cause of action. Based on the foregoing, the trial court denied relief on the second cause of action.
14
DISCUSSION
CONSISTENCY REQUIREMENT AND ITS APPLICATION
TO HUNTINGTON BEACH, A CHARTER CITY 4
City abandons its main argument raised in the lower court that it should be given
time to amend the housing element as allowed in section 65754, rather than having the
amended BECSP considered void as a matter of law. Instead, City argues for the first
time on appeal that sections 65860 and 65454, which require consistency of zoning
ordinances and specific plans to the general plan, respectively, do not apply to
Huntington Beach as it is a charter city. Kennedy insists this issue cannot be reviewed
for the first time on appeal. Moreover, if this court decides to address the issue, City was
not exempt because it adopted the consistency requirement. We note that the relevant
section here is the violation of section 65454, as Kennedy argued that the specific plan
was inconsistent with the general plan.
Initially, City asks us to take judicial notice of charter documents that show
Huntington Beach is a charter city and, additionally, to notice that the population of
Huntington Beach is less than 2,000,000. These documents were not provided to the trial
court.
4 We do recognize the City has claimed that these issues are not ripe for adjudication, and that Kennedy lacked standing to bring a claim under section 65454. We adopt the same reasoning in Urban Habitat Program v. City of Pleasanton (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1561, 1580-1581, and find the issues are ripe for adjudication and Kennedy has standing.
15
“ ‘In determining the propriety of taking judicial notice of a matter, or its tenor,
the reviewing court has the same power the trial court has under Evid C § 454. Evid C
§ 459(b).’ ” (Lockley v. Law Office of Cantrell, Green, Pekich, Cruz & McCort (2001)
“The reviewing court shall take judicial notice of (1) each matter properly noticed by the
trial court and (2) each matter that the trial court was required to notice under Section 451
or 453. The reviewing court may take judicial notice of any matter specified in Section
452.[ 5] The reviewing court may take judicial notice of a matter in a tenor different from
that noticed by the trial court.” Subdivision (d) of section 459 provides, “In determining
the propriety of taking judicial notice of a matter specified in Section 452 or in
subdivision (f) of Section 451 that is of substantial consequence to the determination of
the action, or the tenor thereof, if the reviewing court resorts to any source of information
not received in open court or not included in the record of the action, . . . the reviewing
court shall afford each party reasonable opportunity to meet such information before
judicial notice of the matter may be taken.” “An appellate court may properly decline to
take judicial notice under Evidence Code sections 452 and 459 of a matter which should
have been presented to the trial court for its consideration in the first instance.”
(Brosterhous v. State Bar (1995) 12 Cal.4th 315, 325-326.)
5 Subdivision (b) of Evidence Code section 452 provides, “Regulations and legislative enactments issued by or under the authority of the United States or any public entity in the United States.”
16
The court may take judicial notice of a city charter or municipal code. (See
LaGrone v. City of Oakland (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 932, 941, fn. 3 [judicial notice of
provisions of charter]; Madain v. City of Stanton (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1280,
fn. 1 [judicial notice of municipal code for the first time on appeal].)
This court has the discretion to take judicial notice of the City of Huntington
Beach charter and the population. While this court is cognizant of the fact that City
should have raised this argument in the trial court, and presented the charter documents to
the trial court in the first instance, we exercise our discretion to review the issue.
Kennedy argued below that the case was entitled to an expedited hearing date pursuant to
section 65751, which refers to a challenge to a general plan. Charter cities are still
subject to preparing a general plan in accordance with state law. (§§ 65300, 65302.)
City argued that Kennedy was restricted to arguing under these sections since it was
granted an expedited hearing. The trial court acknowledged that Kennedy unlawfully
“line jumped” but decided the merits of the attack on the specific plan under section
65454. City argues that this was its first chance to argue the merits of the consistency
requirements for specific plans. Although not a justification for failing to raise the
charter city issue below, it does support giving some latitude to City on appeal since the
trial court refused to restrict the issues. We therefore grant City’s request for judicial
notice.
Moreover, Kennedy has had a chance to object to the request for judicial notice in
this court and has responded to the claim in its brief, which complies with Evidence Code
17
section 459, subdivision (d). Additionally, we will grant Kennedy’s request for judicial
notice of chapters 201, 203, and 215 of the City of Huntington Beach’s zoning ordinance.
Finally, “The scope of an exemption provided by statute is a question of statutory
interpretation and also one of law. In reviewing the trial court’s ruling, the appellate
court has an independent function, and need not defer to the trial court’s ruling.”
(Verdugo Woodlands Homeowner etc. Assn. v. City of Glendale (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d
696, 702 (Verdugo); see California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Golden Valley
Unified School Dist. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 369, 375.) As such, we will address whether
the trial court properly issued a writ of mandate against City for adopting a specific plan
that was inconsistent with the housing element in the general plan.
“Section 65300 mandates that ‘[e]ach county and city shall adopt a
comprehensive, long-term general plan for the physical development of the county or
city, . . .’ Section 65300.7 declares that ‘The Legislature finds that the diversity of the
state’s communities and their residents requires planning agencies and legislative bodies
to implement [a mandated general plan] in ways that accommodate local conditions and
circumstances, while meeting its minimum requirements.’ As it then read, section 65302
sets forth the minimum requirements a general plan must include, enumerating basic
areas of concern, and declares that ‘The requirements of this section shall apply to charter
cities.’ (Sections 65301 and 65302 were amended in 1984 and 1985; section 65301 now
declares that the general plan requirement is applicable to charter cities). All of the above
referenced sections are contained in chapter 3” of title 7, division 1 of the Government
Code. (Verdugo, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 699.)
18
Section 65860, subdivision (a), provides, “County or city zoning ordinances shall
be consistent with the general plan of the county or city by January 1, 1974.” However,
section 65803 provides, “Except as otherwise provided, this chapter shall not apply to a
charter city, except to the extent that the same may be adopted by charter or ordinance of
the city.” Subdivision (d) of section 65860 provides, “Notwithstanding Section 65803,
this section shall apply in a charter city of 2,000,000 or more population to a zoning
ordinance adopted prior to January 1, 1979, which zoning ordinance shall be consistent
with the general plan of the city by July 1, 1982.” “Section 65860 imposed a duty on
local governments to make their zoning ordinances consistent with the general plan by
January 1974, and requires them to continue to amend zoning ordinances consistently
with any amendments to the plan.” (Mira Development Corp. v. City of San Diego
Relevant here, section 65454 applies to specific plans. Section 65454 provides,
“No specific plan may be adopted or amended unless the proposed plan or amendment is
consistent with the general plan.” “A zoning ordinance that conflicts with a general plan
is invalid at the time it is passed. [Citation.] The court does not invalidate the ordinance.
It does no more than determine the existence of the conflict. It is the preemptive effect of
the controlling state statute, the Planning and Zoning Law, which invalidates the
ordinance.” (Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek (1990) 52 Cal.3d 531,
544.)
19
However, there is an exemption for charter cities. Section 65700 states, “The
provisions of this chapter shall not apply to a charter city, except to the extent that the
same may be adopted by charter or ordinance of the city; except that charter cities shall
adopt general plans in any case, and such plans shall be adopted by resolution of the
legislative body of the city, or the planning commission if the charter so provides, and
such plans shall contain the mandatory elements required by Article 5 (commencing with
Section 65300) of Chapter 3 of this title.”
“Government Code section 65700, subdivision (a), makes plain, however, that
none of the planning law’s procedural requirements, except the provision that the plan be
adopted by resolution of the legislative body or planning commission, apply to charter
cities. The planning law distinguishes between the adoption of a plan and its amendment,
and when its provisions are meant to apply both to adoption and amendment, they
explicitly state so. [Citations.] Accordingly, Government Code section 65700,
subdivision (a), leaves the nature of the general plan amendment process entirely to the
discretion of charter cities. Because the Legislature implicitly declared that the process
of plan amendment was not a matter of statewide concern, we have no reason to infer that
it sought to control that process by precluding initiative amendments. In other words, the
freedom given charter cities to control the general plan amendment process—including
the freedom, presumably, to allow amendment by initiative if the city charter so
provides—belies the claim that the Legislature intended to delegate the general plan
amendment authority exclusively to local governing bodies in order to fulfill the
20
statewide objectives of the planning law.” (DeVita v. County of Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th
763, 784.)
Here, section 103 of the Huntington Beach charter provides, “The City shall have
the power to make and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to municipal affairs,
subject only to such restrictions and limitations as may be provided in this Charter or in
the Constitution of the State of California.” It is clear from this language that City did
not intend to adopt the Government Code in its charter. Hence, the issue in this case is
whether City adopted this consistency requirement in an ordinance.
The case of Garat v. City of Riverside (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 259 (Garat),
overruled on other grounds in Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th
725, is relevant to this issue. As stated in Garat, the City of Riverside (Riverside) was a
charter city. (Garat, at pp. 269-270.) “In 1969, [Riverside] formally adopted a general
plan—a comprehensive and long-term amalgam of policies, goals, standards, guidelines
and maps designed to form a cohesive and integrated framework within which to plan for
the future physical development of [Riverside] (Gov. Code, §§ 65300-65301)—in
accordance with the requirements of chapter 3 (‘Local Planning,’ beginning with
§ 61000), division 1 (‘Planning and Zoning,’ beginning with § 65000), title 7 (‘Planning
and Land Use,’ beginning with § 65000) of the Government Code.” (Id. at p. 271, fn.
omitted.) In 1979, the voters adopted Measure R, which applied an agricultural zoning
classification to various portions of Riverside to help control development. In November
1987, the voters adopted Measure C, which further protected against development. (Id. at
p. 271.) Arlington Heights Consortium filed a lawsuit, which in part had a cause of
21
action for a petition for writ of mandate directing Riverside to void Measures R and C.
(Id. at p. 272.) The “Garat consortium” also filed suit seeking to void Measure C. The
suit was focused on whether the general plan was invalid and “whether Measures R and
C were themselves invalid because it was inconsistent with the (allegedly) invalid general
plan.” (Id. at p. 272.)
Riverside filed a motion for summary judgment arguing in part that the “statutory
requirement of consistency between zoning ordinances and their underlying general plans
(§ 65860) was not applicable to charter cities.” (Garat, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 273.)
The trial court concluded that Measures R and C were required by law to be consistent
with the general plan. The measures were found to be void. (Id. at pp. 273-274.) The
trial court ordered that Measures R and C be rescinded. (Id. at p. 274.)
On appeal, this court addressed whether a city’s legislative zoning enactments
have to be consistent with the provisions of its general plan. We first noted that sections
65860 and 65803 exempted charter cities from the consistency requirement. We
determined that it was undisputed that Riverside was a charter city. We then addressed
whether Riverside had adopted a consistency requirement by ordinance. (Garat, supra, 2
Cal.App.4th at p. 281.)
This court found that Riverside had not adopted a consistency requirement in its
zoning ordinance. We concluded, “The sole question remaining in determining whether
the exemption provisions of section 65803 apply to [Riverside], then, is whether
[Riverside] has adopted a consistency requirement by way of ordinance. Garat argues
that such is the case, and in support of its argument points to several provisions in
22
[Riverside]’s zoning laws that require that adjudicative/administrative approvals of
applications for certain types of conditional use permits and minor variances be
consistent with [Riverside]’s ‘master plan.’ These scattered references to consistency,
however, fall far short of section 65803’s provision that a specific requirement of
consistency between the zoning enactments and the general plan of a charter city will be
found to exist only if that requirement is ‘adopted by charter or ordinance.’ On the face
of [Riverside]’s extant charter/statutory scheme, then, there is no requirement that
[Riverside]’s zoning enactments be consistent with its general plan.” (Garat, supra, 2
Cal.App.4th at pp. 281-282.)
This court also rejected that the adoption of specific plans in accordance with
section 65450 shows that Riverside intended to adopt the consistency requirement in
section 65454. We rejected this argument as follows: “Garat also argues that
[Riverside]’s adoption of various ‘specific plans’—a specific plan being a more focused
and detailed development ‘scheme’ for a particular, limited portion of the greater area
encompassed by the broader overall development ‘scheme’ of a general plan—pursuant
to Article 8 (‘Specific Plans,’ beginning with section 65450), chapter 3, division 1, title 7
of the Government Code means, by logical necessity, that [Riverside] has adopted a
zoning enactment/general plan consistency requirement. The logic of Garat’s argument
unfolds in this way: (a) [Riverside] has adopted specific plans (e.g., the Sycamore
Canyon Specific Plan) ‘in accord with California State requirements for specific plans
(Government Code § 65450)’; (b) the adoption of specific plans is not subject to the
general exemption from state zoning laws which is provided in section 65803 for charter
23
cities; (c) specific plans must be consistent with their inclusive general plans (§ 65454);
(d) no zoning enactments may be adopted or amended with respect to an area within a
specific plan unless the zoning enactment would be consistent with the specific plan
(§ 65455); (e) consequently, [Riverside], by adopting specific plans in accordance with
state law, has indirectly adopted an overall zoning enactment/general plan consistency
requirement by ordinance. There are at least two flaws in this argument. First, assuming
arguendo that [Riverside] has implicitly adopted a zoning enactment/general plan
consistency requirement within certain specific plan areas, this simple fact does not
compel the conclusion that [Riverside] has, as a general matter, adopted such a
requirement for the entire general plan area. Second, and far more importantly, section
65700, subdivision (a), exempts charter cities from the provisions of chapter 3 (‘Local
Planning,’ beginning with section 65100), division 1, title 7 of the Government Code
(excepting the requirement that a city adopt a general plan containing all of the statutorily
mandated plan elements) in virtually the same way that section 65803 exempts charter
cities from the provisions of chapter 4 of that division and title—and the above provisions
of the Government Code relating to specific plans are contained in that chapter 3. Thus,
[Riverside] enjoys, even under this analysis, an exemption from consistency requirements
unless the same are assumed ‘by charter or ordinance’—not ‘by remote implication.’ ”
(Garat, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at pp. 282-283.)
In Verdugo, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d 696, the appellate court examined the
exemption in section 65803 for consistency of zoning ordinances with the general plan.
Although that case involved zoning ordinances, it is persuasive here. The appellate court
24
in Verdugo determined that the exemption in section 65803 must be strictly construed.
The appellate court concluded, “[I]n the face of clear statutory language exempting
charter cities from ‘the provisions of this chapter’ [‘Zoning Regulations’], we cannot say
that by implication, the state law concerning consistency may be imposed on City or may
be deemed to have been adopted by City when it adopted the state-mandated general
plan. Plaintiffs’ argument, therefore, must fail in this court.” (Verdugo, at p. 704.)
The above cases demonstrate that City must have made it clear that the exemption
in section 65700 was being rejected by City and that it intended that no specific plan
could be adopted that was not consistent with the general plan. Kennedy’s attempts to
show City adopted the consistency requirement in section 65454 fails.
In reviewing the Huntington Beach zoning ordinance, City did not explicitly state
that any specific plan that was not consistent with the general plan was void. chapter
215.02 of the zoning ordinance establishes the specific plan district. It provides, “The SP
Specific Plan District is established by this chapter. This district provides areas for the
development and administration of specific plans, prepared in accord with the
Government Code and consistent with the general plan and, for specific plans located
within the coastal zone, the Local Coastal Program.” Although this section refers to
consistency, it does not adopt the language of section 65454 that “[n]o specific plan may
be adopted or amended” unless it is consistent with the general plan. City did not adopt
the same requirement that an inconsistent specific plan must be void.
Chapter 201.06 of the zoning ordinance states the purpose of chapter 215.06 as
follows, “The purpose of the zoning and subdivision ordinance is to implement the
25
policies of the City of Huntington Beach General Plan, as provided in the California
Government Code, Title 7, Division 1, Planning and Zoning, and Division 2,
Subdivisions, and in the California Constitution, Chapter 11, Section 7. The purpose of
the Local Coastal Program Implementation Plan is to implement the policies of the City
of Huntington Beach certified Land Use Plan (Coastal Element) and the public access
and recreation policies of the Coastal Act. It is further adopted for the purpose of
promoting and protecting the public health, safety, and general welfare of Huntington
Beach residents and to provide the physical, economic and social advantages which result
from a comprehensive and orderly planned use of land resources. This zoning and
subdivision ordinance is not intended to authorize, and shall not be construed as
authorizing the City of Huntington Beach to exercise its power in a manner which will
take or damage private property for public use. This zoning ordinance is not intended to
increase or decrease the rights of any owner of property under the constitution of the
State of California or the United States. (3334-6/97)” This is similar to the language in
Garat, supra, that the permits and variances be consistent with the “master plan.” While
this section refers to the Government Code, it does not precisely require that the specific
plan must be consistent with the general plan or it would be void. Further, it does not
mandate the single remedy that the specific plan cannot be adopted; City could amend the
housing element so that it met the RHNA requirements in lieu of refusing to adopt the
amended BECSP.
Additionally, chapter 215.14 of the zoning ordinance provides, “A specific plan
adopted by resolution of the City Council shall be administered as prescribed by the
26
Council, consistent with the Government Code, Section 65450 et seq.” This is not a
declaration that City intended to be subject to the state law and chose to abandon the
exemption. The language is ambiguous in that it states the specific plan shall be adopted
by the city council and administered by the council first. We cannot imply from this
language that City intended that any specific plan that was not consistent with the general
plan would be void or could not be adopted. This is a reasonable interpretation as City
sought to amend the housing element but keep the amended BECSP. Nothing in the
Huntington Beach Charter or zoning ordinances forecloses such a procedure.
Kennedy argues that, “even [if] as a general matter charter cities may be exempt
from the requirement of § 65454 that specific plans be consistent with the general plan, if
a specific plan is employed to implement a program in the General Plan housing element,
it necessarily must conform to that program.” In Verdugo, the appellate court was
concerned that applying the exemption to charter cities would impact the Legislature’s
ultimate objective of consistency in planning and land use practices. It noted, “We have
stated that an exemption is subject to strict, i.e., narrow, construction. It also is true that
wherever possible, a statute must be harmonized with other statutes contained in the
legislative scheme. [¶] We cannot say that the section 65803 exemption is not applicable
in the case at bench, when by its plain language it is. It is applicable in chapter 4, which
includes the ‘consistency’ provision mandating consistency between a community’s
general plan and its zoning. Defendant City’s conduct in digressing from the [Land Use
Element] of its general plan to assist defendant Developers squarely falls within the ambit
of [a] chapter 4 exemption. While one may question the legislative wisdom in
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continuing, at this point in time, the leeway granted in 1965 to charter cities, we believe
that the trial judge was correct in saying that he could not substitute his will for that of the
Legislature.” (Verdugo, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at pp. 703-704.) Such reasoning equally
applies to section 65454.
Kennedy additionally argues that even if the exemption applied, that the amended
BECSP should be considered void because once the amendment was adopted the housing
element violated state law. However, even if we accepted this as true, the remedy would
not be that the amended BECSP was void. Rather, according to section 65750, City
should have been granted time to amend its housing element. As noted, City had already
submitted an amended housing element to the HCD for approval prior to the trial court’s
decision in this case. Moreover, the trial court ruled that it would not grant relief on
Kennedy’s claim that City must implement the housing element in its current state. It
was without dispute that City was working with the HCD to have the housing element
comply with state law. City was free to amend its housing element to comply with state
law while leaving the amended BECSP in place.
Lastly, we note that Kennedy dismissed its causes of action three through six
without prejudice, and it was denied relief on the second cause of action. The writ of
mandate must be reversed, however Kennedy should be given an opportunity to address
the remaining issues.
DISPOSITION
The superior court’s order granting Kennedy’s petition for writ of mandate is
reversed, and the matter is remanded to the superior court in order for Kennedy to move
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to have the remaining causes of action three through six reinstated. If Kennedy does not
seek to reinstate the remaining causes of action within 30 days of the issuance of this
opinion, the case will be final and the stay issued by this court on May 26, 2016, is
ORDERED lifted. Otherwise, the stay issued by this court on May 26, 2016, is
ORDERED lifted when the remittitur in this case is issued. In the interests of justice,
each party shall bear its own costs. 6
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
MILLER Acting P. J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON J.
FIELDS J.
6 The City has filed an additional appeal in case No. E066605 addressing the attorney fees awarded to Kennedy. We address that case by separate opinion.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the City of Huntington Beach, as a charter city, is exempt from the state law requirement that its specific plans be consistent with its general plan. Consequently, the trial court erred in invalidating the City's amendment to the Beach Edinger Corridors Specific Plan based on such a consistency requirement.
Issues
Whether a charter city is exempt from the requirement that its specific plans be consistent with its general plan pursuant to Government Code section 65700.
Whether the trial court erred in invalidating the City's specific plan amendment for inconsistency with the general plan.
Disposition. Reversed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“City argues for the first time on appeal that sections 65860 and 65454, which require consistency of zoning ordinances and specific plans to the general plan, respectively, do not apply to Huntington Beach as it is a charter city.”