convicted of grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)), and two counts of receiving stolen property (§
496, subd. (a)). The court also found true the allegations that Drew had two strike priors
(§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i) & 1170.12) and four prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Based on
existing law, Drew was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 29 years to life.
Two years later, in a second and separate proceeding (People v. Drew (Super. Ct.
San Diego County, 2001, No. SCE199615) (SCE199615)), Drew was convicted of
robbery (§ 211), three counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (b)), and two counts
of possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)). With attendant findings and
admissions, he was sentenced to a total of 70 years to life in prison, and that sentence was
ordered to run consecutive to the sentence imposed in the 1999 proceeding.
In September 2016 Drew filed a petition to recall his 1999 sentence in case
number SCE194453 pursuant to the TSRA. Because the TSRA required that petitions be
filed by November 7, 2014, absent "a showing of good cause," (§ 1170.126, subd. (b)),
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified. 2
the court issued an order to show cause (OSC) why his petition should not be denied as
untimely. Drew's response to the OSC asserted that he "never contacted anyone seeking
relief because he did not know he was eligible" and his case was never "caught by any of
the myriad agencies who were working to identify and file the cases that were eligible for
relief." According to Drew, his inaction was attributable to his lack of awareness of his
possible eligibility because of "his life sentences on other nonqualifying offenses and
cases." The People opposed Drew's recall petition arguing it was untimely and there was
no good cause to excuse the late filing. Specifically, the People noted Drew's conviction
in the 1999 proceeding had been final since April 11, 2001, but he did not file his petition
until September 2016, almost two years after the petition period had expired under the
TSRA. The court ultimately found Drew had not shown adequate good cause for not
timely pursuing a petition under the TSRA and denied his petition.
DISCUSSION
In 2012, the California electorate approved Proposition 36 and enacted the TSRA,
which included the addition of section 1170.126 to the Penal Code. (People v. Johnson
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 674, 682–683 (Johnson).) The TSRA's effective date was November
7, 2012. (Ibid.) Before enactment of the TSRA, California's Three Strikes Law provided
that a recidivist offender with two or more prior qualifying strikes was subject to an
indeterminate life sentence if convicted of any new felony offense. (People v. Yearwood
(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161, 167–168.) Under the reforms adopted by the TSRA,
however, life sentences were limited to cases where the new crime was a serious or
3
violent felony or the prosecution pled and proved an enumerated disqualifying factor; in
all other cases, the recidivist would be sentenced as a second strike offender. (Ibid.)
In addition to changing how defendants would be sentenced prospectively, the
TSRA also created a retroactive relief procedure for inmates presently serving an
indeterminate term of imprisonment under the former Three Strikes Law whose sentence
under the TSRA would not have been an indeterminate life sentence. Eligible inmates
would be permitted to seek resentencing under the TSRA. (Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th
at p. 682.) Under that procedure, an inmate serving a Three Strikes sentence for an
offense not defined as serious or violent (and who is not otherwise disqualified) may
commence a request for resentencing by filing a petition for a recall of sentence within
two years of the date of the act "or at a later date upon a showing of good cause."
(§ 1170.126, subd. (b); Johnson, at p. 682.)
The parties agree that because Drew's current offense in case number SCE194453
is not defined as serious or violent, he was not otherwise disqualified from seeking
resentencing, and he could have petitioned for recall of his sentence "within two years
after the effective date of the act." (§ 1170.126, subd. (b).) The parties also agree the
specified two-year time frame for that recall petition expired on November 7, 2014, so
measured by the general rule Drew's recall petition was not timely. But the two-year
limitations period under section 1170.126 contains an exception: it permits an inmate to
file his recall "at a later date upon a showing of good cause." (Ibid. at subd. (b).) This
appeal presents the question whether Drew has established "good cause" so as to take
advantage of the exception.
4
1. Standard of Review
As a general matter appellate courts have recognized a trial court "has broad
discretion to determine whether good cause exists." (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th
900, 1037 [discretion to determine whether good cause exists to grant continuance of
trial].) In circumstances where such discretion exists, our review of the trial court's
"good cause" determination employs the familiar "abuse of discretion" standard. (Ibid.;
accord, Stroud v Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 952, 973.) We recognize, of course,
that the court's discretion must be " 'exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and
in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice.' "
(Bettencourt v. Los Rios Community College Dist. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 270, 275.)
Moreover, "[t]he scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied."
(City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297.)
2. "Good Cause" in the Context of the TSRA
We begin with a basic but important proposition. By including a limitations
period subject to a "good cause" exception, the TSRA impliedly determined that not
every delay in filing a recall petition would be excusable. Our task is thus to distinguish
excusable delays from inexcusable ones. In doing so we sail uncharted waters. The
parties agree that neither section 1170.126 nor any published authority has defined "good
cause" within the meaning of that section.
The briefs of both parties refer us to case law interpreting section 1382—which
contains various time limitations that ensure a defendant receives a speedy trial—
suggesting that it may provide at least rough guidance for construing "good cause" under
5
section 1170.126, subdivision (b). Like section 1170.126, "[s]ection 1382 does not
define 'good cause' as that term is used in the provision, but numerous California
appellate decisions that have reviewed good-cause determinations under this statute
demonstrate that, in general, a number of factors are relevant to a determination of good
cause: (1) the nature and strength of the justification for the delay, (2) the duration of the
delay, and (3) the prejudice to either the defendant or the prosecution that is likely to
result from the delay." (People v. Sutton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 533, 546.) The courts have
concluded in other contexts that, when making a "good-cause" determination, a trial court
must consider all of the relevant circumstances of the particular case, "applying principles
of common sense to the totality of circumstances." (See, e.g., Stroud v Superior Court
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 952, 969.)
We recognize that the analogy between section 1382 (which is focused on the
state's obligation to timely bringing a person to trial) and section 1170.126 (which
focuses on an inmate's obligation to commence the recall petition process) is an imperfect
one because they involve entirely different phases of the criminal process. But the
analogy may provide some guidance because both statutes are concerned with time limits
within which certain actions must be taken and under what circumstances a delay beyond
those deadlines should be permitted. Under both, delays beyond the deadlines carry
consequences, and "good cause" functions as a barometer to evaluate the excuse for the
delay and decide whether to obviate those consequences.
At the same time, one of the judicially-crafted considerations employed under
section 1382—prejudice to the opposing party—appears far less likely to be a significant
6
factor under section 1170.126. Under the former provision, prejudice from delay can be
a highly pertinent consideration because evidence can become stale, memories can fade,
and witnesses can become unavailable. (See People v. Hill (1984) 37 Cal.3d 491, 498.)
Under section 1170.126, however, it is difficult to see how the prosecution would ever be
significantly prejudiced by a delay in the filing of a recall petition, because the factors
guiding whether to grant the resentencing rest on largely immutable facts contained in
records maintained by the courts and the prison authorities. (See § 1170.126, subd. (g).)
Thus, while the first two factors identified in People v. Sutton, supra, 48 Cal.4th at
page 546, are relevant analytical tools in determining "good cause" under section
1170.126, in most cases the third factor will not be germane.
3. Application to the Facts of This Case
There is no dispute that the delay here was substantial. Drew waited nearly two
years after expiration of the statutory deadline for relief under the TSRA before filing his
petition. Weighed against that significant delay was the proffered reason for the delay:
Drew claimed only that he was not aware he might be eligible for resentencing in case
number SCE194453 because of his "life sentences on other nonqualifying offenses and
cases"2 and it was not until Johnson3 was decided in July 2015 that it was clear his
2 Although the record is not entirely clear, we construe Drew's reference to his "life sentences on other nonqualifying offenses and cases" to refer to his nonqualifying life sentence imposed in case number SCE199615.
7
sentence in case number SCE194453 was eligible for resentencing notwithstanding his
other nonqualifying offenses.
While Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th 674 did definitively clarify that Drew was not
barred, at least one earlier case (published in May 2014) held that "although section
1170.126 does not address eligibility for resentencing where a petitioner's commitment
offenses include both a felony categorized as serious or violent and a felony that is not so
categorized, a conclusion that nonserious/nonviolent offenses are eligible for
resentencing (absent other disqualifying factors) is consistent with the language of the
statute and would advance the voters' intent in enacting Proposition 36." (In re Machado
(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1048, review granted July 30, 2014, S219819.) The
Machado decision, which created a split of authority on this question (see Braziel v.
Superior Court (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 933, review granted July 30, 2014, S218503),
was filed many months before the expiration of the two-year deadline and provided solid
support for an argument that his other nonqualifying conviction did not preclude
resentencing.
Indeed, Machado, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th 1044 is significant not merely for its
extensive analysis that supported Drew's eligibility, but also because the Supreme Court
granted review of Machado on July 30, 2014, and ultimately endorsed Machado's result.
3 Noting that section 1170.126 "is ambiguous as to whether a current offense that is serious or violent disqualifies an inmate from resentencing with respect to another count that is neither serious nor violent," the Supreme Court in Johnson concluded that in light of the history and purpose of the TSRA, "resentencing is allowed with respect to a count that is neither serious nor violent, despite the presence of another count that is serious or violent." (Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 694–695.) 8
That Drew may have been subjectively unaware of his eligibility does not necessarily
provide objective good cause for delay. (Cf. In re Douglas (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 236,
244 [a "petition for writ of habeas corpus that is substantially delayed without good cause
is considered untimely" and a "[m]istaken belief is . . . insufficient to explain the lengthy
delay in filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus"].) Instead, the state of the law
throughout mid-2014 and until the deadline was at worst uncertain, providing Drew with
a more than nonfrivolous argument in favor of his eligibility for resentencing. Under
these circumstances, the court could well conclude there was no good cause for the delay.
Indeed, in light of the conflict in the decisional law and the pending expiration of a clear
two-year limitations period, there was simply no legal downside to filing the recall
petition prior to the deadline.4
In contrast to his arguments in the trial court, on appeal Drew now concedes that
his delay was not really attributable to pre-Johnson uncertainty. Instead, he appears to
assert there was "good cause" within the meaning of section 1170.126 because he delayed
during a time he lacked legal representation (for which he should be excused), but then
promptly pursued his recall petition after the Public Defender's office serendipitously
unearthed his case nearly a year after Johnson and alerted him to the potential for
resentencing. In effect, he contends there should be no time limits for filing a recall
4 Moreover, Drew's implied claim that his delay was attributable to an unawareness fueled by legal uncertainty is undermined by the fact that even after Johnson was filed on July 2, 2015, he waited over another year to file his recall petition. Thus, a trial court could well conclude the actual reason for delay was entirely unrelated to any flux in the law. 9
petition as long as no one told him he had the ability to request resentencing. Were this
contention accepted, it would be tantamount to erasing the limitations period from the
statute in all but the most unusual of circumstances.
Here, there was no evidence Drew did anything to investigate potential relief for
three and one-half years (between the Nov. 7, 2012, effective date of the TSRA, through
late May, 2016), even though he was then serving a life sentence that at least arguably
was impacted by the TSRA. He did not contact the court. He did not request assistance
from the Public Defender's office that previously represented him. He did not inquire of
anyone at the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Certainly, we do
not suggest a good cause showing requires that an untutored layman such as Drew
undertake yeoman efforts in an effort to navigate the intricacies of the TSRA. But neither
do we accept Drew's claim on appeal that faced with years during which there is no hint
of activity or even de minimus effort by the inmate to protect his rights, a trial court
abuses its discretion when it determines there is no good cause to dispense with the
legislatively prescribed deadline for filing recall petitions.
In this case, the delay was lengthy and the reason for Drew's inactivity is
unexplained except by the absence of a lawyer proactively advising him regarding his
rights and remedies. We cannot conclude it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court
to find that Drew did not show "good cause" for his late-filed recall petition.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
10
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
IRION, J.
11
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a Three Strikes Reform Act (TSRA) recall petition as untimely, as the defendant failed to demonstrate 'good cause' for a nearly two-year delay beyond the statutory deadline. A defendant's subjective lack of awareness regarding eligibility or the absence of proactive legal counsel does not constitute good cause to excuse a failure to file within the prescribed period.
Issues
Whether a trial court abuses its discretion by finding no 'good cause' for a late-filed TSRA recall petition when the defendant claims ignorance of eligibility.
What factors constitute 'good cause' for a late-filed petition under Penal Code section 1170.126, subdivision (b).
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“That Drew may have been subjectively unaware of his eligibility does not necessarily provide objective good cause for delay.”