concluding the condition is reasonable under Lent because it will allow the probation
department to effectively supervise Trujillo. Additionally, the probation condition
satisfies constitutional standards because the infringement on Trujillo's privacy rights is
outweighed by the state's strong need to closely monitor Trujillo's conduct and protect
public safety, and there are no facts showing Trujillo's electronics contain the type of
private information meriting heightened protection or that a search of these devices
would be more intrusive than a warrantless search of his home, to which Trujillo has not
1 Numerous cases addressing the propriety of an electronics-search probation condition are currently pending review in the California Supreme Court. (See In re Ricardo P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 676, review granted Feb. 17, 2016, S230923; In re Patrick F. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 104, review granted Feb. 17, 2016, S231428; In re Alejandro R. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 556, review granted Mar. 9, 2016, S232240; In re Mark C. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 520, review granted Apr. 13, 2016, S232849; In re A.S. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 758, review granted May 25, 2016, S233932; In re J.E. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 795, review granted Oct. 12, 2016, S236628 (J.E.); People v. Nachbar (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1122, review granted Dec. 14, 2016, S238210 (Nachbar); People v. Bryant (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 396, review granted June 28, 2017, S241937.)
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objected. The record does not support that the electronics-search condition is
unnecessarily broad or will result in an unjustified invasion of Trujillo's privacy rights.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We base our factual summary on the probation reports. In October 2016, at about
2:15 a.m., two individuals (S and V) were retrieving S's car left in a Smart and Final
parking lot. When S and V drove into the parking lot, Trujillo was inside S's parked car.
Trujillo then exited the car, approached S and V, and pointed what appeared to be a semi-
automatic handgun at them (which later turned out to be an airsoft replica gun). When S
got out of the car and walked towards Trujillo, Trujillo pointed the gun at S's face. S
backed away, and Trujillo struck him in the head with the gun. Trujillo then pointed the
gun at V and demanded she give him everything she had. When V refused, Trujillo fled.
S and V called law enforcement.
S sustained a large cut to his head. S's vehicle (that had been left at the parking
lot) was damaged. S reported items missing from his car, including $100 in cash, a
phone charger, a backpack, and the vehicle registration.
Several hours later, at about 5:15 a.m. Trujillo approached another victim (C) at a
fast-food restaurant about 100 yards away from the Smart and Final parking lot. C was in
his vehicle waiting at a drive-through window. Trujillo brandished an airsoft gun,
pointed it at C's face, and demanded cash. C believed the gun was real and feared for his
safety, but was able to wrestle the weapon away from Trujillo. After Trujillo fled, C
called the police. A security camera captured the event.
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Shortly after, deputies arrested Trujillo and transported him to a sheriff's
substation. Trujillo's vehicle contained a bottle with two Xanax pills (that had not been
prescribed to him). Deputies interviewed Trujillo while he was in a holding cell. His
breath had a strong alcohol odor and he exhibited slurred speech. Trujillo said he had
been " 'drinking all night,' but could not recall what he had been drinking." He told
deputies he was "desperate for money."
After being charged by separate complaint for each incident, Trujillo pleaded
guilty in both cases. On the Smart and Final parking lot incident, Trujillo pleaded guilty
to assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury. On the fast-food incident, Trujillo
pleaded guilty to attempted robbery.
Probation Reports
A separate probation report was prepared for each case. The probation reports
noted that 19-year-old Trujillo had no criminal history, and the parties had agreed he
would be granted probation. On the Smart and Final case, the probation officer
summarized his interview with Trujillo. He said Trujillo admitted using Xanax pills and
drinking alcohol before the offenses, and Trujillo believes the combination of the pills
and alcohol caused him to commit the crimes. Trujillo apologized and said he learned his
lesson.
The other probation report provided a similar interview summary, and also
explained various issues in Trujillo's background, including that his biological father
committed suicide when Trujillo was a small child, and Trujillo's mother abandoned the
4
family in 2013. Two of Trujillo's brothers have died. Trujillo's younger brother
committed suicide in 2014 and Trujillo witnessed the suicide. The other brother died in
2015. Trujillo has three younger siblings (ages 13, 6, and 3), whom he is helping to
support. Trujillo did not graduate from high school. At the time of his arrest, he had
been working in the fast food industry. He said he had been working at two restaurants
for a combined 120 hours per week, earning approximately $1,000 per month. Upon his
release, Trujillo plans to live with his aunt.
Trujillo admits he drinks alcohol daily, and believes his current legal problems are
related to his alcohol use. Trujillo said he abuses alcohol to cope with the death of his
two siblings and is willing to participate in treatment and abide by all proposed probation
conditions. Trujillo denied having a mental health disorder or having medications for
mental health problems. He claimed the day of the crimes was the first time he had used
Xanax pills and said "it was out of character for him to do such a crime." He indicated he
"previously dealt with suicidal ideation as a youth, but . . . is currently feeling 'good.' "
He acknowledged he has experienced insomnia and nightmares since his brother's
suicide, and said "he has coped with the event by 'drinking.' " He described his childhood
as " 'rough.' " Trujillo has no gang tattoos and denied any gang affiliation, although his
deceased younger brother had been associated with a gang. Trujillo expressed surprise
that the plea agreement would permit him to avoid prison, stating the court was " 'giving
me less than I thought I would get.' "
5
Both probation officers evaluated Trujillo under the COMPAS assessment tool
(Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions). The
assessments found Trujillo could be successfully guided and monitored in the community
(as opposed to prison), but also identified multiple risk factors, including "Substance
Abuse, Residential Instability, Social Isolation," and "Family Criminality."
The probation officers said they considered the results of the COMPAS
assessment in conjunction with other relevant information to formulate the recommended
probation conditions, and emphasized the importance of close supervision. One
probation officer noted: "Interventions in the community may want to focus on cognitive
behavioral interventions which would aim to restructure the way [Trujillo] interprets the
world around him as a result of past traumatic experiences, i.e. parental abandonment,
parental death, and witnessing his brother's suicide . . . ." The other probation officer
stated: "Based on the COMPAS assessment, it appears [Trujillo] would benefit from
some guidance and monitoring in the community via probation supervision and referrals
to community resources. Supervision, along with treatment, will likely be beneficial to
the defendant as it appears he is in need of guidance and coping skills to deal with tragic
events he has experienced in his life."
Both probation officers recommended 365 days in county jail, and three years of
formal probation, noting they did not evaluate the appropriateness of a prison sentence
because the parties had agreed to probation. Both probation officers recommended
numerous probation conditions, including the condition at issue in this case: "Submit
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person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, computers, and recordable media
. . . to search at any time with or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause,
when required by [the probation officer] or law enforcement officer." (Italics added.)
The other proposed probation conditions included: (1) seek and maintain full-time
employment or schooling; (2) participate in recommended treatment, therapy, and
counseling; (3) provide written authorization for the probation officer to receive progress
and compliance reports from any medical/mental-health provider or other treatment
provider; (4) do not knowingly use or possess alcohol or controlled substances without a
prescription; (5) submit to any chemical test of blood, breath, or urine to determine blood
broad authority to search a probationer's residence without a warrant or reasonable cause.
(See People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 505-506; Balestra, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 66-68; In re Binh L. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 194, 203-205.) In this case, Trujillo does
not challenge the probation condition providing the officers with the authority to conduct
random and unlimited searches of his residence at any time and for no stated reason.
Third, the state's need to supervise a convicted criminal is different from the
objectives of the arresting officer in Riley. In contrast with the United States Supreme
Court's somewhat critical view of law enforcement's perceived need to routinely search
an arrestee's cell phone without waiting for a warrant (see Riley, supra, 134 S.Ct. at pp.
2485-2488), the factual record here supports that the electronics-search condition is
necessary to protect public safety and to ensure supervision and rehabilitation during a
three-year period. Unlike the warrant requirement that can usually be quickly satisfied in
an arrest situation, Trujillo has not identified any practical alternatives to the electronics-
search condition in his particular case. Although the probation condition allows the state
to potentially invade privacy interests, it was a necessary means of imposing the level of
supervision required to protect public safety and prevent future criminality, as an
alternative to prison. Because the probation department will need to monitor Trujillo
with respect to the triggers for his criminal conduct (e.g., alcohol abuse, "desperate"
financial circumstances, social isolation, family pressures, weapons purchases), a routine
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search of his electronic data is strongly relevant to the probation department's supervisory
function. Even when a governmental action constitutes a serious invasion of privacy
rights, the action may be justified if it "substantially furthers one or more legitimate
competing or countervailing [governmental] interests . . . ." (In re Christopher M. (2005)
127 Cal.App.4th 684, 695, disapproved on another ground in People v. Gonzales (2013)
56 Cal.4th 353, 375, fn. 6.)
Fourth, to the extent other appellate courts have found merit to constitutional
overbreadth challenges (see e.g., Appleton, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 724-727; P.O.,
supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 297-298), we are reviewing Trujillo's as-applied
constitutional challenge and therefore we are required to focus on the particular facts of
this case, rather than uncritically follow conclusions of other courts considering different
factual circumstances. (See People v. Mitchell (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1378.)
Significantly, the factual record here contains no information that Trujillo owns a cell
phone or computer and uses these devices to hold the type of sensitive medical, financial,
or personal information described in Riley and Appleton. Although many devices hold
this information, there is no evidence that this young man uses his devices in this way.
Additionally, there are no facts in the record showing a search of Trujillo's electronics
would be any more invasive than an unannounced, without-cause, warrantless search of
his residence, a condition to which he has not objected. Absent particularized facts
showing the electronics-search condition will infringe on Trujillo's heightened privacy
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interests, there is no reasoned basis to conclude the condition is constitutionally
overbroad or to remand for the court to consider a more narrowly-drawn condition.
To the extent Trujillo adds information on his electronic devices that would invoke
stronger privacy protections beyond a warrantless search of his home and would be
unrelated to his criminality or future criminality, Trujillo would have the right to seek a
modification of the probation condition to protect the privacy of such information. (See
Pen. Code, § 1203.2, subd. (b); Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 379.) But as the record
stands now, there is no reasoned basis for more narrowly tailoring the search condition.
Additionally, any concerns regarding the potential invasiveness of the electronics-search
condition are ameliorated by the restriction against arbitrary, capricious, or harassing
probation searches. (See People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 682; People v.
Cervantes (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1404, 1408.)
DISPOSITION
Affirmed.
HALLER, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
O'ROURKE, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that an electronics-search probation condition is reasonable under the Lent standard and constitutionally valid because it assists the probation department in effectively supervising a defendant convicted of violent felonies. The condition is not overbroad because the state's interest in monitoring the defendant's conduct and ensuring public safety outweighs the privacy intrusion, particularly absent evidence that the devices contain sensitive information.
Issues
Whether an electronics-search probation condition is reasonable under the Lent standard when it has no direct relationship to the underlying crimes.
Whether an electronics-search probation condition is constitutionally overbroad under the Fourth Amendment and the reasoning in Riley v. California.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the condition is reasonable under Lent because it will allow the probation department to effectively supervise Trujillo.”
“The record does not support that the electronics-search condition is unnecessarily broad or will result in an unjustified invasion of Trujillo's privacy rights.”
“The court made the factual determination that the electronics-search condition is necessary to provide appropriate supervision for Trujillo while he is on probation.”