attorney fees may be awarded to a party who successfully defends a public interest
lawsuit]; Woodland Hills Homeowners Organization v. Los Angeles Community College
6
Dist. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 79, 96 [same].) Accordingly, we conclude the Committee's
status as a project proponent does not categorically bar it from obtaining a section 1021.5
attorney fees award if it otherwise satisfies the award's requirements.
C
Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has "recognized an exception to be
applied in cases where all three [section 1021.5] factors are satisfied, but the party from
whom fees are sought 'is not the type of party on whom private attorney general fees
were intended to be imposed.' " (Serrano, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 1027, citing Joshua S.,
supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 953.) Under this exception, "a section 1021.5 fee award may not
be imposed on a litigant who did nothing to adversely affect the public interest."
(Serrano, at p. 1020, citing Joshua S., at p. 958.)
In explicating this exception, the Supreme Court noted, under the American rule,
codified in section 1021, "each party to a lawsuit must ordinarily pay his or her own
attorney fees." (Joshua S., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 954.) "Although not explicit in either
the statute or case law, it may be supposed that one unspoken justification for departing
from the American rule in the case of section 1021.5 private attorney general fees is that
it is equitable to impose public interest attorney fees on parties that have done something
to adversely affect the public interest." (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court's review of published cases in which courts awarded section
1021.5 attorney fees supported this supposition. The review revealed courts typically
only imposed such fees on parties who "had engaged in conduct that in some way had
adversely affected the public interest," for example by acting or failing to act in a manner
7
"somehow impairing the statutory or constitutional rights of the public or a significant
class of people." (Joshua S., supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 954–955 & fn. 3.)
In addition, the Supreme Court looked to the language of section 1021.5 and
determined the language impliedly required that "the party on whom attorney fees are
imposed be responsible for adversely affecting the public interest." (Joshua S., supra, 42
Cal.4th at p. 955.) The court explained, "[a]lthough the statute does not explicitly
address the type of conduct that would make a party liable for attorney fees, it does
suggest what conduct the Legislature had in mind. Section 1021.5 authorizes fees for
'any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the
public interest … .' (Italics added.) The enforcement of an important right affecting the
public interest implies that those on whom attorney fees are imposed have acted, or failed
to act, in such a way as to violate or compromise that right, thereby requiring its
enforcement through litigation." (Joshua S., at p. 956.)
The Supreme Court found further support for its conclusion in the statute's
legislative history, which indicated the Legislature intended to provide for an award of
attorney fees in "litigation designed to promote the public interest by enforcing laws that
a governmental or private entity was violating." (Joshua S., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 956.)
The court also found its conclusion was consistent with Connerly v. State Personnel Bd.
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 1169, which "acknowledged that the parties against whom attorney
fees should be assessed should be those responsible for the policy or practice adjudged to
be harmful to the public interest." (Joshua S., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 957.)
8
The relevant inquiry in cases where the defendant or real party in interest prevails
in defending against litigation and seeks attorney fees from the party who initiated the
litigation is whether the litigation was detrimental to the public interest because it sought
to curtail or compromise important public rights. (Joshua S., supra, 42 Cal.4th at
pp. 957–958.) We cannot answer this inquiry affirmatively in this case.
By filing the petition for writ of mandamus, SOHO did not seek to curtail or
compromise important public rights or exonerate SOHO's violation of such rights.
(Joshua S., supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 957–958.) Rather, the litigation sought to correct
what SOHO perceived to be violations of state and local environmental, historic
preservation, and land use laws by the City. While ultimately unsuccessful, the litigation
was precisely the type of enforcement action section 1021.5 was enacted to promote.
(Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 611–612.) We, therefore, cannot conclude the litigation was detrimental to the public
interest such that imposing a fee award on SOHO would be appropriate. Consequently,
we conclude the trial court did not err in denying the Committee's motion for an award of
section 1021.5 attorney fees.4
4 The trial court denied the Committee's motion for attorney fees on a different ground. We review the trial court's order, not its reasoning, and may affirm the order if it is correct on any theory apparent from the record. (Wal-Mart, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 625.) 9
DISPOSITION
The order denying the motion to recover attorney fees is affirmed. Each party is to
bear its own appeal costs.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
HALLER, J.
10
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. A project proponent may be a 'successful party' eligible for attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, but such fees cannot be imposed on a party like SOHO that initiated litigation in good faith to enforce public rights rather than to compromise them.
Issues
Whether a project proponent may obtain attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5.
Whether a court may impose section 1021.5 attorney fees on a party that initiated litigation to enforce public rights.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“a section 1021.5 fee award may not be imposed on a litigant who did nothing to adversely affect the public interest.”
“SOHO is not the type of party against whom the court may impose such an award because SOHO did nothing to compromise public rights.”
“the Committee's status as a project proponent does not categorically bar it from obtaining a section 1021.5 attorney fees award if it otherwise satisfies the award's requirements.”