In 2009, Crockett granted the County of San Diego (County) two public easements
for a public unpaved recreational hiking and equestrian trail, which runs parallel to the
golf course. A chain-link fence approximately six feet high and a line of eucalyptus trees
spread eight to 12 feet apart separate the trail from the golf course in the area of the 13th
hole. There are no warning signs on the fence along the trail side of the 13th hole
indicating golf is being played on the golf course.
1 All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 2
In 2013, as the Leyvas were walking on the trail adjacent to the 13th hole, a stray
golf ball struck Miguel in the eye. As a result of his injury, Miguel lost 80 percent of his
vision in his left eye and has a permanently sunken left orbital wall.
Crockett stated the fencing along the 13th hole serves as a property boundary
rather than a barrier for stray golf balls. Prior to this incident, the Club had not received
reports of anyone who had been hit by a golf ball while walking on the trail behind the
13th hole.2
B
Procedural History
The Leyvas sued Crockett3 for (1) negligence, (2) unsafe condition of property,
(3) failure to warn, (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (5) negligent infliction
of emotional distress, and (6) negligent infliction of emotional distress for bystanders.
Crockett moved for summary judgment arguing the action was barred under two
different theories: trail immunity under section 831.4 and recreational use immunity
under Civil Code section 846. The superior court granted summary judgment for
Crockett based on the trail immunity.
2 After the incident, the Club spent $14,000 to increase the height of the fencing along the 10th hole from six feet to 12 feet, but the Club has not assessed whether to raise the fencing along the 13th hole.
3 The Leyvas initially named the County as a defendant, but subsequently dismissed the County from the suit and filed a first amended complaint. 3
DISCUSSION
I
Standard of Review
"On appeal after a motion for summary judgment has been granted, we review the
record de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition
papers except that to which objections have been made and sustained." (Guz v. Bechtel
National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334.) A motion for summary judgment "should be
granted if no triable issue exists as to any material fact and the defendant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." (Kahn v. East Side Union High School Dist. (2003) 31
de novo review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs as the
losing parties." (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2003) 32 Cal.4th 1138,
1142.) "[W]e liberally construe plaintiffs' evidentiary submissions and strictly scrutinize
defendant's own evidence, in order to resolve any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in
plaintiffs' favor." (Ibid.)
"We are not bound by the issues actually decided by the trial court. 'The appellate
court should affirm the judgment of the trial court if it is correct on any theory of law
applicable to the case, including but not limited to the theory adopted by the trial court,
providing the facts are undisputed. [Citations.] Thus we must affirm so long as any of
the grounds urged by [defendants], either here or in the trial court, entitle [them] to
summary judgment.' " (Schmidt v. Bank of American, N.A. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1489,
1498.)
4
II
Analysis
The Leyvas contend the trail immunity does not apply to Crockett because
Miguel's injury was not caused by a condition of the trail, but by Crockett's failure to
erect safety barriers on the 13th hole of the golf course to stop golf balls flying onto the
trail. We disagree.
Section 831.4 provides in relevant part, "A public entity … or a grantor of a
public easement to a public entity for any of the following purposes, is not liable for an
injury caused by a condition of: [¶] (a) Any unpaved road which provides access to
fishing, hunting, camping, hiking, riding, including animal and all types of vehicular
riding, water sports, recreational or scenic areas and which is not a (1) city street or
highway or (2) county, state or federal highway or (3) public street or highway of a joint
highway district, boulevard district, bridge and highway district or similar district formed
for the improvement or building of public streets or highways. [¶] (b) Any trail used for
the above purposes." (§ 831.4, subds. (a) & (b), italics added.) "This immunity is
afforded 'to encourage public entities to open their property for public recreational use,
because "the burden and expense of putting such property in a safe condition and the
expense of defending claims for injuries would probably cause many public entities to
close such areas to public use." ' " (Amberger-Warren v. City of Piedmont (2006) 143
Cal.App.4th 1074, 1078 (Amberger-Warren), citing Armenio v. County of San Mateo
(1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 413, 417.)
5
"[T]o fulfill its purpose, trail immunity must extend to claims arising from the
design of a trail, as well as its maintenance." (Amberger-Warren, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1084; see Prokop v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1341–1342
(Prokop).) "[L]ocation, no less than design, is an integral feature of a trail, and both must
be immunized for the same reasons." (Amberger-Warren, at p. 1085.) This immunity is
absolute. (Armenio v. County of San Mateo, supra, 28 Cal.App.4th at p. 416.)
Crockett as a grantor of a public easement to a public entity for a recreational
purpose, falls within the scope of the trail immunity statute.4 However, the Leyvas
contend the trail's location next to the golf course "has nothing to do with the fact that
[Miguel] was injured by a golf ball from the Club property," and the golf course's lack of
safety barriers on the 13th hole is not a faulty design or condition of the trail. We
disagree and find the analysis of Amberger-Warren, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th 1074 and
Prokop, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th 1332 persuasive.
In Amberger-Warren, the plaintiff slipped and fell on a pathway in a public dog
park in the City of Piedmont. (Amberger-Warren, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 1077.)
The trial court granted summary judgment for the city pursuant to section 831.4, and the
plaintiff appealed, arguing, in part, trail immunity did not apply because the accident was
caused by conditions " 'unrelated' " to the trail. (Ibid.) Two of these alleged "unrelated"
conditions included the city's failure to install a guardrail where the accident occurred and
the trail's dangerous location next to a slope where people could fall. (Id. at p. 1083.)
4 The parties do not dispute the recreational purpose of the trail. 6
The court rejected both arguments and held trail immunity "must" extend to a trail's
design and location. (Id. at pp. 1084–1085.) The court reasoned, "[t]o accept plaintiff's
argument would be to require installation of handrails or other safety devices on trails, or
relocation of trails, whenever the surroundings could otherwise be considered
unreasonably dangerous," and "[t]he likely and unacceptable result" would be the closure
of many public trails. (Id. at p. 1085.)
In Prokop, the plaintiff sued the City of Los Angeles after he suffered injuries
while bicycling on a public bikeway designed by the city. (Prokop, supra, 150
Cal.App.4th at p. 1335.) While cycling off the bikeway, the plaintiff ignored messages
painted on the pavement that said "WALK BIKE" and he collided with a chain link
fence. (Ibid.) The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant, finding the
city was immune under section 831.4. (Prokop, at p. 1336.) The plaintiff appealed,
arguing, in part, his injury was caused by the design of the bicycle gate rather than the
condition of the bikeway. (Id. at p. 1341.) The court rejected this argument and followed
Amberger-Warren, holding the " 'condition' of" the bikeway included the design of the
bicycle gate. (Prokop, at pp. 1341–1342.) The court also rejected the plaintiff's
argument that trail immunity did not apply because the accident did not occur on the
bikeway itself, and it stated the "gateway to or from a bike path is patently an integral
part of the bike path." (Id. at p. 1342, citing Amberger-Warren, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1085.)
Here, the Leyvas are incorrect to argue the location of the trail next to the golf
course is unrelated to Miguel's injuries: Miguel would not have been struck by the golf
7
ball if he had not been walking on a trail located next to the golf course. Just as the trail's
location next to a hill in Amberger-Warren, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th 1074 is an integral
feature of the trail, so is the trail's location next to the golf course. Further, it makes no
difference whether the alleged negligence in failing to erect safety barriers along the
boundary between the golf course and the trail occurred on the golf course or on the trail
itself because the effect is the same.
Additionally, the erection of a safety barrier on the boundary of the golf course is
equivalent to the installation of a handrail in Amberger-Warren. In that case, the court
observed, "[w]e presume that there are many miles of public trails on slopes in this state
that could be made safer with handrails, and that handrails would perhaps enhance the
safety of all trails, wherever located, that bear pedestrian traffic. But to require
installation of handrails along every public trail where it might be reasonably prudent to
do so would greatly undermine the immunity's objective of encouraging access to
recreational areas . . . ." (Amberger-Warren, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1084–1085.)
Similarly, public pathways along golf courses certainly could be made safer by cordoning
off or erecting high barriers between the golf courses and trails. However, setting aside
how the aesthetics of such barriers could mar the recreational experience for trail users,
the burden and expense of erecting barriers to make recreational trails entirely safe from
errant golf balls would chill private landowners, such as Crockett, from granting public
easements to public entities along golf courses, resulting in closure of such areas to
public use. (Id. at p. 1085.) As the Amberger-Warren court noted, "we would like to live
in a world of resources sufficient to guarantee reasonable safety at all times, [but] 'users
8
of recreational trails or bike paths generally understand the risk of injury inherent in the
use of such pedestrian ways,' and recognize that ' "[a] large portion of the activities
comprising modern public park and recreation programs … might well be curtailed,
deferred or even completely eliminated if the risk of tort liability were to impose unduly
large obligations.' " (Ibid.)
Crockett as a grantor of a public easement to a public entity is absolutely immune
from liability under section 831.4 arising from injuries caused by conditions of the trail,
including injuries arising from the trail's location and design. Accordingly, we conclude
the trial court properly granted Crockett's motion for summary judgment on the grounds
the Leyvas complaint is barred by trail immunity provided in section 831.4. Given this
conclusion, we need not decide whether the immunity under Civil Code section 846
applies.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The respondent is awarded its costs on appeal.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, J.
IRION, J.
9
Filed 1/25/17
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
MIGUEL LEYVA et al., D069756
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2014-00011334- CU-PO-CTL) CROCKETT & COMPANY, INC., ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION Defendant and Respondent. FOR PUBLICATION
THE COURT:
The opinion in this case filed January 18, 2017, was not certified for publication.
It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules
of Court, rule 8.1105(c), the request pursuant to rule 8.1120(a) for publication is
GRANTED.
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for publication
specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and
ORDERED that the words "Not to Be Published in the Official Reports" appearing
on page 1 of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be published in the Official
Reports.
McCONNELL, P. J.
Copies to: All parties
2
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. A grantor of a public easement for a recreational trail is entitled to absolute immunity under Government Code section 831.4 for injuries caused by the trail's design or location, including its proximity to a golf course.
Issues
Whether a grantor of a public easement is immune from liability under Government Code section 831.4 for injuries occurring on a trail adjacent to a golf course.
Whether the lack of safety barriers between a golf course and an adjacent public trail constitutes a condition of the trail subject to statutory immunity.
Disposition. affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Crockett as a grantor of a public easement to a public entity is absolutely immune from liability under section 831.4 arising from injuries caused by conditions of the trail, including injuries arising from the trail's location and design.”
“[T]o fulfill its purpose, trail immunity must extend to claims arising from the design of a trail, as well as its maintenance.”
“[L]ocation, no less than design, is an integral feature of a trail, and both must be immunized for the same reasons.”