Goodrich argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the
People's recommitment petition. According to Goodrich, MDO "commitments require an
underlying felony, whereas appellant's commitment offense is now a misdemeanor." He
contends that because section 1170.18, subdivision (k) specifies that the reduction of a
felony offense to a misdemeanor is to be " 'for all purposes,' " Proposition 47 has
effectively altered the felony on which his original commitment was based, and,
therefore, he can no longer be recommitted as an MDO. As Goodrich states, "Nothing
remains to justify a commitment, especially one imposed under a catchall provision for
felonies involving violence or serious threats."
We disagree with Goodrich's analysis. At the time that Goodrich was initially
committed as an MDO, his situation satisfied all six of the criteria allowing for an MDO
commitment. Indeed, it was determined not only that Goodrich had a severe mental
9
disorder that was not in remission or could not be kept in remission without treatment,
and that he represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others as a result of the
disorder, but, also that the disorder was a cause of or aggravating factor in his
commission of an offense for which he was sentenced to prison. Not only was Goodrich
sentenced to prison, but he served his term, and had been in treatment for the disorder for
90 days or more preceding his scheduled release on parole. Thus, in 2008, when
Goodrich was initially committed as an MDO pursuant to section 2962, he was
determined to have met all of the requisite criteria; therefore, the record demonstrates that
at the time Goodrich was initially committed as an MDO in 2008, he met the requisite
factors for commitment.
Goodrich is presently seeking to prevent his further recommitment as an MDO.
Recommitment is governed by sections 2970 and 2972. Section 2970 requires that the
People file a petition with the trial court if the People seek the continued involuntary
treatment of an MDO for an additional year. The People's petition must "be accompanied
by affidavits specifying that treatment, while the prisoner was released from prison on
parole, has been continuously provided by the State Department of State Hospitals either
in a state hospital or in an outpatient program," and must "specify that the prisoner has a
severe mental disorder, that the severe mental disorder is not in remission or cannot be
kept in remission if the person's treatment is not continued, and that, by reason of his or
her severe mental disorder, the prisoner represents a substantial danger of physical harm
to others." (Id., subd. (b).)
10
Pursuant to section 2972, subdivision (c), if, at the hearing on the People's petition
made pursuant to section 2970, "the court or jury finds that the patient has a severe
mental disorder, that the patient's severe mental disorder is not in remission or cannot be
kept in remission without treatment, and that by reason of his or her severe mental
disorder, the patient represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others," the court
must order the MDO to be recommitted.
As is clear from the statutory framework, there is no requirement that the People
present evidence to establish the existence of the three "static" criteria (i.e., that mental
disorder was a cause of or an aggravating factor in an enumerated crime; that the
individual was sentenced to prison for the crime; and that the individual had been in
treatment for the disorder for 90 days or more in the year preceding his or her release on
parole) at a recommitment proceeding. Rather, once an individual has been determined to
be an MDO and has been properly committed in an initial commitment proceeding, the
only things that must be established in a recommitment proceeding are "that the patient
has a severe mental disorder, that the patient's severe mental disorder is not in remission
or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, and that by reason of his or her severe
mental disorder, the patient represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others."
(§ 2972, subd. (c).) Thus, at Goodrich's recommitment proceeding, the court was not
required to consider whether Goodrich had served a sentence for any offense. Goodrich's
current commitment is not predicated upon his felony conviction; rather, it is predicated
on his current mental state and dangerousness. His prior felony conviction is not a factor
bearing on his current recommitment. It is undisputed that, at the time he was initially
11
committed as an MDO, he had suffered a felony conviction for which he served a
sentence in prison and that the initial commitment was proper. Nothing about
Proposition 47 changes this.
What Goodrich seeks is a retroactive collateral change to his initial commitment
as an MDO as a result of having obtained relief pursuant to section 1170.18, subdivision
(f). However, there is no indication that the voters, in passing Proposition 47, intended
for its provisions to have the retroactive collateral consequence that Goodrich advances.
To the contrary, the procedures set forth in section 1170.18 that must be followed to
obtain the resentencing and reclassification benefits of Proposition 47 indicate that the
electorate intended a specific, limited prospective application of the relief available under
the new law. (See People v. Shabazz (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 303, 313-314; see also
People v. Noyan (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657, 672; People v. Rivera (2015) 233
Cal.App.4th 1085, 1100 [section 1170.18, subdivision (k), does not apply retroactively to
change rules applied to determine appellate jurisdiction].)
The stated purpose of Proposition 47 is a further indication that voters did not
intend for it to have the effect that Goodrich proposes. Specifically, "the express intent of
Proposition 47 is to 'reduce[ ] penalties for certain offenders convicted of nonserious and
nonviolent property and drug crimes.' " (Acosta, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 526, italics
added, original italics omitted.) An MDO, however, is, by definition, a person who not
only has a "severe mental disorder," but who has served a prison sentence as a result of
committing a serious or violent offense punishable by prison (i.e., one of the statute's
serious or violent enumerated offenses or any other felony offense that involved violence
12
or serious threats), and who continues to represent a "substantial danger of physical harm
to others" because of the disorder. (§ 2962, subds. (d) & (e).) Proposition 47 was
intended to reduce penalties for individuals who commit crimes that are not serious or
violent, and, therefore, are not likely to pose a danger of physical harm to others. To
apply Proposition 47 retroactively for the collateral purpose of invalidating an initial
MDO commitment long after it was properly imposed would be at odds with the purpose
intended by the voters.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
AARON, J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P. J.
HALLER, J.
13
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The redesignation of a felony conviction to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 does not invalidate a prior, lawful initial commitment as a Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) or preclude subsequent annual recommitment proceedings. Recommitment is based on the defendant's current mental state and dangerousness, not the underlying conviction status.
Issues
Does the redesignation of a felony conviction to a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 entitle an MDO to release from a civil commitment?
Must the People re-establish the 'static' criteria of an initial MDO commitment during annual recommitment proceedings?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Goodrich's current commitment is not predicated upon his felony conviction; rather, it is predicated on his current mental state and dangerousness.”
“To apply Proposition 47 retroactively for the collateral purpose of invalidating an initial MDO commitment long after it was properly imposed would be at odds with the purpose intended by the voters.”