512, 1194, 1199, 2802.)1 On November 17, 2009, the LWDA responded that "after
review," the agency "does not intend to investigate the allegations."
Five days later, Silva filed her first amended complaint (the operative complaint
here), alleging three causes of action. In the first two causes of action, Silva alleged See's
Candy violated California wage and hour laws and the unfair competition law (UCL;
Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) by failing to: (1) pay for all work performed; (2) pay
overtime compensation; (3) maintain lawful meal and rest period policies; (4) pay for
each meal or rest period that was not provided; (5) reimburse employees for business
related expenses; and (6) provide accurate itemized wage statements. Silva brought these
1 All further statutory references are to the Labor Code, unless otherwise specified. 3
claims on behalf of herself and on behalf of a putative class of current and former See's
Candy workers.
In the third cause of action, Silva alleged a PAGA claim, seeking PAGA statutory
penalties for the alleged Labor Code violations. (§ 2698 et seq.) In this cause of action,
Silva alleged See's Candy "committed the above-referenced and incorporated wage and
hour violations against Plaintiffs and the class members." She also specifically identified
several alleged statutory violations, including the failure to: (1) pay full compensation
due "by improperly 'rounding' the time worked by employees," citing sections 204, 510,
and 1194; (2) provide required rest and meal periods, citing sections 226.7 and 512; (3)
provide statutorily-compliant itemized wage statements, citing section 226; and (4)
indemnify employees for necessary business expenditures or losses, citing section 2802.
In its amended answer, See's Candy denied Silva's allegations and asserted
numerous affirmative defenses, including that its employees were fully and fairly
compensated under its rounding policy and grace-period policy, and that these policies
were consistent with state and federal laws.
Based on Silva's request, the court certified a class only on the issues of whether
See's Candy's rounding and grace-period policies violate applicable law. The certified
class consisted of California workers who were employed by See's Candy "from October
20, 2005 to the present." The court certified the class on two issues: (1) "Whether class
members suffered a loss of compensation when they clocked in and out on the . . .
timekeeping system utilized by See's [Candy] which rounded time to the nearest six
minutes" (the rounding policy); and (2) "Whether class members suffered a loss of
4
compensation when they clocked in or out on the . . . timekeeping system utilized by
See's [Candy] during the 'grace period,' defined as up to ten minutes before their
scheduled start times and up to ten minutes after their scheduled quitting times" (the
grace-period policy).
Silva then moved for summary adjudication on See's Candy's rounding-policy
affirmative defense. Silva argued See's Candy's rounding policy violates California law
requiring an employer to fully compensate an employee every two weeks and pay
premium wages for overtime work. The court (Judge Joel Pressman) agreed, granted the
motion, and dismissed See's Candy's rounding defense.
See's Candy successfully petitioned for a writ of mandate in this court. (See's
Candy, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th 889.) Adopting the federal standard and the rule used by
California's regulatory agency, we held an employer is entitled to use a rounding policy if
the policy "is fair and neutral on its face" and " 'is used in such a manner that it will not
result, over a period of time, in failure to compensate the employees properly for all the
time they have actually worked.' " (Id. at p. 907.) Applying this standard, we found that
Silva did not meet her summary adjudication burden to show See's Candy's rounding
policy was unlawful as a matter of law, and even if she did meet this burden, See's
Candy's evidence showed the existence of triable issues of fact. (Id. at pp. 907-913.)
Because See's Candy had not affirmatively moved for summary adjudication or
judgment, we did not consider whether See's Candy was entitled to judgment based on its
own submitted evidence.
5
Summary Adjudication on PAGA Claim
While this writ proceeding had been pending in this court, See's Candy moved in
the trial court for summary adjudication on Silva's PAGA claim seeking penalties for the
alleged Labor Code violations. In this motion, See's Candy asserted separate arguments
regarding two portions of Silva's PAGA claim: (1) the portion of the PAGA claim
challenging See's Candy's rounding and grace-period polices; and (2) the portion of the
PAGA claim asserting other statutory violations (e.g., mealtime violations, failure to
reimburse for business expenses).
On the portion of Silva's PAGA claim challenging See's Candy's rounding and
grace-period policies, See's Candy argued it was entitled to judgment on this claim
because: (1) Silva's notice to the LWDA was insufficient to notify the agency of these
challenges (see § 2699.3, subd.(a)(1)); (2) PAGA does not govern challenges to rounding
and grace-period policies; (3) Silva's position conflicted with the Labor Commissioner's
enforcement policies; and (4) PAGA is unconstitutional.
On the portion of the PAGA claim seeking relief for the other alleged labor
violations, See's Candy argued these claims were without merit based on See's Candy's
discovery responses reflecting that these claims were no longer "at issue."
Silva opposed the motion on numerous grounds. Regarding the rounding/grace-
period policies, Silva argued the LWDA notice was adequate and that she was not
required to more specifically detail the grounds of the claim in the notice, particularly
because these issues pertain to an affirmative defense and because she was unaware of
6
these grounds (alleged improper rounding/grace-period timekeeping policies) when she
first sent the LWDA notice.
Regarding the other alleged Labor Code violations, Silva argued she never
abandoned these claims, and produced evidence of her counsel's January 2010 letters to
defense counsel indicating the grace-period and rounding policy challenges were not the
only claims being asserted in her complaint. She did not, however, produce any facts
supporting the validity of these alleged Labor Code violations.
Shortly after the parties filed these briefs, the trial court stayed the matter pending
the completion of the writ proceeding. Our decision in See's Candy then became final in
February 2013. After remand, the trial court gave the parties leave to file supplemental
briefs given the lengthy passage of time. In her supplemental brief, Silva focused only on
her PAGA claims based on the rounding/grace-period claim, and did not present any
argument or evidence on the individual claims.
After considering the parties' submissions and conducting a hearing, the court
(Judge Randa Trapp) granted summary adjudication on Silva's PAGA cause of action.
On the portion of the PAGA claim challenging See's Candy's rounding and grace-period
policies, the court found See's Candy was entitled to prevail as a matter of law because
Silva's LWDA notice was defective as it was not sufficiently specific with respect to
these particular challenges. (See § 2699.3, subd. (a)(1).) On the PAGA claims based on
other alleged Labor Code violations, the court found that although Silva had alleged
various wage and hour violations in her PAGA claim, Silva's interrogatory responses
7
showed she had "abandoned" these claims. The court also noted that Silva had certified a
class only "as to the issues of rounding and grace periods."
See's Candy's Summary Judgment Motion
Ten days later, See's Candy moved for summary judgment on the remaining
claims alleged in Silva's first and second causes of action. In this motion, See's Candy
argued the class-certified claims failed as a matter of law because the undisputed
evidence demonstrated Silva could not prove the class lost compensation as a result of
See's Candy's application of the rounding or grace-period policies.
In support, See's Candy produced evidence describing its timekeeping policies.
According to this evidence, See's Candy uses a timekeeping software system, known as
Kronos, to record its employee work hours. Employees are required to "punch" into the
system at the beginning and end of their shifts, as well as for lunch breaks. A Kronos
punch shows the actual time (to the minute) when the employee clocked into the system.
During the relevant times, See's Candy calculated an employee's pay based on the Kronos
punch times, subject to adjustment under two policies: (1) a rounding policy; and (2) the
grace-period policy.
Under the rounding policy, in and out punches are rounded (up or down) to the
nearest tenth of an hour (every six minutes beginning with the hour mark). The time
punches are thus rounded to the nearest three-minute mark. For example, if an employee
clocks in at 7:58 a.m., the system rounds up the time to 8:00 a.m. If the employee clocks
in at 8:02 a.m., the system rounds down the entry to 8:00 a.m. Both times are indicated
on the punch card.
8
Under the separate grace-period policy, employees whose schedules have been
programmed into the Kronos system may voluntarily punch into the system up to 10
minutes before their scheduled start time and 10 minutes after their scheduled end time.
This grace period is voluntary, and is offered to employees to provide flexibility in the
manner and times that workers clock in and out of the shifts. See's Candy's rules prohibit
employees from working during the grace period. If an employee is asked to work during
this time, the manager is required to make a timekeeping adjustment to ensure the
employee is paid for that work. Managers at See's Candy shops closely monitor
employee start and stop times to ensure they are not working outside their scheduled
work times.
Because See's Candy assumes the employees are not working during the 10-
minute grace period, if an employee punches into the system during this time, the
employee is paid based on his or her scheduled start/stop time, rather than the punch
time. In other words, the grace-period time-punches accurately show when the employee
punched in or out, but they do not show the beginning or end of the employee's work
time, i.e., compensable time. Generally, if the grace-period rule is applied, the rounding
policy becomes irrelevant because the start and/or stop time will be exactly the
employee's scheduled time and there will be no need to round down or up to the nearest
tenth of an hour.
See's Candy also presented two declarations of Dr. Ali Saad, a labor economist
and statistician, who examined thousands of See's Candy time records. Dr. Saad said that
each time punch record contained two entries: (1) the actual time the employee clocked
9
in or out; and (2) the actual punch time to the nearest tenth of an hour, either up or down.
Using these records, Dr. Saad calculated each employee's shift twice, first using the
actual unrounded time stamps, and second using the rounded time stamps. Dr. Saad then
computed the differences in duration between the shifts. Based on these calculations, Dr.
Saad concluded in two separate studies (one in 2010 and one in 2011) that See's Candy's
rounding rule is "unbiased."
In his 2010 study, Dr. Saad examined See's Candy employee time punch records
from October 2005 to March 2010. Dr. Saad found See's Candy's rounding policy
resulted in a total gain of 2,230 hours for the class members as a whole. For plaintiff
Silva, Dr. Saad found an "aggregate shortfall" of .47 hours or 28 minutes, which he said
"equates to a shortfall in the average rounded relative to actual shift of 2 seconds." Based
on these calculations and a statistical analysis, Dr. Saad opined that the rounding policy
"is exactly neutral" and unbiased.
In the 2011 study, Dr. Saad expanded the coverage period to April 2011 and also
included hourly employees who worked in See's Candy's administrative office locations.
This increased the number of employees analyzed from 7,500 to 9,000, and the number
of shifts from approximately 900,000 to more than 1.2 million. Dr. Saad also specifically
considered California law providing a worker had the right to overtime pay after working
an eight-hour day.
Based on this study, Dr. Saad reaffirmed that See's Candy's rounding rule is "both
mathematically and empirically unbiased." Specifically, he concluded: (1) the aggregate
impact of rounding actual time punches produced a net surplus of 2,749 employee work
10
hours in time paid and thus resulted in a net economic benefit to the employees as a
group; (2) 67 percent of the employees had either no impact or a net gain under the
rounding policy; (3) the rounding policy did not negatively impact employee overtime
compensation: it was "virtually a wash—neither the employees nor See's benefited from
this rounding practice"; and (4) there was no meaningful impact on Silva's hours paid
under the rounding practice; she obtained an aggregate surplus of 1.85 hours.
In reaching these conclusions, Dr. Saad said he had assumed employees did not
work during the grace period; whether this assumption was correct could not be observed
from the data; and he was not asked to address this factual issue. Dr. Saad indicated he
did not round during the 10 minutes before or after an employee's scheduled time period
if the employee's scheduled work times had been programmed into the Kronos system
because under the grace-period policy, the employee would be paid from the scheduled
time, not from a rounded time.
See's Candy also presented evidence that it periodically reminded employees they
were prohibited from working if they clocked in during the grace period, and employees
were told that if they worked during this time they must notify the manager who would
manually add time to the employee's Kronos records. See's Candy submitted declarations
from numerous employees who stated they did not work during the grace period;
understood that if they did work they would be compensated for the time; understood that
the decision to use the policy is "always voluntary"; and described the types of personal
activities performed during this period, including using the restroom "to do my makeup
11
or hair," going to the post office to drop off personal mail, "go[ing] across the street to
the [drugstore]," and "play[ing] games on my cell phone."
Silva's Summary Judgment Opposition
In opposition, Silva argued the summary judgment motion must be denied because
See's Candy made no attempt to meet its burden to show her nonclass claims
(nonrounding/nongrace-period claims) alleged in her first two causes of action have no
merit. She noted that in her amended complaint she alleged that she did not receive
statutorily-required rest and meal periods in violation of sections 226.7 and 512, and that
See's Candy "failed to reimburse her for expenses she incurred through the performance
of her job duties, in violation of . . . section 2802." Silva also presented her declaration to
support the viability of these individual (nonclass/nonrounding/nongrace-period) claims.
In relevant part, Silva's declaration stated:
"While I was working at SEE'S, there were times when our store was very busy. This was especially true during the Holiday Season, which normally lasted from October through January, each year. During these peak times, it was extremely rare that I would be provided a rest break."
"I also know that I never received a rest period payment on the occasions where I was not provided a rest break. In fact, I am unaware of anyone at SEE'S who ever received a rest period payment. [¶] . . . Throughout my employment, but especially during the Holiday season, there were occasions when it was just not possible for me to get to take a full 30 minute meal break, because we were too busy in the store."
"During these interrupted lunch breaks, my time records would show I was punched out for lunch. However, I would be asked by SEE'S to perform work or assist a customer during my lunch break. I would do so when asked, even though I did not punch back in to be
12
paid for that time. [¶] . . . I do not believe I was ever given a meal period payment for these interrupted lunches."
"Additionally, while working for SEE'S, I was often required to use my personal car to drive to the bank for See's business. While I did receive some reimbursement from SEE'S, I do not believe it was enough to cover all of my expenses. I also received, and had to make, calls for SEE'S on my personal cell phone, for which I never received reimbursement."
Silva also contended that the summary judgment motion on her class claims
(challenging the rounding/grace-period policies) was without merit because the See's
Candy court had already ruled triable factual issues exist on these issues. She
alternatively argued that See's Candy did not meet its summary judgment burden because
Dr. Saad had made numerous unsupported assumptions and his conclusions were
contrary to applicable law. Silva also submitted the declaration of her own expert, Robert
Fountain, a statistics professor, to show the existence of triable issues of fact on her
rounding/grace-period claims. In his declaration, Fountain opined that See's Candy's
timekeeping "system is inherently not fair or neutral in its application to the employees,"
and that numerous employees "lost very large amounts of compensation . . . ."2
To show triable issues of fact on her challenge to See's Candy's grace-period
policy, Silva mainly argued that the employees were under See's Candy's control while
clocked into the Kronos system. Silva relied on her expert's declaration (who assumed
that employees were working during the grace period) and excerpts from her deposition
2 We do not further detail Fountain's opinions because (as explained below) the court sustained See's Candy's objections to the entire declaration, and Silva has not challenged this evidentiary ruling on appeal. 13
testimony, in which she said that she occasionally saw employees clocking in 10 minutes
before their shifts and they would then "either . . . do hand exercises or . . . do things or
whatever, you know. They would just come in and start their shift and work." Silva
acknowledged, however, that she did not know if these other employees' schedules were
programmed into the Kronos system and did not know if they were paid for the time they
worked before their scheduled shifts.
See's Candy's Reply
In its reply memorandum on the issue of Silva's individual claims, See's Candy
argued that Silva's first two causes of action encompass only class allegations
(challenging See's Candy's rounding and grace-period policies), and that these causes of
action did not include any individual claims. See's Candy also presented a copy of a July
2010 settlement and release agreement (Settlement Agreement) between See's Candy and
Silva, in which Silva agreed to release discrimination claims she previously filed with the
Equal Opportunity Commission in exchange for a monetary payment from See's Candy.
See's Candy argued that in this Settlement Agreement, Silva had agreed not to pursue any
individual claims in her existing superior court action and to assert only her class claims.
See's Candy alternatively argued that if the court concluded that Silva had remaining
viable individual (nonrounding/nongrace-period) claims, the court should permit See's
Candy to file and serve an amended notice requesting summary adjudication on the class
claims as an alternative to a summary judgment.
14
See's Candy also asserted numerous objections to Fountain's declaration, including
that Fountain's opinions lack factual foundation and were based on assumptions contrary
to the law established in See's Candy.
Silva's Response to New Material Submitted in See's Candy's Reply
Silva objected to See's Candy presenting new evidence (the Settlement
Agreement), and argued that the Settlement Agreement was irrelevant because it applied
only to her discrimination claims and not to her wage and hour claims alleged in the first
amended complaint. Silva also objected to See's Candy's counsel's proposed amended
notice to add a summary adjudication motion as an alternative to her summary judgment
motion.
Court's Ruling Granting Summary Judgment
After considering the parties' submissions and conducting a hearing, the court
granted See's Candy's motion in its entirety. With respect to the class claims, the court
first sustained See's Candy's evidentiary objections to the declaration of Silva's expert,
Fountain. The court then found that See's Candy met its "initial burden on summary
judgment of demonstrating that the time rounding policy was facially neutral," and Silva
did not meet her burden to create a triable issue of fact on this issue. The court similarly
found See's Candy met its burden to show its grace-period policy did not result in
undercompensation, and Silva did not meet her burden to show a triable factual issue on
the lawfulness of this policy.
The court also agreed with See's Candy that Silva had not alleged individual
claims in her first two causes of action. The court noted that although the complaint's
15
caption stated the claims were being brought in Silva's individual capacity, the body of
the complaint focused on her class allegations. The court also found Silva had released
any individual claims by entering into the Settlement Agreement.
In moving for reconsideration, Silva objected to the court's conclusion that she had
not alleged individual claims in her amended complaint. Silva pointed out that her
amended complaint contained numerous references to the fact that she was bringing
claims in her individual capacity (particularly the alleged meal and rest break violations
and the failure to reimburse for business expenses). Silva also submitted her counsel's
declaration and her own declaration explaining the settlement of the discrimination
claims, and that the parties did not intend that it would apply to the individual wage and
hour claims asserted in the complaint. She noted that the Settlement Agreement
contained an express exclusion for the "claims" alleged in Silva's class action complaint.
The court denied the motion.
DISCUSSION
I. Review Standards
A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication "bears the
burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [the defendant]
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25
Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) To meet this burden, the defendant must show one or more
elements of the cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense
to that cause of action. (Ibid.) This burden can be met by relying on the opposing party's
factually inadequate discovery responses if these responses show the plaintiff "will be
16
unable to prove its case by any means." (Weber v. John Crane, Inc. (2006) 143
Cal.App.4th 1433, 1439; see Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Construction Co. (1999) 69
Cal.App.4th 64, 78-81.) A defendant seeking to prevail on this ground must make an
affirmative showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain,
evidence to prove his or her case. (Collin v. CalPortland Co. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th
582, 587; see Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768 (Saelzler).)
If the defendant does not present sufficient evidence to meet its initial burden, the
court must deny the motion. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) But if the defendant
satisfies its burden, " 'the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of
one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.' " (Id. at
p. 849.) The plaintiff must present admissible evidence to establish a triable issue of fact.
(Dollinger DeAnza Associates v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1132,
1144-1145.) An "issue of fact . . . is not created by 'speculation, conjecture, imagination
or guess work.' " (Sinai Memorial Chapel v. Dudler (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 190, 196.)
We review de novo a summary judgment or summary adjudication. (Saelzler,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 767.) We must affirm the court's ruling if it is correct on any
ground asserted in the trial court, regardless of the trial court's stated reason. (Grebing v.
24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 631, 637.) In evaluating the record,
we strictly scrutinize the moving party's papers and resolve all doubts in the opposing
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 96, 102-107 (Andrews); Union Bank v. Superior Court (1995) 31
Cal.App.4th 573, 578.) A plaintiff's response to a comprehensive interrogatory question
must fully disclose the information known at the time of the discovery request.
(Andrews, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 106.)
In answering a direct request that she "state with particularity" the facts supporting
her PAGA claim, Silva discussed only facts pertaining to the rounding/grace-period
challenges. (Capitalization omitted.) From this response, it is reasonable to presume that
Silva was unaware of any other facts or theories supporting her PAGA claim. Silva
argues this inference is unreasonable because she expressly reserved the right to
supplement her responses, and See's Candy delayed some of its own discovery responses.
Although Silva had the right to add information to her interrogatory responses, the critical
point is that she never did so. See's Candy asked for information that was within Silva's
knowledge and control, and Silva's omission of facts to support her
nonrounding/nongrace-period claims was sufficient to meet See's Candy's burden to show
these factual theories underlying Silva's PAGA claim were nonexistent or had been
abandoned.
37
Because See's Candy met its summary adjudication burden, the burden of
production shifted to Silva to establish with admissible evidence the existence of a triable
issue of fact as to her PAGA claim on the nonrounding/nongrace-period theories. (See
Andrews, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 107.) On our independent review of the record,
we conclude Silva did not do so.
In attempting to meet this burden, Silva relied on her counsel's declaration and
2010 correspondence between her counsel and See's Candy's counsel in which her
counsel indicated that the grace-period and rounding claims were not the only claims
being asserted in the complaint. This evidence did not meet Silva's burden to show a
triable issue of fact. The fact that defense counsel was on notice in 2010 that Silva's
counsel was intending to assert theories in addition to rounding/grace-period claims as
support for Silva's PAGA claim, does not mean that Silva had any facts to support these
claims four years later in 2014 when she opposed the summary adjudication motion. In
opposing the summary adjudication motion, Silva did not come forward with any
admissible evidence supporting her PAGA claim on the nonrounding/nongrace-period
issues. Accordingly, the court properly granted summary adjudication on the PAGA
cause of action in its entirety.
IV. Silva's Violation of Appellate Rules
It is a fundamental principle of appellate law that the lower court's judgment is
presumed to be correct. An appellant has the burden to overcome the presumption of
correctness and show prejudicial error. (See Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d
557, 564.) To satisfy this burden, the appellant must comply with rules that ensure both
38
parties receive a fair and complete review of their contentions. Silva failed to comply
with several of these rules.
Most important, Silva violated the rule that an appellant's brief must provide "a
summary of the significant facts" relevant to the appellate issues raised in the case. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).) In her appellate briefs, Silva made no effort to
summarize all of the evidence presented in the summary judgment proceeding, and
frequently ignored the evidence presented by See's Candy. A summary judgment motion
triggers a procedure in which the parties pierce the pleadings to determine whether there
are disputed facts and thus whether a trial is necessary to resolve the dispute. (Jordan v.
City of Sacramento (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1492.) Thus, when a summary
judgment is challenged, a reviewing court must examine the facts presented by the parties
to determine whether summary judgment or summary adjudication was warranted. By
failing to describe all of the evidence proffered in the proceedings, Silva did not satisfy
her appellate burden.
Additionally, Silva violated the rule requiring an appellant to provide a record
sufficient to determine whether the asserted errors are meritorious. (See Stasz v.
Eisenberg (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1039; Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72
Cal.App.4th 111, 136.) Silva failed to designate many of See's Candy's documents
submitted in support of its summary adjudication and summary judgment motions. The
fact that See's Candy did later produce these records in a Respondent's Appendix does not
relieve Silva of the obligation to have provided a complete record.
39
Silva also made numerous factual assertions without providing any record citation.
Statements of fact not supported by citations to the record are improper. (Nwosu v. Uba
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246; Bernard v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1991) 226
Cal.App.3d 1203, 1205.)
See's Candy contends Silva forfeited her right to appeal by violating these
appellate rules. In the interests of justice we have considered the merits of Silva's
appellate assertions. However, Silva's counsel should be mindful of the governing
appellate rules in future briefs he files in the California courts.
40
DISPOSITION
We affirm the summary adjudication on the PAGA claim (third cause of action).
We reverse the summary judgment on the first and second causes of action with
directions to the trial court to enter a new order: (1) granting summary adjudication in
See's Candy's favor on the class and individual claims based on Silva's challenges to See's
Candy's rounding and grace-period policies; and (2) denying summary adjudication on
Silva's individual claims alleging See's Candy violated Silva's rights with respect to rest
and meal periods, and business expense reimbursement. Under these orders, the court
shall dismiss the class-certified claims and the PAGA claims in their entirety. The parties
to bear their own costs on appeal.
HALLER, J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, Acting P. J.
AARON, J.
41
Filed 1/5/17 COURT OF APPEAL - STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
PAMELA SILVA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SEE'S CANDY SHOPS, INC., Defendant and Respondent. D068136 San Diego County No. 37-2009-00100692-CU-OE-CTL
THE COURT:
The opinion in this case filed December 9, 2016, was not certified for publication. It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), the requests pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(a), for publication are GRANTED.
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and
ORDERED that the words "Not to Be Published in the Official Reports" appearing on page 1 of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be published in the Official Reports.
Holding. The court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on certain individual wage and hour claims, but correctly entered judgment for the employer on the PAGA cause of action and class-certified claims regarding rounding and grace-period policies.
Issues
Whether the trial court properly granted summary adjudication on the PAGA claim due to insufficient LWDA notice.
Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment on class claims regarding rounding and grace-period policies.
Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on individual non-class wage and hour claims.
Disposition. Reversed in part and affirmed in part.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We determine the court erred in granting summary judgment with respect to certain of Silva's individual claims, but the court properly entered judgment in See's Candy's favor on all remaining claims, including the PAGA cause of action”