California Court of Appeal Sep 22, 2016 No. D067946Unpublished
Before: Prager, Nares, Haller
Filed 9/22/16 P. v Boswell CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D067946
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD250082)
JEFF ANTOINE BOSWELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Howard H.
Shore, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Nancy J. King, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson, Kristine A.
Gutierrez and Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury found Jeff Antoine Boswell guilty of murdering Blanche Griffin while
engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery and burglary (count 1),
and burglary of an inhabited dwelling (count 2). The jury also found Boswell guilty of
two counts of commercial burglary (counts 3, 4) and petty theft (count 5). The trial court
found true certain prior conviction allegations. The court sentenced Boswell to a total
to joined charges is simple and distinct, the prejudicial effect of joinder usually does not
rise to a level of gross unfairness].) The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM
No. 3515 that each count charged a distinct crime and had to be considered separately.
The jury also received instructions on the elements of the offenses, the mental state
required for each charge, and the prosecution's burden of proving the charges beyond a
reasonable doubt. We presume the jury followed these directions. (People v. Sanchez
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852.) Boswell cited to nothing in the record suggesting the jury
expressed any confusion about the charges. Accordingly, Boswell has not demonstrated
any gross unfairness that denied him due process or a fair trial.
A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show not only that his
or her counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms, but also that it is reasonably probable, but for counsel's
failings, the result would have been more favorable to the defendant. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694.) To prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel based specifically on counsel's failure to move for severance,
Boswell "must show that reasonably competent counsel would have moved for
severance, that such motion would have been successful, and that had the counts been
severed an outcome more favorable to him was reasonably probable." (People v. Grant
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 829, 864-865.) Assuming, without deciding, that reasonably competent
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counsel would have moved for severance, Boswell cannot demonstrate that a motion to
sever would have been successful.
"Joinder of criminal charges for trial benefits the public by reducing delay in the
disposition of criminal charges, and it benefits the state by conserving judicial resources
and public funds." (People v. Hill (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 727, 735.) Section 954
contains the statutory rules governing the joinder and severance of criminal charges.
Section 954 provides, in part: "An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different
offenses connected together in their commission, or . . . two or more different offenses of
the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts . . . ." (§ 954.)
Here, the threshold statutory requirements for joinder are met as the crimes were
connected together in their commission with the "element of intent to feloniously obtain
property run[ning] like a single thread through the various offenses." (People v. Mendoza
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 160 [robberies and a murder committed on sequential days were
connected together in their commission]; People v. Stewart (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 1050,
1058 [proper to join murder and robbery charges involving different victims where the
offenses occurred during a one-month period and therefore grew out of a "continuing and
intertwined sequence of criminal activity"].) Nonetheless, Boswell may be entitled to
severance of the charges "in the interests of justice and for good cause shown." (§ 954.)
To have prevailed on a motion to sever, Boswell had the burden of demonstrating
substantial prejudice requiring that the charges be separately tried. (People v. Bradford
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1315.) " 'Refusal to sever may be an abuse of discretion where:
(1) evidence on the crimes to be jointly tried would not be cross-admissible in separate
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trials; (2) certain of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against the
defendant; (3) a "weak" case has been joined with a "strong" case, or with another "weak"
case, so that the "spillover" effect of aggregate evidence on several charges might well
alter the outcome of some or all of the charges; and (4) any one of the charges carries the
death penalty or joinder of them turns the matter into a capital case. [Citations.]' " (Ibid.)
As the People note, evidence cross-admissibility existed because the police linked
Boswell's DNA to three of the four crime scenes. Police obtained Boswell's DNA profile
from fingernail scrapings on Griffin's right hand and from samples taken from her neck.
From this evidence, police connected Boswell to the two commercial burglary cases that
occurred a few weeks after the murder. In addition, the evidence presented concerning
the commercial burglaries and petty theft was less inflammatory than the murder
committed during a burglary and robbery. The commercial burglaries occurred when the
stores were closed and unoccupied. Additionally, Boswell stole the cellular telephone
after the owner of the telephone had left the room. Thus, it is unlikely that these theft
crimes inflamed the jury into convicting Boswell of murder because it determined he was
a thief.
As for coupling a weak case with a strong case, strong evidence demonstrated
Boswell's culpability for each charge. Boswell admitted stealing the cellular telephone
and stealing cigarettes at the two commercial establishments where he left his blood.
Although Boswell denied killing Griffin, DNA evidence collected from her neck and
under her fingernails connected him to the crime. The jury also heard evidence that
Griffin told her gardener that she did not trust Boswell and was "afraid of him." This is
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not a situation where the "spillover" effect of aggregate evidence on several charges
might have altered the outcome of the murder charge.
We conclude that joinder was proper; thus, had defense counsel opposed the
consolidation or moved for severance, these requests would have been denied.
Accordingly, defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the consolidation
and not moving for severance.
III. Admissibility of Photographic Evidence
A. Additional Background
The prosecutor moved in limine to admit crime scene and autopsy photographs.
The prosecutor argued that the photographs would help the medical examiner present his
testimony, and assist the jury in determining whether Griffin's death was due to trauma
and whether Boswell possessed the requisite mental state. The trial court ruled that the
prosecution could show the photographs to witnesses, but before any photograph was
published or offered into evidence, the defense could object and the court would rule on
the objection.
During the medical examiner's testimony, defense counsel objected to numerous
photographs of Griffin taken during the autopsy. The court overruled the objections and
later allowed the photographs into evidence. During the testimony of Griffin's daughter,
defense counsel objected to the publication of exhibits 2S and 2T, showing the position
of Griffin's body at the crime scene. The court allowed the prosecutor to ask Griffin's
daughter about the photographs, and would then, depending upon the answers, make a
final ruling as to whether they could be published. Defense counsel renewed the
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objection before the photographs were published to the jury, but the court overruled the
objection.
Defense counsel also objected to exhibits 12A through 12E, photographs of
Griffin's face, arguing that they were the "most gruesome in detail." The court stated it
would allow the photographs into evidence because they depicted areas of Griffin's body
which were discussed in the testimony, and were not "unduly prejudicial when compared
with the[ir] probative value."
B. Analysis
Boswell contends the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his Evidence
Code section 352 objections to the photographs because the photographs were
cumulative, unduly prejudicial and inflammatory. We find no prejudicial error.
A trial court has the discretion to "exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the
issues, or of misleading the jury." (Evid. Code, § 352.) Specifically, admission into
evidence of victim photographs is within the broad discretion of the trial court when a
claim is made that the photographs are unduly gruesome or inflammatory. (People v.
Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 133.) We will not disturb the trial court's exercise of its
discretion unless the probative value of the photographs clearly is outweighed by their
prejudicial effect. (Id. at p. 134.) Appellate courts "have rejected the contention that
photographs of a murder victim must be excluded as cumulative simply because
testimony also has been introduced to prove the facts that the photographs are intended to
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establish." (Id. at pp. 134-135.) Prosecutors "are not obliged to prove their case with
evidence solely from live witnesses," and a jury is "entitled" to see photographs of a
victim's body "to determine if the evidence supports the prosecution's theory of the case."
(People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 624.)
We have examined the photographs and find they are not of such a nature as to
overcome the jury's rationality. The trial court properly admitted the two photographs of
Griffin's body at the crime scene to corroborate and illustrate the testimony of Griffin's
daughter and the investigating officers about the condition in which they found the crime
scene. Generally, the autopsy photographs depicted the external injuries to Griffin's
body, the inside of her mouth, her eyes and internal skull. These photographs were
relevant to establish that a murder had occurred and assist the jury in understanding the
medical examiner's testimony. The photographs supported the prosecution's theory of
felony murder in the commission or attempted commission of robbery and burglary.
Exhibits 12A through 12E, photographs of Griffin's injuries taken at the crime scene,
similarly assisted the jury in understanding and illustrating the medical examiner's
testimony that some type of trauma caused the injuries to Griffin's lip, hands, ear and
skin.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the
risk of undue prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of each of the
admitted photographs. Even assuming the trial court abused its discretion in allowing
their admission, the assumed error is harmless given the strength of the evidence
connecting Boswell to the murder. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [error
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will be deemed harmless if reviewing court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
a rational jury would have found defendant guilty absent the error]; People v. Allen
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1258 [any error in admitting photographs was plainly harmless
given the evidence linking defendant to the slayings].)
IV. Abstract of Judgment
Boswell contends, the People concede, and we agree that the trial court erred in
imposing a parole revocation fine under section 1202.45 because Boswell was sentenced
to life without the possibility of parole. Section 1202.45 does not apply where, as here,
there will be no parole period. (People v. Oganesyan (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1183.)
Boswell contends, the People concede, and we agree that the trial court stayed Boswell's
sentence on count 2 under section 654, but that the stay is not indicated in the abstract of
judgment. We order that the judgment be modified to delete the parole revocation fine
and to reflect the stay of sentence on count 2.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to strike the parole revocation fine under Penal Code
section 1202.45, and to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that sentence on count
2 is stayed under Penal Code section 654. The clerk of the superior court is directed to
prepare an amended abstract of judgment and to forward a certified copy of the amended
abstract to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (Pen. Code, §§ 1213, subd.
(a), 1216.) As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
PRAGER, J.*
WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P. J.
HALLER, J.
* Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 16
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Holding. The court held that burglary is not a lesser-included offense of murder with a burglary special circumstance, as special circumstances are penalty provisions rather than elements of the offense. The court also affirmed the trial court's joinder of charges and admission of photographic evidence, while ordering a modification to the abstract of judgment to correct clerical errors regarding a parole revocation fine and a stayed sentence.
Issues
Whether burglary is a lesser-included offense of murder with a burglary special circumstance.
Whether the consolidation of murder and theft charges denied the defendant due process.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting crime scene and autopsy photographs.
Whether the abstract of judgment contained clerical errors regarding sentencing.
Disposition. Affirmed as modified.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The burglary special circumstance is not an element of murder; rather, it functions similar to a sentencing enhancement to increase Boswell's penalty for the murder.”
“We conclude that joinder was proper; thus, had defense counsel opposed the consolidation or moved for severance, these requests would have been denied.”
“We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the risk of undue prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of each of the admitted photographs.”