Denney v. CSX Transportation CA4/2 (2016) · DecisionDepot
Denney v. CSX Transportation CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Sep 19, 2016 No. E064240Unpublished
Filed 9/19/16 Denney v. CSX Transportation CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
SCOTT DENNEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E064240
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIC1409672)
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC., OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Dallas Holmes, (retired
judge of the Riverside Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of
the Cal. Const.), and John D. Molloy, Judges. Affirmed.
Moriarity & Associates and Demos P. Anagnos for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Mayer Brown and Brian Netter for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Scott Denney alleges that he was injured on the job, cutting
his leg while attempting to open the stuck door of a railway auto carrier that,
unbeknownst to him, had been damaged by a previous attempt to pry the door open,
creating a sharp edge. He brought suit in Riverside Superior Court against several 1
entities, including defendant and respondent CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX), which he
contends owns the auto carrier where he was injured.
CSX, a Virginia corporation with its corporate headquarters in Florida, appeared
specially to file a motion to quash, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff contends that
the trial court erred by granting the motion “without permitting [plaintiff] any discovery
to determine if the jurisdictional requirement for minimum contacts could be met.” We
affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
According to plaintiff’s complaint, on December 29, 2012, he was working at a
rail yard in Mira Loma, California, for his employer Caliber Auto Transfer. As part of
his duties, he attempted to open an auto carrier, but found the door to be stuck. He was
injured while attempting to apply force to the door mechanism with his foot, striking the
back of his knee against a sharp edge, apparently created by previous use of a pry bar to
open the door mechanism. It is undisputed, at least for purposes of the motion to quash at
issue here, that CSX owns the auto carrier or “rack” that plaintiff was attempting to open
when he was injured (it does not own the rail car on which the rack sat).
Plaintiff filed suit on October 10, 2014, asserting causes of action under the
Federal Employers’ Liability Act and the Federal Locomotive Inspection Act, as well as
state negligence law. On March 2, 2015, plaintiff amended the complaint to name one of
the Doe defendants to be CSX.
CSX, appearing specially, filed its motion to quash on June 8, 2015. The motion
was supported by the declaration of its “General Commerce Counsel and Corporate
2
Secretary,” Paul Hitchcock, stating that CSX is a Virginia corporation, with corporate
headquarters in Florida. The Hitchcock declaration states as follows: “[CSX] does not
own, operate or maintain any rail lines in California. Any rail cars, auto racks or
locomotives owned or leased by [CSX] that may be within [California] would have been
brought there by other carriers under the rules of the Association of American Railroads
(AAR). Such rules provide that the carrier pulling the rail car assumes responsibility for
its condition.” Copies of portions of the referenced A.A.R. (Association of American
Railroads) rules are attached as exhibits to CSX’s motion.
Plaintiff opposed CSX’s motion, but the opposition memorandum of points and
authorities was not supported by any attached evidence. Plaintiff’s opposition papers
also did not include a request for jurisdictional discovery. The opposition suggested that
plaintiff might present “oral and documentary evidence” at the hearing on the matter.
Nevertheless, plaintiff did not file a notice of intent to appear after the trial court issued
its tentative ruling granting the motion, and the trial court declined to waive the rules
requiring such notice, so plaintiff was not allowed to argue at the hearing on July 20,
2015. (Riverside County Local Rules, rule 3316 [“The tentative ruling shall become the
ruling of the Court unless, by 4:30 p.m. on the court day before the scheduled hearing, a
party gives notice of intent to appear to all parties and the court.”]; see also Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1) [requiring notice of intent to appear to challenge tentative ruling
of trial court].)
3
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“On a challenge to personal jurisdiction by a motion to quash, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the factual bases justifying the
exercise of jurisdiction. [Citation.] The plaintiff must come forward with affidavits and
other competent evidence to carry this burden and cannot simply rely on allegations in an
unverified complaint. [Citation.] If the plaintiff meets this burden, ‘it becomes the
defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable.’” (Buchanan v. Soto (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1362 (Buchanan).)
“When the evidence of jurisdictional facts is not in dispute, the issue whether the
defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction is a legal question subject to de novo review.
[Citation.] When evidence of jurisdiction is in dispute, we accept the trial court’s
resolution of factual issues, draw all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s
order, and review the trial court’s determination of factual issues for substantial
evidence.” (Burdick v. Superior Court (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 8, 17.)
B. Analysis
Plaintiff urges that we should reverse the trial court’s order granting CSX’s motion
to quash, and direct that jurisdictional discovery may be conducted with respect to CSX.
We find no error in the trial court’s ruling, and affirm.
As an initial matter, we note that the primary authority cited in briefing by plaintiff
for the proposition that he should be permitted to conduct jurisdictional discovery is a
California appellate court opinion that is no longer published, because a petition for
4
review was granted by the California Supreme Court.1 (BNSF Railway Co. v. Superior
Court (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 591, review granted July 22, 2015, S226284.) The
California Rules of Court, with exceptions not applicable here, provide that unpublished
opinions of this state’s courts of appeal “must not be cited or relied on by a court or a
party in any other action” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a)), and the recent
amendments to the Rules of Court allowing citation of Court of Appeal opinions pending
Supreme Court review had not yet gone into effect. (Id., rule 8.1115(e)(1) [effective
July 1, 2016]; McMahon v. City of Los Angeles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1336, fn.
10 [citation of appellate court opinion superseded after the Supreme Court granted review
violates California Rules of Court, rule 8.115].) “Appellant’s counsel should know
better. It goes without saying we have not considered such improper authority.” (People
v. Wallace (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1105, fn. 9.)
Turning now to the substance of plaintiff’s arguments, we find no merit in
plaintiff’s assertion that the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion “without
permitting [plaintiff] any discovery to determine if the jurisdictional requirement for
minimum contacts could be met.” To be sure, a plaintiff is “generally entitled to conduct
discovery with regard to a jurisdictional issue before a court rules on a motion to quash.”
(Goehring v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 894, 911.) Nevertheless, the trial
court is not precluded from issuing a ruling on a motion to quash where there has been no
1 Plaintiff’s citation of this case in the trial court was proper, because review had not yet been granted at the time his opposition to the motion to quash was filed. Briefing in this appeal, however, was filed months after the California Supreme Court’s grant of review.
5
timely request for jurisdictional discovery. (Thomson v. Anderson (2003) 113
Cal.App.4th 258, 271-272 [finding no abuse of discretion where plaintiff did not request
discovery in written opposition, and oral request for discovery made in passing at hearing
did not identify what kind of discovery was being requested, or what kind of
jurisdictional facts discovery might disclose].) The first time plaintiff submitted a
specific request for jurisdictional discovery with respect to CSX, identifying what type of
discovery was sought and what kind of jurisdictional facts discovery might disclose, was
in his opening brief in this appeal. Plaintiff did not suggest, even in a general way, that
he wished to take jurisdictional discovery until after the trial court’s tentative ruling had
become the ruling of the court when no party filed a timely notice of intent to appear.
The trial court acted appropriately by making its ruling on the record before it.
Furthermore, the trial court’s ruling, based on the evidence presented by the
parties, was correct. Plaintiff failed to present any evidence in support of the exercise of
jurisdiction, thereby failing to meet his burden under Buchanan, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1362, and similar authority. The allegations of plaintiff’s complaint, and various
contentions asserted in briefing, are not evidence.
The only evidence in the record is the declaration submitted by CSX in support of
its motion, establishing that CSX is a Virginia corporation, headquartered in Florida; that
CSX does not own, operate, or maintain any rail lines in California; and that any rail cars,
auto racks, or locomotives owned or leased by CSX that may be in California were
brought here by others, under rules that place responsibility for the condition of those rail
cars, auto racks, or locomotives on the carrier pulling them. We need not decide whether
6
these facts, if not controverted, would be sufficient to preclude the possibility of
establishing specific jurisdiction. It is enough for us to observe that these facts alone—
the only facts in the record supported by evidence—are insufficient to establish either
general or specific jurisdiction over CSX. (See, e.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman (2014) 134
S.Ct. 746, 760-761 [exercise of general jurisdiction appropriate when affiliations are “‘so
“continuous and systematic” as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.’”];
Dow Chemical Canada ULC v. Superior Court (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 170, 179 [finding
circumstance that defendant “might have predicted or known that its products would
reach California” insufficient for exercise of specific personal jurisdiction].) As such, the
trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion to quash was not erroneous.
III. DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is affirmed. Defendant is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J. We concur:
MILLER J.
SLOUGH J.
7
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court affirmed the trial court's order granting a motion to quash for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof and failed to timely request jurisdictional discovery.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred in granting a motion to quash without permitting jurisdictional discovery.
Whether the plaintiff met the burden of proving the factual bases for personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Plaintiff failed to present any evidence in support of the exercise of jurisdiction, thereby failing to meet his burden”