California Court of Appeal Sep 19, 2016 No. D068308Unpublished
Filed 9/19/16 P. v. Jacobo CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D068308
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD251966)
FREDERICK JACOBO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Melinda J.
Lasater, Judge. Affirmed.
Kurt David Hermansen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr. and Quisteen S.
Shum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The fact that a person is being detained in a custodial facility by itself does not
require that when, in the course of investigating a crime or violation of rules that occurred
in the facility, guards or correctional officers must provide the detainee with a Miranda1
warning before speaking to the detainee about the crime or violation. A detainee must be
given a Miranda warning only when, under all the circumstances, a reasonable person
four prior prison terms and two "strike" convictions. The trial court sentenced defendant
to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, he argues the trial court
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erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to the deputy sheriff
following discovery of the razor blade.
DISCUSSION
I
"[I]t has been repeatedly recognized it is difficult to apply basic Miranda
principles in the context of questioning directed to a prisoner who is already under
detention in a custodial facility. 'Courts have rightfully concluded that while the Miranda
considerations are quite relevant within prison walls, the definition of custody must take
into account the highly regulated life of inmates.' " (People v. Macklem (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th 674, 692.) Thus, it is now clear that "imprisonment alone is not enough to
create a custodial situation within the meaning of Miranda." (Howes v. Fields (2012)
___U.S.___ [132 S.Ct. 1181, 1190] (Fields).) There are three grounds for this
conclusion. First, "questioning a person who is already serving a prison term does not
generally involve the shock that very often accompanies arrest." (Ibid.) "Second, a
prisoner, unlike a person who has not been sentenced to a term of incarceration, is
unlikely to be lured into speaking by a longing for prompt release." (Id. at p. 1191.)
"Third, a prisoner, unlike a person who has not been convicted and sentenced, knows that
the law enforcement officers who question him probably lack the authority to affect the
duration of his sentence." (Ibid.)
"In short, standard conditions of confinement and associated restrictions on
freedom will not necessarily implicate the same interests that the Court sought to protect
when it afforded special safeguards to persons subjected to custodial interrogation. Thus,
service of a term of imprisonment, without more, is not enough to constitute Miranda
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custody." (Fields, supra, 132 S.Ct. at p. 1191.) Rather, "[w]hen a prisoner is questioned,
the determination of custody should focus on all of the features of interrogation. These
include the language that is used in summoning the prisoner to the interview and the
manner in which the interrogation is conducted." (Id. at p. 1192.)
In Fields, the court expressly rejected a contention that separating an inmate from
other inmates for questioning was coercive and sufficient to give rise to Miranda
custody: "Isolation from the general population is often in the best interest of the
interviewee and, in any event, does not suggest on its own the atmosphere of coercion
that concerned the Court in Miranda." (Fields, supra, 132 S.Ct. at p. 1192.)
In Fields, an inmate was serving a sentence when he was escorted to a conference
room in a jail and subjected to what turned out to be a five- to seven-hour interrogation.
The inmate was questioned about allegations he had engaged in sexual relations with a
12-year-old boy. Eventually, he confessed to engaging in sex acts with the boy. At the
beginning of the interview, the inmate was told he was free to leave at any time and
return to his cell; he was not handcuffed or subjected to any other physical restraints.
However, both of the interrogators were armed. The door to the conference room was
sometimes open and sometimes shut. At one point, when the inmate became upset, one
of the deputies interrogating him used an expletive and told him he could return to his
cell if he did not want to cooperate. In finding that the inmate was not in custody for
purposes of applying Miranda, the court relied "especially" on the "undisputed fact that
[the inmate] was told that he was free to end the questioning and to return to his cell."
(Fields, supra, 132 S.Ct. at p. 1194.)
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II
In reviewing a trial court's determination that a defendant was not subjected to an
interrogation which required a Miranda warning, we are bound by the trial court's factual
determinations but independently determine whether, given those facts, a reasonable
person would have felt free to end the interrogation. (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th
386, 395.)
Here, we have no difficulty determining that defendant was in fact free to end his
interrogation. Of critical importance, there is no dispute he was told at the outset that he
could end the interview. (See Fields, supra, 132 S.Ct. at p. 1194.) By all accounts, the
interview only lasted a few minutes, during which defendant's somewhat belligerent
responses demonstrated he certainly did not believe he was being questioned about
anything serious or substantial. Defendant was not handcuffed or shackled but,
consistent with the reasoning in Fields, merely separated from other prisoners. Given the
potential threat the razor blade would pose to other prisoners as well as jail personnel, the
private interview served defendant's interests as well as the interests of the investigators.
Admittedly, the facts here are distinguishable from those considered in Fields, in
that, prior to questioning defendant, the deputy subjected him to a strip search. Given
that a lethal weapon had been found in defendant's bunk, a strip search was certainly
justified on safety grounds. More importantly, however, given that the search was
performed on a relatively long-term inmate, as opposed to an arrestee who had not yet
spent a day in custody, the strip search was not something that would amount to a new,
shocking, or intimidating event that would, or was calculated to, break down defendant's
free will. Relatively long-term jail detainees, such as defendant, are subject to a
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continuous and fairly substantial loss of privacy, including, as the record here shows,
"hygiene searches" of their bunks and belongings. (See Fields, supra, 132 S.Ct. at
pp. 1190-1191.)
In short, given the objective circumstances of the interrogation, defendant was not
in Miranda custody and the trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress his
statements.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
BENKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that a detainee in a custodial facility is not entitled to Miranda warnings unless the circumstances of the interrogation would lead a reasonable person to believe they were not at liberty to terminate the questioning.
Issues
Whether a detainee in a custodial facility is entitled to Miranda warnings prior to questioning regarding a rule violation.
Whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to suppress statements made by a detainee without Miranda warnings.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“A detainee must be given a Miranda warning only when, under all the circumstances, a reasonable person would not have felt at liberty to terminate questioning by investigators.”
“In short, given the objective circumstances of the interrogation, defendant was not in Miranda custody and the trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress his statements.”