Randle v. Davis CA2/8

Filed 8/31/16 Randle v. Davis CA2/8 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

JEREMIAH RANDLE, B262277

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC404955) v.

ROOSEVELT DAVIS,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Holly E. Kendig, Judge. Affirmed.

Jeremiah Randle, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Fidelity National Law Group and Teresa Y. Hillery, for Defendant and Respondent.

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Plaintiff and appellant Jeremiah Randle challenges a trial court order granting defendant Roosevelt Davis’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, based on res judicata. As we understand his arguments, Randle contends no facts supported the trial court ruling; the court improperly relied on a default judgment entered against him in another matter; and the court improperly engaged in ex parte communications with defense counsel. We find no error and affirm the judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This case involves a property in Los Angeles that became a subject of dispute in Randle and Laura Vinson-Randle’s divorce proceedings (“the property”). Although deeds were recorded indicating Vinson-Randle alone took title to the property, whether it was separate or community property was disputed. In 1999, Vinson-Randle executed a grant deed in favor of her mother, Diane Truly, granting the property to her. In 2003, Vinson-Randle and Randle, through counsel, executed a stipulation indicating the property was to be sold by a mutually agreeable broker, at a mutually agreed upon price, subject to the agreement of Truly, who was identified as the sole titleholder of the residence. Per the terms of the stipulation, the net proceeds of any such sale were to be deposited in a blocked trust account for the benefit of Vinson-Randle, Randle, and Truly. The funds were not to be released absent a court order. In May 2007, the family law court found a notice of lis pendens Randle filed regarding the property in 2003 was void and invalid. The court granted Truly’s motion to expunge the lis pendens, noting that Randle had not only failed to give statutorily- required notice of the lis pendens, he had not “submitted any evidence whatsoever to show that he has any interest in the property whatsoever.” In July 2007, Truly sold the property to Roosevelt Davis.1 In 2008, a family court order indicated there was a stay in effect on several unresolved issues, including the “sales proceeds.” In January 2009, Randle filed a civil complaint naming Vinson-Randle, Truly, and Davis as defendants.