California Court of Appeal Aug 30, 2016 No. D068125Unpublished
Filed 8/30/16 In re M.J. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re M.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D068125 THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J236144)
v.
M.J.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Roderick
W. Shelton and Aaron H. Katz, Judges. Affirmed as modified.
Amanda Fates, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Kathryn
Kirschbaum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
M.J., a minor, appeals his adjudication as a ward of the court under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 602, after the juvenile court found true the allegation that M.
annoyed or molested a child, in violation of Penal Code section 647.6, subdivision (a).
The juvenile court granted M. probation with various conditions and placed him under his
aunt's supervision. M. argues that the probation conditions relating to computer use are
invalid because they are not related to his offense or his risk of future criminality. M.
contests four probation conditions: (1) that he cannot use a computer unless supervised
by a responsible adult over the age of 21 who is aware that he is on probation and is
aware of the charges (the supervision condition, condition 43); (2) that he not use a
computer for any purpose other than school-related assignments and that he is always
supervised when using a computer in a common area (the use restriction condition,
condition 44); (3) that he may not use a password on any file or computer he uses (the
password condition, condition 45); and (4) that his waiver of his Fourth Amendment
rights extends to any computer he uses or can access (the search condition, condition 46).
M. also argues the term "computers" is impermissibly vague and, in the alternative, that
the probation conditions must have an explicit knowledge requirement. We hold that the
probation conditions are invalid, unconstitutionally overbroad and impermissibly vague,
and strike them.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the incident that resulted in M.'s adjudication, he was living with his
aunt, Marquita W., her eight-year-old daughter K., and other family members. M., then
14 years old, asked K. if she wanted to play cops and robbers with him. K. agreed and
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pretended to steal a tablet. M. then chased K. into a bedroom upstairs and M. arrested
her, pulled her on top of him, and then told her to take off her pants and underwear. K.
refused, but M. took off his pants and underwear and then took off K.'s pants and
underwear. During the incident, Marquita W. came home and called for her daughter.
When K. did not immediately respond, Marquita W. went upstairs and saw M. running
naked from Marquita W.'s room to his room. M. shut his bedroom door, and Marquita
W. knocked on it, asking M. to open it. M. opened the door and Marquita W. saw M.
naked in his room. Marquita W. heard K. go into the bathroom and followed her in. K.
was naked from the waist down, and Marquita W. determined that M. had hurt K..
The San Diego Police Department arrested M. on the same day. The district
attorney filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging M.
annoyed or molested a child, in violation of Penal Code section 647.6, subdivision (a).
The juvenile court found the allegation true and M. was adjudged a ward of the court.
At disposition, M.'s attorney moved to strike the probation conditions
recommended by the probation department that related to computer use. The attorney
argued that because M.'s offense was not related to computers, there should not be a
restriction on his computer use. The People agreed the supervision condition and the use
restriction condition should not be imposed, but that the remainder of computer-related
conditions, including the password condition and the search condition, would be properly
imposed to allow the probation officer to make sure M. was complying with other terms
of his probation. Despite the People's argument that the supervision condition and the
use restriction condition should not be imposed, the court imposed all four conditions.
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DISCUSSION
M. contends that, under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent), these four
conditions must be stricken. He asserts that because his offense did not involve
computers, restricting his use of computers is not rationally related to future criminality.
M. also contends the conditions must be stricken because the term "computers" is
unconstitutionally vague. In the alternative, M. argues a knowledge requirement should
be added to the conditions to restrict their application to devices he knows to be
computers.
The People concede the supervision condition and the use restriction condition
should be stricken because M.'s offense did not involve computers and the conditions
impose a greater restriction on his rights than is reasonably necessary to prevent future
criminal conduct. We accept the People's concession (Williams v. Superior Court (1964)
226 Cal.App.2d 666, 674) and will order stricken the supervision condition and the use
restriction. We are therefore required only to consider the propriety of the remaining two
contested conditions.
With respect to the two remaining challenged conditions, the People argue the
password condition and the search condition, if narrowed, are valid because they allow
the probation officer to supervise M.'s compliance with other unchallenged probation
conditions that are reasonably related to future criminality. We review the juvenile
court's probation conditions for abuse of discretion. (In re Erica R. (2015) 240
Cal.App.4th 907, 912 (Erica R.).) The juvenile court has broader discretion over
juveniles than superior courts do over adults because juveniles are " 'more in need of
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guidance and supervision than adults, and because a minor's constitutional rights are
more circumscribed.' " (In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 910.) " ' " 'A
condition of probation that would be unconstitutional or otherwise improper for an adult
probationer may be permissible for a minor under the supervision of the juvenile
court.' " ' " (Ibid., quoting In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 889.)
However, the juvenile court's discretion is not unlimited (Erica R., supra, 240
Cal.App.4th at p. 912), and "[u]nlike a parolee, a minor cannot be made subject to an
automatic search condition." (In re Binh L. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 194, 203.) A juvenile
probation condition is invalid if it: " '(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the
offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3)
requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .' "
(Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) "[A] condition of probation which requires or forbids
conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the
crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality." (Ibid.) All three
prongs of the Lent test must be satisfied before the court will invalidate a term of
probation. (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379 (Olguin).) The reasonableness
and propriety of the juvenile probation condition is measured not just by the
circumstances of the current offense, but by the minor's entire social history. (In re
Walter P. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 95, 100; accord, In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th
288, 294 [although a juvenile court broad discretion to fashion conditions, "it has limits"
and " 'every juvenile probation condition must be made to fit the circumstances and the
minor' "].)
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M. argues the challenged probation conditions are invalid under the test articulated
in Lent. With regard to the password and search conditions, the parties agree that the first
two prongs of the Lent test for invalidity are satisfied, computers have no relationship to
M.'s offense and the use of computers is not in itself criminal. In dispute is whether the
search condition and the password condition are reasonably related to M.'s potential
future criminality.
The People argue, under Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th 375, the search condition and
password condition are reasonably related to future criminality because they allow the
probation officers to effectively supervise M. to ensure compliance with other probation
conditions.1 In Olguin, the Supreme Court validated a probation condition that required
the defendant to notify his probation officer of any pets at his residence for the officer's
safety. (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 378.) The court held the third prong of the Lent
test was satisfied because "a condition of probation that enables a probation officer to
supervise his or her charges effectively is . . . 'reasonably related to future criminality.' "
(Olguin, at pp. 380-381, quoting People v. Kwizera (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1240.)
Several courts have applied the reasoning of Olguin to uphold electronic search
conditions, including search and password conditions. These courts concluded the
1 The People also rely on several opinions (In re Alejandro R. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 556, review granted March 9, 2016, S232240; In re Ricardo P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 676, review granted February 17, 2016, S230923; In re Patrick F. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 104, review granted February 17, 2016, S231428) to support this argument. These cases hold that an electronic search condition is reasonable under Lent, despite having no connection to the minor's offense. After the People's brief was filed, the California Supreme Court granted review of these cases, and they no longer have any precedential effect. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(e)(1).) 6
conditions are reasonable under Lent where the offense involved the use of electronic
devices, or specific facts or circumstances of the defendant's personal or social history
suggested that an electronic search condition would " 'serve the rehabilitative function of
precluding [the minor] from any future criminal acts.' " (Erica R., supra, 240
Cal.App.4th at p. 913; People v. Ebertowski (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1176-1177
[upholding an electronic search condition and password condition where the defendant
was convicted of gang-related offenses and used social media sites to promote his gang].)
However, where the offenses and personal history of the offender had no
connection to the use of electronic devices and any criminal activity, the courts have
concluded the conditions were unreasonable under Lent. (See Erica R., supra, 240
Cal.App.4th at p. 914; In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 755-756.) In Erica R.,
there was no evidence connecting the minor's drug offense to electronic devices and no
reason to believe the condition would serve to prevent future criminality. (Erica R., at
pp. 909-910.) Likewise, in J.B., no facts connected electronic devices or social media
usage to the minor's petty theft offense or to a risk of future criminal conduct. (In re J.B.,
at p. 752.)
We agree with the analyses set forth in these cases, and conclude the search
condition and password condition at issue here are invalid because they are not
reasonably related to future criminality. M.'s offense did not involve computers,
electronic devices, or the Internet. There are no facts or circumstances in M.'s personal or
social history that suggest he needs additional supervision of his computer use, and no
facts or circumstances connecting M.'s computer use to past or future criminal activity.
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The record indicates M. had no gang affiliations to which searches of his social media or
computers might be relevant; he had no history of drug abuse that might have made those
searches germane to rehabilitative goals; there is no suggestion the incident in which he
was involved (which the psychologist opined "appears to be an isolated incident . . . not
. . . a pattern of antisocial behavior or sexual acting out") was even remotely connected to
or exacerbated by his use of computers; and the social study stated M. "has not had too
many behavioral problems[, which] seems quite impressive considering the chaotic
family in which he is involved." We are convinced that, because there is no evidence the
minor here presented a social history involving a constellation of problems where close
and extensive monitoring would be warranted by his rehabilitative needs (cf. In re Walter
P., supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 100), the imposition of the search and password
conditions far exceeded any reasonable boundaries that " 'fit the circumstances and the
minor' " (In re P.O., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 298-294), and are invalid under Lent.
We conclude there must be a reason to believe the computer-related conditions
" ' "will serve the rehabilitative function of precluding [the minor] from any future
criminal acts" ' " for the conditions to be valid. (In re J.B., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at
p. 756, quoting Erica R., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 913.) On this record, there is none,
and we therefore conclude the search and password conditions cannot pass muster under
Lent.
We accept the People's concession that the supervision condition (condition 43)
and the use condition (condition 44) should be stricken as unnecessary based on the facts
of this case. We further conclude, on this record, that imposition of the search condition
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(condition 46) and password condition (condition 45) is invalid under Lent, supra, 15
Cal.3d 481, and therefore those conditions must be stricken.
DISPOSITION
The challenged probation conditions 43, 44, 45, and 46 are stricken. The
judgment is otherwise affirmed.
McDONALD, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR:
AARON, J.
IRION, J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that four probation conditions restricting a minor's computer use were invalid because they were not reasonably related to the minor's offense or future criminality.
Issues
Whether probation conditions restricting computer use are valid when the underlying offense did not involve computers.
Whether the imposition of search and password conditions on a minor's electronic devices constitutes an abuse of discretion under the Lent test.
Disposition. Affirmed as modified.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We hold that the probation conditions are invalid, unconstitutionally overbroad and impermissibly vague, and strike them.”
“The challenged probation conditions 43, 44, 45, and 46 are stricken.”
“M.'s offense did not involve computers, electronic devices, or the Internet.”