California Court of Appeal Aug 25, 2016 No. E064325Unpublished
Filed 8/25/16 P. v. Medina CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E064325
v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV1403928)
ALEJANDRO MEDINA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michael A. Smith,
Judge. (Retired judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Erica Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton, and Sabrina Y.
Lane-Erwin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
In this Proposition 47 case, defendant Alejandro Medina appeals an order denying
his petition for resentencing as to his conviction for receiving a stolen vehicle (Pen. Code,
§ 496d, subd. (a)).1 Defendant contends Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and
not have a fundamental interest in a specific term of imprisonment or in the designation a
particular crime receives.’ [Citations.]” Therefore, the rational basis test is applicable
here to an equal protection challenge involving “‘an alleged sentencing disparity.’”
7
(Ibid.) Our Supreme Court also has applied the rational basis test to an alleged statutory
disparity: “Where, as here, a disputed statutory disparity implicates no suspect class or
fundamental right, ‘equal protection of the law is denied only where there is no “rational
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate governmental
purpose.”’ [Citation.]” (Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881
(Johnson).)
In Johnson, the court explained that application of the rational basis standard
“‘does not depend upon whether lawmakers ever actually articulated the purpose they
sought to achieve. Nor must the underlying rationale be empirically substantiated.
[Citation.] While the realities of the subject matter cannot be completely ignored
[citation], a court may engage in “‘rational speculation’” as to the justifications for the
legislative choice [citation]. It is immaterial for rational basis review “whether or not”
any such speculation has “a foundation in the record.”’ [Citation.]” (Johnson, supra, 60
Cal.4th at p. 881.) Therefore, “[t]o mount a successful rational basis challenge, a party
must ‘“negative every conceivable basis”’ that might support the disputed statutory
disparity. [Citations.] If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts may not second-
guess its ‘“wisdom, fairness, or logic.”’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
Defendant argues that a defendant would qualify for resentencing for the same
criminal act of receiving a stolen vehicle worth $950 or less, if convicted under section
496. But section 496, is a more general statute, which is not limited just to the receipt of
stolen vehicles, as is section 496d, subdivision (a). Under the well-known cannon of
statutory construction, “‘A specific provision relating to a particular subject will govern a
8
general provision . . . .’” (People v. Tanner (1979) 24 Cal.3d 514, 538.) Here, the
district attorney chose to prosecute defendant under the narrower statute, section 496d,
which specifically applies to defendant’s crime of receiving a stolen vehicle. It is
reasonable to assume the voters intended that the crime of receiving a stolen vehicle
would normally be charged and prosecuted under the more narrowly tailored statute,
section 496d, rather than section 496, and that resentencing would not apply under
Proposition 47 to a conviction for a section 496d crime, since section 496d is not
mentioned or amended in Proposition 47.
There are several plausible reasons for the resentencing disparity between a
section 496d conviction and a section 496 conviction. One reason is that the offense of
buying or receiving a stolen vehicle, as opposed to other property, may have greater
adverse consequences for the victims than other theft-related offenses. The owners of
vehicles are often dependent on their vehicles for transportation to work and school, and
for obtaining the necessities of life, which is not as likely to be the case with theft of
other forms of property.
Another reason is that, unlike other types of stolen property, stolen vehicles are
often dismantled and sold for parts in “chop shops” which can raise their worth above
retail value. Section 496d was added “to the Penal Code to encompass only motor
vehicles related to the receiving of stolen property.” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor
Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2390 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as
amended June 23, 1998.) The statute was intended to provide “‘additional tools to law
enforcement for utilization in combating vehicle theft and prosecuting vehicle thieves.
9
Incarcerating vehicle thieves provides safer streets and saves Californians millions of
dollars. These proposals target persons involved in the business of vehicle theft and
would identify persons having prior felony convictions for the receiving of stolen
vehicles for enhanced sentences.’” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d
reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2390 (1997-1998 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 23,
1998.)
A third plausible reason for the disparity arising from excluding a section 496d
conviction from qualifying for resentencing under Proposition 47 is that the voters did
not intend to eliminate prosecutorial discretion to charge a section 496d offense as either
a felony or misdemeanor. Our Supreme Court has ruled that “numerous factors properly
may enter into a prosecutor’s decision to charge under one statute and not another, such
as a defendant’s background and the severity of the crime, and so long as there is no
showing that a defendant ‘has been singled out deliberately for prosecution on the basis
of some invidious criterion,’ that is, ‘“one that is arbitrary and thus unjustified because it
bears no rational relationship to legitimate law enforcement interests[,]”’ the defendant
cannot make out an equal protection violation. [Citation.]” (Wilkinson, supra, 33 Cal.4th
at pp. 838-839.) These plausible reasons provide a rational basis for any resentencing
disparity that might exist between a section 496d conviction for buying or receiving a
vehicle and a section 496 conviction.
In addition, someone who knowingly receives or buys a stolen vehicle is culpable
of intentionally perpetuating and exploiting a vehicle theft by failing to report the theft to
law enforcement by failing to return the vehicle to the owner. Such conduct provides car
10
thieves with a financial incentive to steal and dispose of vehicles. Imposing harsher
penalties on those who knowingly buy or receive stolen vehicles may be intended to deter
vehicle theft. This constitutes another plausible, rational reason for any disparity in
resentencing as to section 496d crimes.
We also reject defendant’s equal protection challenge asserting that those
convicted of a vehicle theft crime (§§ 487, subd. (a), 490.2) are similarly situated to
defendants convicted of the section 496d crime of receiving a stolen vehicle. Those who
steal a vehicle are not similarly situated to those who buy or receive a stolen vehicle, for
purposes of equal protection. Theft and the crime of receiving or buying stolen property
are entirely different crimes, even if the stolen property may be of the same nature.
Denying defendant’s petition for resentencing on his section 496d conviction therefore
does not violate defendant’s equal protection rights. Defendant is not similarly situated
to those resentenced on convictions for thefts and there are plausible reasons for any
disparity in resentencing on a section 496d conviction and convictions for other theft
related crimes.
Because we conclude defendant’s conviction for violating section 496d,
subdivision (a), does not qualify for resentencing as a matter of law, defendant’s due
process challenge to not receiving an evidentiary hearing on his resentencing petition
need not be addressed as moot.
11
V
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
MILLER J.
12
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. A conviction for receiving a stolen vehicle under Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a) does not qualify for resentencing under Proposition 47 because the statute was not amended by the initiative and remains a wobbler.
Issues
Does a conviction for receiving a stolen vehicle under Penal Code section 496d qualify for resentencing under Proposition 47?
Does the exclusion of section 496d convictions from Proposition 47 resentencing violate the equal protection rights of defendants?
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We conclude a conviction for violating section 496d, subdivision (a), does not qualify for resentencing under Proposition 47.”
“The absence of any reference in Proposition 47 to section 496d, including in the list of crimes eligible for resentencing, shows that section 496d was intended to remain beyond Proposition 47’s reach.”
“Denying defendant’s petition for resentencing on his section 496d conviction therefore does not violate defendant’s equal protection rights.”