Chase Bank v. Arbogast CA4/2 (2016) · DecisionDepot
Chase Bank v. Arbogast CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Aug 22, 2016 No. E063261Unpublished
Filed 8/22/16 Chase Bank v. Arbogast CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
CHASE BANK USA, N.A.,
Cross-complainant and E063261 Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. MCC1300894) v. OPINION TOMI ARBOGAST,
Cross-defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Raquel A. Marquez,
Judge. Affirmed.
Lieberg, Oberhansley & Strohmeyer and Jon H. Lieberg for Cross-defendant and
Appellant.
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Bryan Cave, Glenn J. Plattner and Richard P. Steelman, for Cross-complainant
and Respondent.
Chase Bank USA, N.A. (the Bank) initiated foreclosure proceedings on Tomi
Arbogast’s house in Temecula. Arbogast sued the Bank (1) to quiet title; (2) to obtain
an injunction; and (3) to obtain declaratory relief. The Bank cross-complained,
asserting four causes of action for (1) breach of contract; (2) an equitable mortgage;
(3) unjust enrichment; and (4) declaratory relief. The trial court denied Arbogast’s anti-
SLAPP motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16.) Arbogast contends the trial court erred by
denying her anti-SLAPP motion and her requests for judicial notice. We affirm the
457.) This second step of the anti-SLAPP procedure “‘operates like a “motion for
summary judgment in ‘reverse,’” in that the plaintiff is demonstrating its case has
minimal merit. (Ibid.) The elements of a breach of contract cause of action are (1) the
existence of a contract; (2) performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach by the defendant;
and (4) damages. (First Commercial Mortgage Co. v. Reece (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th
731, 745.)
As to whether there was a contract, the elements of a contract are (1) parties
capable of contracting; (2) consent; (3) a lawful purpose; and (4) sufficient
consideration. Arbogast is an adult. The Bank is a nationally chartered bank. Thus,
there are two parties capable of contracting. The Settlement Agreement was signed by
both Arbogast and the Bank, indicating their consent. In the Settlement Agreement,
Arbogast agreed to dismiss her 2010 lawsuit and release the Bank from any further
claims arising out of the facts set forth in the lawsuit or the Settlement Agreement,
which is a lawful purpose for the agreement. The Bank agreed to pay Arbogast
$90,000, which would be sufficient consideration. Accordingly, there is proof of a
contract.
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Bank alleged it paid Arbogast $90,000. Additionally, Arbogast dismissed her
2010 lawsuit with prejudice. Thus, it can be inferred that the Bank paid Arbogast the
$90,000, otherwise she would not have dismissed her lawsuit with prejudice. Therefore
there is proof of performance by the Bank.
Next, we address breach by Arbogast. In the Settlement Agreement, in the
“Fact” section, it reflects a trustee’s sale was conducted on December 24, 2009; a
Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale was recorded on July 20, 2009; and a Notice of Rescission of
Trustee’s Sale and Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale was recorded on November 17, 2010. In
the “Release” portion of the Settlement Agreement, Arbogast released and discharged
the Bank from any claims “arising out of or related to the facts alleged in the Lawsuit or
set forth in Section 2 [(the Facts)] of this Agreement.” In other words, Arbogast agreed
to the Rescission and released the Bank from any claims arising out of the Rescission
because the Rescission is included in the facts of the Settlement Agreement.
As explained ante, the Rescission made it as though the trustee’s sale had never
been held, and restored the property’s title record to Arbogast’s name and the existence
and priority of all lien holders to the status quo prior to the recordation of the Trustee’s
Deed Upon Sale. Thus, Arbogast agreed to the restoration of the mortgage, and
released her claims in connection with the Rescission.
In Arbogast’s current lawsuit, in the First Cause of Action to Quiet Title, she
contends the Bank no longer has a deed of trust securing the property because the Bank
foreclosed. Arbogast requested the trial court find she owned the property “free and
clear.” Arbogast alleges, “The purported rescission of the Trustee’s Sale (at Exhibit J)
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by First American is ineffective and did not meet the requirements of California Civil
Code section 1058.5(b).” Arbogast is directly challenging the Rescission, which could
reasonably be viewed as a breach of the release in the Settlement Agreement because in
the Settlement Agreement Arbogast released the Bank from any claims arising out of
the Rescission. Thus, there is proof by which a trier of fact could find a breach by
Arbogast.
In its cross-complaint, the Bank asserts it suffered damages by Arbogast’s breach
of contract “in an amount to be proved at trial.” In its Prayer, the Bank seeks
compensatory damages. Assuming Arbogast breached the Settlement Agreement, it
would be reasonable to infer the Bank incurred damages by being forced to engage in
unnecessary litigation.
In sum, there is merit to the Bank’s breach of contract cause of action.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Arbogast’s anti-SLAPP motion.
D. JUDICIAL NOTICE
1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Arbogast filed a request for judicial notice in support of her anti-SLAPP motion.
The request included (1) Arbogast’s 2010 complaint; (2) the Banks’s 2010 answer to the
2010 complaint; (3) the 2010 Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale conveying the property to
Canter; (4) the 2010 Notice of Rescission; (5) the 2011 Quitclaim Deed conveying the
property from Canter to Arbogast; (6) Arbogast’s 2012 Request for Dismissal of her
2010 lawsuit with prejudice, and the order of dismissal with prejudice; (7) Arbogast’s
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2013 complaint in the instant case; and (8) the Bank’s 2013 cross-complaint in the
instant case.
The trial court denied Arbogast’s request for judicial notice “because the
documents are not relevant to determination of this motion.”
2. ANALYSIS
Arbogast contends the trial court erred by denying her request for judicial notice
as it relates to the court-filed documents.
A trial court must take judicial notice of court-filed documents if (1) it is
requested by a party; (2) the adverse party is given sufficient notice of the request; and
(3) the court is furnished with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice
of the matter. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 453.)
Arbogast’s request for judicial notice was filed on January 5, 2015, and mailed to
the Bank’s attorney on January 6, 2015. The court-filed documents were attached to the
Request for Judicial Notice. The hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion took place on
February 5, 2015. Accordingly, the request was made by a party, the Bank was given
sufficient notice, and the court had sufficient information. Therefore, we agree the trial
court erred by denying the request for judicial notice because the statutory requirements
were met. The request for judicial notice was made in support of the anti-SLAPP
motion. Because we have concluded, ante, the trial court did not err in denying the anti-
SLAPP motion, we will not direct the court make any changes in relation to the request
for judicial notice because there would be no point. We have discussed the request for
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judicial notice for the sake of explaining our use of the documents for which judicial
notice was requested.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
HOLLENHORST J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court properly denied the appellant's anti-SLAPP motion because the respondent demonstrated a probability of prevailing on its breach of contract claim, as the appellant's current lawsuit challenged the validity of a rescission she had previously agreed to and released in a prior settlement agreement.
Issues
Did the trial court err in denying the appellant's anti-SLAPP motion regarding the respondent's breach of contract claim?
Did the respondent demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of its breach of contract claim?
Did the trial court err in denying the appellant's request for judicial notice of court-filed documents?
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Arbogast is directly challenging the Rescission, which could reasonably be viewed as a breach of the release in the Settlement Agreement because in the Settlement Agreement Arbogast released the Bank from any claims arising out of the Rescission.”
“In sum, there is merit to the Bank’s breach of contract cause of action. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Arbogast’s anti-SLAPP motion.”