The trial court did not reach the merits of Wagner's motion but instead found that
it did not have jurisdiction under section 1473.6 to consider Wagner's claims. Wagner
filed a timely notice of appeal. Contrary to the trial court's determination, section 1473.6
did give it jurisdiction over its earlier order revoking Wagner's parole. Accordingly, we
reverse the trial court's order and remand for a hearing on the merits of Wagner's motion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Underlying Conviction
In 2006, Wagner was convicted of impersonating a public officer, false
imprisonment, robbery, being a former convict in a custodial facility, and being a felon in
possession of a weapon. These convictions grew in part out of Wagner's work as a
bounty hunter for a bail bond agency. Acting as a bail bondsman, Wagner would wear
clothes that resembled police uniforms and drive refurbished police vehicles. When
Wagner arrested bail jumpers, although a felon, he would take them to custodial
facilities; Wagner also detained Hispanic residents and threatened them with deportation,
and, on at least one occasion, Wagner stole the contents of a detainee's wallet.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2
Wagner was sentenced to nine years four months in prison. However, Wagner
was paroled in 2011.
2. Revocation
In late 2013, Wagner was arrested in Murrieta, California, and police recovered
and seized a number of items, including a ballistic vest, a spring knife, a replica handgun
and holster, a plastic badge, surveillance equipment, video equipment, binoculars and a
police citation book. Following his arrest, Wagner filed a civil complaint against the
officers involved in his arrest and obtained an order requiring that the seized items be
returned to him.
In June 2014, the San Diego County District Attorney filed a petition to revoke
Wagner's parole. At a hearing on the petition, a parole officer testified Wagner had been
seen driving a black Ford Crown Victoria that resembled a police cruiser. The parole
officer further testified that because of Wagner's underlying conviction, on May 13, 2014,
as a condition of parole, he instructed Wagner to cease driving the Crown Victoria. The
parole officer testified that thereafter, on May 28, 2014, Wagner was observed driving the
Crown Victoria and again arrested. Following Wagner's arrest, his home and office were
searched and badges, cards and other paraphernalia suggesting that Wagner was
impersonating a law enforcement officer were seized.
At the revocation hearing, Wagner and his girlfriend, who was also present on
May 13, 2014 when Wagner met with the parole officer, testified. They both stated the
parole officer did not give Wagner any instructions with respect to the Crown Victoria.
3
The trial court found that Wagner had violated his parole and, as we indicated, revoked
his parole, imposed 120 days of local custody, and reinstated his parole.
3. Section 1473.6 Petition
Following his release from custody, Wagner obtained copies of emails to and from
the parole officer who testified at the revocation hearing. In one email sent to a law
enforcement officer before the parole officer met with Wagner and his girlfriend, the
parole officer stated that he did not plan to speak to Wagner about his use of the Crown
Victoria at the May 13, 2014 meeting.
Based on the emails he obtained, Wagner filed a motion under section 1473.6 in
which he asked that the order finding that he violated the terms of his parole be vacated.
Without reaching the merits of Wagner's petition, the trial court denied the petition on the
grounds that section 1473.6 did not give it any power to disturb its order revoking
Wagner's parole. Wagner filed a timely notice of appeal.2
DISCUSSION
I
The People's petition to revoke Wagner's parole was governed by section 3000.08,
under which, as of July 1, 2013, revocation of parole is determined in the first instance by
the trial court in the county in which a parolee is released or resides in, or in which a
parole violation occurred. A trial court's order revoking parole "is a postjudgment order
2 On appeal, Wagner's counsel filed a brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436; Wagner filed his own supplemental brief, and we directed the Attorney General to file a respondent's brief. Wagner then filed a reply brief. 4
affecting the substantial rights of the party, and is therefore appealable." (People v.
Because the trial court did not reach the merits of Wagner's contentions but instead
dismissed his section 1473.6 motion on the grounds it had no jurisdiction to hear the
motion, we must determine whether, as Wagner contends, the order revoking his parole
and imposing a term of custody was subject to section 1473.6. As we indicated at the
outset, we agree with Wagner: the trial court's order revoking his parole was subject to
6
section 1473.6
As the People point out, by its terms Penal Code section 1473.6 permits a
challenge to a "judgment." Although the order revoking Wagner's parole does not state it
is a "judgment," nonetheless for purposes of applying Penal Code section 1476.3 we have
little doubt it should be treated as a judgment. Under Code of Civil Procedure section
577, "[a] judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or
proceeding." In this regard, cases have consistently held that whether a trial court
determination is to be treated as a judgment depends not on what form or style the
determination takes but on what impact it has on the parties' rights. "[A] judgment, no
matter how designated, is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action.
Thus, an 'order' which is the final determination in the action is the judgment."
(Passavanti v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1602, 1606.) By the same token, "[a]
paper filed in an action does not become a judgment merely because it is so entitled; it is
a judgment only if it satisfies the criteria of a judgment." (City of Shasta Lake v. County
of Shasta (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1, 10, accord Baker v. Castaldi (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th
218, 224.)
In considering whether relief is available under section 1473.6, we must also
recognize that because it is a determination that a parolee has violated the terms of his or
her parole, a revocation order may have a substantial and enduring impact on the parolee.
"Under California's penal system, any future interactions between defendant and the
justice system will likely bring to light defendant's parole revocation. Should defendant
7
suffer a further criminal conviction, the parole revocation may be used as part of his
sentencing determination. The parole revocation also may be used against defendant in
other noncriminal arenas, such as employment decisions or child custody matters."
(Osorio, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1412.) These circumstances support the conclusion
that an order revoking parole is not only appealable, as the court in Osorio found, but
subject to relief under section 1473.6.
We also note the well-established principle that parole is itself a form of custody
that will support postjudgment habeas relief. (In re Jones (1962) 57 Cal.2d 860, 861, fn.1
["Actual detention in prison is not an indispensable condition precedent to the issuance of
habeas corpus, and persons on parole or on trial are, in a proper case, entitled to its
issuance."].) This suggests that making parole revocation determinations subject to
postjudgment review under section 1473.6, as well as habeas review, is in no sense novel
or unexpected by the Legislature. Indeed, by express reference section 1473.6
incorporates the procedure that governs habeas relief (§ 1473.6, subd. (c)), and, as we
have discussed, section 1473.6 was adopted as a means of providing relief when, because
an applicant is no longer held in custody, relief by way of habeas corpus is unavailable.
(See People v. Germany, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 791.)
In sum then, a parole revocation order is (1) a final determination by a trial court
that a violation of parole has occurred; (2) is appealable; (3) has substantial impact on a
parolee, including not only incarceration but also significant postrevocation
ramifications; and (4) falls within what, in a civil context, has been recognized as a
8
"judgment" since Code of Civil Procedure section 577 was enacted 1872. Thus, it is a
judgment within the meaning of Penal Code section 1473.6, and, accordingly, the trial
court did have jurisdiction to hear Wagner's motion.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's order denying Wagner's motion for relief under section 1473.6. is
reversed and remanded for consideration of the merits of Wagner's motion.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, J.
McDONALD, J.
9
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. A trial court's order revoking parole constitutes a "judgment" within the meaning of Penal Code section 1473.6, thereby granting the court jurisdiction to hear a motion for relief based on newly discovered evidence of government misconduct.
Issues
Does a trial court have jurisdiction under Penal Code section 1473.6 to consider a motion to vacate an order revoking parole?
Is an order revoking parole a "judgment" for the purposes of Penal Code section 1473.6?
Disposition. reversed and remanded
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Contrary to the trial court's determination, section 1473.6 did give it jurisdiction over its earlier order revoking Wagner's parole.”