California Court of Appeal Aug 17, 2016 No. E063398Unpublished
Filed 8/17/16 P. v. Vega CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E063398
v. (Super.Ct.No. FVA1400015)
LAWRENCE VEGA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ingrid Adamson
Uhler, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Gregory L. Cannon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., and Lise S.
Jacobson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
A jury convicted Lawrence Vega of assault by means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury and found he personally inflicted great bodily injury after hearing
evidence he followed an acquaintance from a New Year’s Eve gathering and got into a
fight which left the acquaintance with a gash on his neck. The victim testified Vega
punched him and then slashed his neck with a boxcutter. Vega testified the victim
punched him, and he responded by throwing a punch and lunging at the victim and falling
with him onto a fence. Vega contended the victim cut himself on the fence. He denied
using a boxcutter and the police did not recover one. The jury hung on the charge Vega
committed assault with a deadly weapon and the allegation he personally used a deadly
and dangerous weapon.1
Vega appeals on the ground his testimony, which some jurors appeared to credit,
was substantial evidence he committed the lesser included offenses of assault and battery,
and the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on those offenses. We agree a
simple assault instruction was required, and therefore reverse the judgment and remand to
allow the People to accept a reduction of the conviction to assault or retry Vega upon
proper instruction.2
1 A prior jury failed to reach a verdict on any charges. 2 Vega also contends that prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal and that we should correct errors in a minute order and the abstract of judgment. Because we reverse on the instructional error, we do not reach those issues.
2
I
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The District Attorney of San Bernardino County filed an information charging
Vega with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1) and
assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count
2).3 With respect to both counts, the information alleged Vega personally inflicted great
bodily injury upon the victim within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a).
With respect to count two, the information alleged Vega personally used a deadly and
dangerous weapon within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). The
information also alleged Vega had suffered two serious and violent felony convictions
(strikes) within the meaning of sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12,
subdivisions (a) through (d), and had suffered five prison prior convictions within the
meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).
The charges arose from events on the evening of December 31, 2013, during and
after two small New Year’s gatherings at Vega’s garage and the apartment of a neighbor.
Vega and the victim, Donald Morgan, attended the gatherings with a few other people.
After Morgan left, Vega followed him, and the two got into a fight near Morgan’s home
which left Morgan with a gash on his neck. The jury heard conflicting testimony about
the events from Morgan and Vega. Officer Steven Roe testified about the police
3 Unlabeled statutory citations refer to the Penal Code.
3
investigation. This appeal primarily concerns the nature of the fight between Morgan and
Vega, so we do not recount in detail the testimony of witnesses about the events that led
to it, except to note inconsistencies with the testimony of the principals.
A. The Victim’s Testimony
Morgan said he arrived at a New Year’s Eve party at Vega’s home at around 8:00
p.m., December 31, 2013. Besides Vega and himself, he said two other people attended
the party—Stephanie and Vera. Morgan said it was a friendly gathering. Everyone was
drinking beer and “talking about, you know, the daily things. You know, New Year[’]s
Eve, you kinda just talk about, you know, things that are going on in the house and things
that are going on outside.” He said no one became unfriendly, there were no arguments,
and no fights. He said he left Vega’s home at about 10:00 p.m. and started to walk home,
about three or four minutes away.4 He said nothing precipitated his leaving, he “just
wanted to go home.”
Morgan’s testimony about the New Year’s Eve gathering differs from the
testimony of Vega and other witnesses who attended the party. Everyone else testified
the party-goers moved from Vega’s home across the street to Vera’s home before
Morgan left for home. Vera and Vega testified Morgan and Vega were involved in some
sort of conflict during the party. Vera said Vega was “starting to become belligerent,”
4 Morgan appears to have been mistaken about the times he reported arriving at and leaving the party. He later agreed he spoke to the police at 8:00 p.m., and law enforcement testified the 911 operator received Morgan’s call reporting the attack at 8:20 p.m., both after he left the party.
4
which is why they decided to move to her place. She said Vega came over to her house
and “was kind of like being a bully towards [Morgan],” “using foul language towards
him” and trying to get Morgan to buy more beer. Vega testified he was “clowning
around” with Morgan, making fun of him for having a male roommate.
At some point, Morgan left the gathering, whether from Vega’s home or Vera’s.
Morgan said he was walking down the middle of the street about one car length from his
home when Vega accosted him. “I turned and I saw him. I said, ‘Larry, what are you
going to do?’ and he just sucker punched me” on the left side of the chin. He said Vega
then “pulled out a knife,” which he described as a red boxcutter, “and cut me” in the neck
below the left ear. Asked whether he fought back, he said, “It happened so quick and I
don’t fight.” Morgan also said no one else was around to see the incident.
Morgan said he “was stunned. I just went over and sat down on the steps at my—
my house.” Immediately after the assault, Vega left and Morgan called 911. Morgan
said his roommate got him a towel for his wound and there was a substantial amount of
blood. Paramedics took Morgan to the hospital, where he received 14 stitches. At the
time of trial, Morgan had a two to two and a half-inch scar, which he showed to the jury.
B. Law Enforcement Testimony
Officer Steven Roe responded to the scene for the Fontana Police Department.
When he arrived, he “observed an ambulance and [Morgan] sitting inside the
ambulance.” Officer Roe saw Morgan and took some photographs, but the evidence
about the injury is of limited value. Officer Roe said Morgan had “a blood-soaked
5
bandage on the left side of his neck.” Asked whether he had the opportunity to view the
injury in its entirety, he responded, “I believe I tried to peel back the bandage, but I didn’t
want to disturb the injury and further injure him.” Officer Roe said the injury was a
“fairly deep,” “5 to 6-inch laceration” “located on the left side of his neck,” which
produced a lot of blood. He said, “the blood stream soaked through the gauze and came
onto his shirt and neck.” The prosecution introduced Officer Roe’s photographs as
exhibits, and they are broadly consistent with his testimony. One photograph shows the
edge of a gash on the left side of Morgan’s neck, but the injury is mostly obscured by
gauze. The gauze had absorbed a significant amount of blood and a small amount of
blood had run onto Morgan’s shirtfront. Officer Roe did not testify whether the gash was
smooth or jagged. Nor did the prosecution present medical records about the injury or
testimony by Morgan’s treating physician or a medical expert. Officer Roe said he saw
no other scratches, cuts, or abrasions on Morgan’s face or body.
Officer Roe spoke to Morgan at the scene. He reported, “Mr. Morgan stated he
was cut on the left side of his neck with a boxcutter by Mr. Vega.” He said, “in the
recording of my statement it stated that he was punched and then cut, but later I
confirmed the statement with him and asked ‘So you were cut then punched?’ and he said
‘Yes.’ So there was kind of a conflicting statement” on whether Vega hit or cut Morgan
first. Police arrested Vega based on Morgan’s description, and Morgan personally
identified Vega as his attacker. Officer Roe said several officers canvassed the
6
neighborhood, but they did not locate a boxcutter. Nor did they find anyone who
witnessed the event, other than the participants.
C. Vega’s Testimony
Vega told a very different story. Vega said he was cleaning his garage when some
friends stopped by with some beer. Morgan came a little later and also brought beer.
Vega said, “I wasn’t planning on nothing, but then we started drinking and then, um, you
know, just—then we moved across the street to [a neighbor’s]” house when it got dark.
At the neighbor’s house, Vega said, “we were clowning around and then Don got mad at
me.” Vega said he was making fun of Morgan because he has a male roommate—asking
things like “Who’s the man in the house?” According to Vega, Morgan asked to talk to
him and the two left the gathering and started walking down the street.
Vega reported Morgan “was mad because of the clowning around. They were
laughing at him. We were joking. I didn’t take him serious. But we kept walking and
when we walked out to the street, he kept on—we kept on walking and when he turned
around like by the curb—we got up on the curb—he turned around and took a swing at
me.” Vega said Morgan then tried to throw a stick at him, “and I swung at him, but when
I swung, I threw my body and we just went back. That’s when we hit the fence. He fell
down and I—I fell on top of him. Then we jumped up and that’s when I thought he
grabbed, like, right here [indicating the right side of the neck] and he goes ‘I’m
bleeding.’” Vega said the fight ended immediately. “He jumped up. I jumped up. He
went towards his house. I went towards mine.” Vega did not say how far the fence was
7
from where he hit Morgan, however, Morgan said the fence was about six feet away.
Vega denied using a boxcutter. Morgan denied falling on the fence.
D. Jury Instructions
The trial court instructed the jury that to prove Vega guilty of assault with force
likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), “the People must prove that:
[¶] 1. The defendant did an act that by its nature would directly and probably result in
the application of force to a person and the force used was likely to produce great bodily
injury; [¶] 2. The defendant did the act willfully; [¶] 3. When the defendant acted, he
was aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that his act by its nature
would directly and probably result in the application of force to someone; [¶] 4. When
the defendant acted, he had the present ability to apply force likely to produce great
bodily injury; and [¶] 5. The defendant did not act in self-defense.” The trial court
further instructed that “Great bodily injury means significant or substantial physical
injury. It is an injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.”
The trial court did not instruct the jury on simple assault or battery. After hearing
Morgan testify and before Vega had decided whether he would testify, the trial court
indicated it believed an assault instruction was appropriate because, “let’s say
hypothetically [the jury] believe[s] Mr. Morgan, that he was sucker punched, and then
based on the force of the sucker punch, he landed into the chain-link fence and that
caused the gash to his throat, then at most he’d be found guilty of simple assault, right?”
The trial court said, “I think [out of] an abundance of caution we should give the lesser-
8
included offense of simple assault.” Defense counsel agreed and requested the
instruction. The prosecutor objected.
The trial court asked whether the prosecutor was “going to argue in the alternative
that the blow to the face . . . caused him to go into the chain-link fence, so he’s still guilty
of the [section] 245 (a) (4)” offense. The prosecutor said, “I don’t think I’ll make that
argument.” The trial court said, “if you aren’t going to make that argument, I think I
should still give simple assault.” The trial court said, “I’ll indicate for the record I did not
give simple assault the first time,” and the prosecutor agreed. The jury failed to return a
verdict in the first trial. The court then said, “I’m thinking in my mind if [the jurors]
separate out the two acts, that maybe it would be just a simple assault” and as a result “I
have a sua sponte obligation to give simple assault.”
Later, after Vega decided to testify, but before he had presented his version of the
events, the trial court decided a simple assault instruction was not required. The court
said, “When I just focus on the defendant’s actions to the victim, if obviously the jurors
believe the victim’s rendition, then there would be no substantial evidence to support any
lesser-included offenses. It’s kind of an all[-]or[-]nothing approach. [¶] In regards to the
blow to the face, obviously that is independent of what happened in terms of the
boxcutter slash to the neck. . . . [I]f the jurors accept the victim’s rendition, then he’s
guilty. If they disbelieve the victim’s rendition, then he’s not guilty. And I don’t believe
there’s any substantial evidence to support any lesser-included offenses, so I will not be
giving those as to the charged offenses.”
9
As we have discussed, Vega later testified he punched Morgan, lunged at him, and
the two fell onto a chain-link fence. The trial court did not revisit the lesser included
offense instruction after hearing that testimony and defense counsel did not renew his
request for the instruction. Neither the trial court nor the parties raised giving the jury a
battery instruction.
E. Verdict and Sentencing
The jury failed to reach a verdict on the allegation Vega used a boxcutter to slash
Morgan’s neck. During deliberations, the jury requested a transcript of Morgan’s
testimony, “describing how he was cut & what was used, what he saw,” and the court
reporter read Morgan’s testimony to the jury. The jury split eight to four on the charge he
assaulted Morgan with a deadly weapon and on the allegation that he employed a deadly
weapon in committing assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily harm. The
record does not disclose whether the eight jurors supported a verdict of guilty or not
guilty. The trial court declared a mistrial on the assault with a deadly weapon count.
However, the jury found Vega guilty of assault by means of force likely to cause great
bodily injury and found Vega had personally inflicted great bodily injury.
On January 23, 2015, the trial court found Vega had sustained two prior strike
convictions (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i))—a 1984 conviction for attempted second degree
robbery and a 1990 conviction for second degree robbery. The court also found he had
suffered five prior prison term convictions (§ 667.5, subd. (b))—the two strikes and three
other convictions. Because assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury
10
is a strike offense, the trial court imposed a Three Strikes sentence of 25 years to life on
count 2. The court imposed three consecutive years for the great bodily injury
enhancement, and two consecutive years for two of the prison priors. The trial court
reduced one prison prior (for drug possession) to a misdemeanor under section 1170.18,
subdivision (a) and struck the sentences on the prison priors that qualified as strikes.
II
DISCUSSION
Vega contends the trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to instruct on
the offenses of assault and battery, which he claims are lesser included offenses. We
agree the court erred by not giving the simple assault instruction.
We review de novo the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on a supposedly
lesser included offense. (People v. Licas (2007) 41 Cal.4th 362, 366.) “‘[A] lesser
offense is necessarily included in a greater offense if either the statutory elements of the
greater offense, or the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading, include all the
elements of the lesser offense, such that the greater cannot be committed without also
committing the lesser. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) It is well established that simple
assault is a lesser included offense of assault by means of force likely to produce great
bodily injury (People v. Yeats (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 874, 879) and also that battery is
not. (People v. Corning (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 83, 90 [“Since aggravated assault may
also be committed without the actual use of force or violence necessary for felony
battery, felony battery is not a lesser included offense of aggravated assault”].)
11
A trial court must instruct concerning all lesser included offenses which find
substantial support in the evidence. (People. v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 194-195.)
Substantial support is evidence a reasonable jury could find persuasive, which, if
accepted, would absolve defendant of guilt on the greater offense, but not on the lesser.
(People v. Licas, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 366.)
The trial court must instruct on lesser included offenses supported by substantial
evidence in all circumstances, even when a party, for tactical reasons, seeks to present the
jury with an all-or-nothing choice between the offense charged and acquittal. (People v.
Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1159-1160, abrogated on other grounds by People v. Scott
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 386.) “The state has no interest in a defendant obtaining an
acquittal where he is innocent of the primary offense charged but guilty of a necessarily
included offense. Nor has the state any legitimate interest in obtaining a conviction of the
offense charged where the jury entertains a reasonable doubt of guilt of the charged
offense but returns a verdict of guilty of that offense solely because the jury is unwilling
to acquit where it is satisfied that the defendant has been guilty of wrongful conduct
constituting a necessarily included offense. Likewise, a defendant has no legitimate
interest in compelling the jury to adopt an all or nothing approach to the issue of guilt.
Our courts are not gambling halls but forums for the discovery of truth.” (People v. St.
Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 533.)
The use of hands or fists may support a conviction of assault by means of force
likely to produce great bodily injury. (People v. Aguilar (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1023, 1028.)
12
Whether such force “would be likely to cause great bodily injury is to be determined by
the force of the impact, the manner in which it was used and the circumstances under
which the force was applied.” (People v. McDaniel, 159 Cal.App.4th 736, 748-749.)
The results of an assault are not conclusive, but are highly probative of the amount of
force used. (Id. at p. 748.) Though actual injury is not required for a conviction, if an
injury results, the extent and location of the injury are relevant facts. (People v. Beasley
(2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1086.) It is the jury’s role to determine whether the
evidence supports a finding that an attack was carried out in a manner likely to cause
great bodily injury. (People v. Armstrong (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1066.)
Here, the court did not instruct the jury on the elements of simple assault, and the
jury convicted Vega of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.
Thus, the question we face is whether there is substantial evidence from which a
reasonable jury could find the force Vega used in assaulting Morgan was less than force
likely to produce great bodily injury.
Vega’s version of the events supplies the evidence from which the jury could have
concluded the attack was simple assault. According to Vega, he “swung at [Morgan], but
when I swung, I threw my body and we just went back. That’s when he hit the fence. He
fell down and I—I fell on top of him.” As it happens, according to Vega’s version,
Morgan fell into a chain-link fence and sustained a gash to his neck. After the fall,
according to Vega, “we jumped up and that’s when I thought he grabbed, like, right here
[indicating the right side of his neck] and he goes ‘I’m bleeding.’”
13
The injury caused Morgan to lose a considerable amount of blood and required
him to be taken to a hospital, where he received 14 stitches. At the time of his testimony
at trial, Morgan had a two to two and a half-inch scar. Otherwise, the evidence
concerning Morgan’s injury was limited. Officer Roe said the injury was bandaged when
he arrived. The prosecutor did not put on clear photographic evidence, testimony by a
treating physician or medical expert, or otherwise introduce Morgan’s medical records.
We conclude that, despite the apparent seriousness of the injury, a reasonable jury could
have concluded from this evidence that Vega was guilty of simple assault by finding the
force he used was not likely to produce such an injury.
Our conclusion is based on cases that involved similar attacks. For example, in
People v. Rupert (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 961, 968, the Court of Appeal determined
evidence of a similar attack required an instruction on simple assault. In Rupert, the
victim testified she had attempted to intercede in an attack on her mother when
“defendant struck her at least five times, knocking her to the floor.” (Id. at p. 966.) The
evidence was not clear whether the defendant struck the victim with his hands alone or
also used a coffee pot. (Id. at p. 968) As a result of the attack, the victim “sustained
several cuts and a concussion, and at the trial she had a scar on her left cheek.” (Id. at
p. 966.) The Court of Appeal recognized assault under section 245 “may be committed
by means of the hand or fist alone,” and “[t]he extent of the injury” and “the nature of the
assault, are questions of fact for the jury to determine.” (Id. at pp. 967-968.) The court
concluded the jury might reasonably have found defendant did not use force likely to
14
produce great bodily injury, despite the fact he knocked the victim to the ground and
despite her injuries, and held “[i]f the jury so concluded, a verdict of guilty of simple
assault would have been proper.” (Id. at p. 968.) The court therefore reversed the
conviction on the basis that the trial court failed to instruct on the lesser included offense.
(Id. at p. 969.)
People v. Clark (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 235 is also instructive. Clark involved a
physical altercation between a father (the defendant) and his wife and their 14-year-old
son. The defendant was chasing his wife outside when the son attempted to intervene.
“The son caught defendant near the outside steps. He could not jump on defendant’s
back because defendant was ‘too tall.’ Instead, the son pushed and tried to hit defendant.
Defendant slapped his son, pushed him away and continued to chase after wife. The son
caught up with defendant again. Defendant tripped his son, causing the son to fall on the
ground onto his back. [¶] . . . [D]efendant [then] got on top of his son and slapped him
on the sides of his head with open palms.” (Id. at pp. 240-241.) The son “sustained
‘cuts’ and a ‘gash’ on his mid and lower back” and “superficial abrasions in the area of
these injuries.” (Id. at p. 241.) The defendant was charged with assault with force likely
to cause great bodily injury for the attack on his son, but the trial court instructed the jury
on the offense of simple assault as a lesser included offense. (Ibid.) The jury found the
defendant not guilty of assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury, but
guilty of simple assault. (Id. at p. 238.)
15
There is substantial evidence in this case that Vega carried out an attack using a
similar degree of force. The jury evidently rejected Morgan’s claim that Vega used a
boxcutter in the attack. It also appears to have accepted some version of Vega’s account.
From Vega’s testimony the jury reasonably could have found the force he used against
Morgan was not likely to produce great bodily injury. As in Rupert and Clark, Vega
attacked his victim with enough force to knock him to the ground. Like the victim in
Rupert, Morgan suffered a gash that left a scar. And like the victim in Clark, evidence
supports the conclusion he suffered a gash from the fall rather than from the blow.
Though the evidence in all three cases was sufficient to support a jury’s verdict that the
defendants had used force likely to cause great bodily injury, the evidence did not compel
that finding.
On the contrary, as the court held in Rupert, the jury might have found defendant
guilty of simple assault. In Clark, the jury, when correctly instructed, did find defendant
guilty of simple assault on similar evidence. In this case, the jury might have found,
based on the limited description of the events put forward by Morgan and Vega, that the
assault was a garden variety fistic encounter that ended badly because the victim
unexpectedly landed on a piece of metal protruding from a chain-link fence. “‘[W]here
the blows are serious, but still leave a question of fact as to the character of the force
used, the defendant is entitled to an instruction on the included offense of simple
Cal. Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) Crimes Against the Person, § 419, p. 481.) By failing to
16
instruct the jury on simple assault, the trial court improperly deprived the jury of the
ability to reach such a verdict. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154-155;
People v. Richardson (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 403, 409 [“[T]he verdicts as rendered could
be sustained if the jury had been instructed properly. But since the jury was not allowed
a choice of convicting of lesser assaults . . . the judgment must be reversed”].)
The fact Morgan suffered a gash that produced a significant amount of blood does
not require a different result. The jury convicted Vega of assault by means of force likely
to cause great bodily injury. Thus, the focus of our inquiry is Vega’s conduct and the risk
it created. And while the nature of the injury is probative of the degree of force used, it is
not dispositive. (McDaniel, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at pp. 748-749.) Here, the evidence
supports a finding that Vega punched and pushed Morgan with sufficient force to knock
him to the ground. Such force plainly creates the risk of injury. Morgan could have hit
his head on concrete or a stone, for example. The defendants in Rupert and Clark used a
similar degree of force, as each knocked his victim to the ground and each victim
suffered a gash. The evidence in this case supports a jury finding that the victim just so
happened to fall so as to slash his neck on a piece of exposed metal. The jury could
reasonably have found that such an injury was outside the scope of the risk of knocking a
person to the ground.
As we have noted, however, the evidence concerning Morgan’s injury was not
well developed. It shows only that Morgan suffered a gash that produced a lot of blood
and required stitches. But no one who inspected the injury testified. Officer Roe
17
observed the injury after it was bandaged and did not remove the bandage to see its
extent. The photographs he took are inconclusive because, as he testified, the injury is
obscured by gauze. The prosecution did not present testimony by anyone who treated
Morgan, did not introduce medical records describing the injury, or even proffer a
medical expert who had viewed photographs of the injury. In addition, Officer Roe
testified he did not see any other scratches, cuts, or abrasions on Morgan’s face or body
that might have indicated Vega used substantial force in punching and pushing him.
More detailed evidence of the nature of the injury and the fight may have helped
distinguish whether Vega used substantial force in knocking Morgan down or whether
the fall was the result of the two men stumbling. On this limited record, we cannot say
the injury was so serious as to require the jury to find Vega used force likely to cause
great bodily injury.
In a noncapital case, we evaluate the trial court’s failure to instruct on lesser
included offenses that are supported by the evidence for prejudice under Watson;5 we
reverse only if it is reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more
favorable result had the error not occurred. (People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at
p. 178.)
On this record, we cannot say the trial court’s failure to instruct on simple assault
was not prejudicial under the Watson standard. The prosecution’s case was not
overwhelming. A first jury failed to reach a verdict on the same charges. The second
5 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837.
18
jury failed to reach a verdict on allegations that Vega used a deadly weapon in
committing the assault. The second jury evidently gave Morgan’s testimony careful
consideration, because it had his testimony “describing how he was cut & what was used,
what he saw” read back by the court reporter during deliberations. But, in the end,
several members of the jury rejected Morgan’s testimony that Vega assaulted him with a
boxcutter. The jury may have discounted his testimony because he had credibility
problems. As defense counsel established, Morgan’s testimony about the time of the
incident and the events precipitating it were inconsistent with the testimony of the other
witnesses.
Meanwhile, Vega’s statements about the incident were not subject to the same
problems. Vega conceded he got into a physical altercation with Morgan and conceded
Morgan was injured as a result. The jury obviously found Vega struck Morgan with his
fist, but it was not given the option of finding the manner of the attack supported a
finding of simple assault. Based on the problems with Morgan’s testimony, the limited
evidence concerning the injury, and the jury’s seeming acceptance of Vega’s testimony
that he punched Morgan and fell with him onto a chain-link fence, we find it reasonably
probable the jury would have returned a result more favorable to Vega under proper
instruction. We therefore conclude the trial court’s failure to instruct on simple assault
was prejudicial.
19
III
DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment and remand the matter to allow the People to accept a
reduction of the conviction to assault or retry Vega upon proper instruction. If the People
accept a reduction, the trial court shall enter judgment against Vega for assault and
sentence him accordingly.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
SLOUGH J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
MILLER J.
20
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court committed prejudicial error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple assault, as there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude the force used was not likely to produce great bodily injury.
Issues
Whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of simple assault.
Disposition. Reversed with directions.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“We agree a simple assault instruction was required, and therefore reverse the judgment and remand to allow the People to accept a reduction of the conviction to assault or retry Vega upon proper instruction.”