People v. Stylz

Filed 8/15/16 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B263072

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. LA075766) v.

ADAM STYLZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Michael Kellogg, Judge. Affirmed. David Blake Chatfield, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Chung L. Mar and Mary Sanchez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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INTRODUCTION Appellant Adam Stylz was charged with burglary for forcibly entering a storage unit with intent to commit larceny. He pled no contest to second degree commercial burglary, and was sentenced to three years formal probation. On March 4, 2015, appellant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code 1 section 1170.18, subdivisions (a) and (f). In his petition, appellant argued his felony burglary conviction was reducible to misdemeanor “shoplifting” under section 459.5. Section 459.5 defines “shoplifting” as “entering a commercial establishment with intent to commit larceny while that establishment is open during regular business hours, where the value of the property that is taken or intended to be taken does not exceed nine hundred fifty dollars ($950).” The trial court denied the petition, after determining that appellant’s crime was not shoplifting. Based on guidance from the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Garcia (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1116 (Garcia), we conclude that appellant was convicted of second degree burglary of a specific storage unit, not burglary of a commercial establishment open during regular business hours. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY On October 13, 2013, appellant forced entry into a locked storage unit rented by Paul Foley, and took property Foley estimated to be worth $4,805. Subsequently, appellant was charged with burglary for entering storage unit No. B309 with intent to commit larceny (§ 459), and grand theft of personal property belonging to Foley (§ 487, subd. (a)). On August 6, 2014, appellant pled no contest to second degree burglary, and the charge of grand theft was dismissed. 1 All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise stated.