Siringoringo v. Superior Court CA4/2 (2016) · DecisionDepot
Siringoringo v. Superior Court CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Aug 11, 2016 No. E063534Unpublished
Filed 8/11/16 Siringoringo v. Superior Court CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
STEPHEN LYSTER SIRINGORINGO,
Petitioner, E063534
v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV1500818)
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN OPINION BERNARDINO COUNTY,
Respondent;
THE PEOPLE,
Real Party in Interest.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate/prohibition. Shahla S.
Sabet, Judge. Petition denied.
Daniel G. Davis and Alan S. Yockelson for Petitioner.
Ronald L. Brown, Public Defender (Los Angeles), Albert J. Menaster, Deputy
Public Defender, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
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Michael A. Ramos, District Attorney, Brent J. Schultze, Deputy District Attorney,
for Real Party in Interest.
In this matter we are called upon to determine whether the complaint filed against
petitioner must be dismissed because counsel was not present to assist him during his
error standard]; Macias v. Municipal Court (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 568, 574-576 [not
error per se]; People v. Carlon (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1193, 1196-1197 [harmless error
standard]; see also People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 418-419 [applying harmless
error standard to violation of defendant’s constitutional right to be personally present at
all critical stages of the trial].) It has also been held that generally the denial of a criminal
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is subject to a finding of prejudice before
dismissal is appropriate. (People v. Hayes (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 400, 409-412 citing
United States v. Morrison (1981) 449 U.S. 361, 364 [Sixth Amendment deprivations
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subject to rule that remedies should be tailored to assure defendant effective assistance of
counsel and a fair trial and require showing of prejudice to merit dismissal].)
In People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519, similar to Jennings v. Superior
Court, supra, 66 Cal.2d 867 cited by petitioner, the court held that the denial of a
substantial right, such as the right to presence of counsel, at a preliminary hearing
rendered an ensuing commitment illegal and entitled a defendant to a dismissal under
Penal Code section 995. (Pompa-Ortiz, at p. 523.) Nevertheless, the court determined
that although the defendant had been entitled to have his motion to dismiss the
information granted, that fact did not require that his conviction be reversed after an
error-free trial coupled with no showing that his trial was prejudiced by the earlier error.
(Id. at p. 530.) Although the court stated that a pretrial challenge to irregularities in the
preliminary hearing would still proceed without the requirement to show prejudice (id. at
p. 529), an issue that was not before it, we are not convinced that the rule applies in this
case. (Cf. Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641, 653 [Pompa-Ortiz dicta states
only that under certain facts relief without a showing of prejudice may be warranted].)
Here, this court is narrowly focused on whether petitioner has demonstrated that
the absence of counsel at his first arraignment was in any way prejudicial to him. As
indicated ante, at the first hearing after the arraignment (held seven days later) petitioner
was represented by counsel of his choice. Since that time, in addition to the hearings
regarding the motion to dismiss that is the subject of this petition, petitioner has been
represented by counsel of his choice at a preliminary hearing where he was held to
answer on all counts and at his arraignments on the information and the first amended
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information. Petitioner makes no showing that the absence of counsel at the arraignment
on the complaint resulted in any prejudice at these later hearings or will prejudice his
eventual trial. By analogy of reasoning to People v. Pompa-Ortiz developments in this
action subsequent to the first arraignment have rendered any error at that hearing
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)
Even if we assume that the first arraignment in this case was not held in conformity with
constitutional and statutory requirements, the trial court is not currently without
jurisdiction to act (see Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 288-
291 [difference between fundamental jurisdiction and action in excess of authority
possessed]) because any error in that proceeding has since been cured.
No other prejudice has been demonstrated. Petitioner states that he was prejudiced
by the denial of counsel of his choice but does not indicate that his chosen counsel would
have done anything differently had he been present. Petitioner claims he was not aware
of his ability to present a challenge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, to
request to appear personally in court, or to argue for a reduction in bail (dubious claims
given petitioner does not deny that he was a licensed attorney), but does not claim that he
would have done so. He also claims he was denied the right to waive time for his
preliminary hearing (a right that he later exercised), and that he was denied his right to a
speedy preliminary hearing because conflict counsel appointed to him did not prepare for
that hearing. However, private counsel was retained and appeared with petitioner at the
pre-preliminary hearing that was set at the time of the first arraignment. There is no
claim that private counsel was not prepared to proceed in whatever manner was deemed
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fit with respect to the preliminary hearing, in fact, the opposite is true. Finally, petitioner
has not explained how any of these factors adversely affected the subsequent proceedings
or will prevent him from receiving a fair trial on the merits.
Because we find an examination of the evidence proffered unnecessary to the
resolution of this petition, the request for judicial notice filed by the People on September
21, 2015, is denied.
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate/prohibition is denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
HOLLENHORST J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the absence of counsel at an initial arraignment does not mandate dismissal of the complaint, as such an error is subject to a harmless error analysis and requires a showing of prejudice.
Issues
Whether the absence of counsel at an initial arraignment conducted via two-way electronic audio-video communication mandates dismissal of the complaint.
Whether the denial of counsel at an initial arraignment constitutes structural error requiring automatic dismissal.
Disposition. denied
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Because we determine that there are no grounds mandating the dismissal of the complaint, we deny the petition.”
“This court has found no case law concluding that the absence of counsel at an initial arraignment constitutes structural error under every circumstance.”
“Petitioner makes no showing that the absence of counsel at the arraignment on the complaint resulted in any prejudice at these later hearings or will prejudice his eventual trial.”