California Court of Appeal Aug 11, 2016 No. D069919Unpublished
Filed 8/11/16 In re Y.D. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re Y.D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D069919 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. CJ1157) Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
V.D. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Laura J.
Birkmeyer, Judge. Affirmed.
Daniel G. Rooney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant J.J.
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant V.D.
Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County
Counsel, and Patrice Plattner-Grainger, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
J.J. (Father) and V.D. (Mother) appeal from a juvenile court order terminating
their parental rights to their daughter (Y). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)1 Father
challenges the court's finding he did not have a sufficient relationship with Y to preclude
the termination of his parental rights. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) Mother contends
that if we reverse the termination order as to Father, we must also reverse the order as to
has the burden to establish the facts supporting an exception. (In re C.F. (2011) 193
Cal.App.4th 549, 553 (C.F.).)
Father relied on section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), which provides an
exception to the adoption preference if terminating parental rights would be "detrimental
to the child" because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with
the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (Italics added.)
We have interpreted the phrase "benefit from continuing the relationship" to refer to a
parent-child relationship that "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to
outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive
parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural
parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and sense of
belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship
would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child
would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's
rights are not terminated." (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 574-575; accord,
9
C.F., supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at pp. 555-557; In re Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922,
936-937 (Jason J.).)
To meet the proof burden for this statutory exception, the parent must show a
relationship that is more than frequent and loving contact, a bond with the child, or
pleasant visits. (C.F., supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 555; Jason J., supra, 175 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 936-937; In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827.) Although daily contact
is not necessary, the "parent must show he or she occupies a parental role in the child's
life, resulting in a significant, positive, emotional attachment between child and parent."
(C.F., supra, at p. 555; Derek W., supra, at p. 827; In re Elizabeth M. (1997) 52
Cal.App.4th 318, 324.) "A friendly relationship . . . 'is simply not enough to outweigh
the sense of security and belonging an adoptive home would provide.' " (Jason J., supra,
175 Cal.App.4th at p. 938.) "Interaction between [a biological] parent and child will
always confer some incidental benefit to the child." (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th
at p. 575.) "For the exception to apply, 'a parental relationship is necessary. . . .' " (In re
J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 529.)
A court must balance the competing considerations (the benefits of continuing the
relationship with the biological parent versus the benefits of stability and permanence in
an adoptive home) " 'on a case-by-case basis and take into account many variables,
including the age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody,
the "positive" or "negative" effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child's
particular needs.' " (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1349-1350.)
"Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the
10
parent unable to meet the child's needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that
preservation of the parent's rights will prevail over the Legislature's preference for
adoptive placement." (Id. at p. 1350.)
"We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the
existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion standard to the
determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would
be detrimental to the child." (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395.)
B. Analysis
At the section 366.26 hearing, the court recognized that Father had regularly
visited with Y, and had manifested love and affection towards his daughter during the
visits. But the court also found the relationship was not the type of relationship that met
the standard for triggering the statutory exception. Overwhelming evidence supported
this finding.
The evidence showed Y regarded Father as a "friendly visitor" during her brief
twice-monthly visits with Father. As noted by the social worker, Father spent most of the
visits sitting next to Y and engaging in parallel play. There was no evidence that this
affectionate interaction between Father and Y resulted in the type of attachment that
would cause Y to be "greatly harmed if parental rights were terminated." (Jason J.,
supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 938.)
In his brief, Father discusses evidence showing he engaged in various parental-
type tasks during the visits, including holding Y, walking around with her, kissing her,
checking her diapers, and giving her a bottle. However, the court had a reasonable basis
11
to find these activities did not give rise to the type of relationship with Father that would
outweigh the benefits to be gained from an adoption. There was no evidence Father's
caretaking activities during his visits resulted in Y having an emotional parent-type
connection with him. She separated easily and did not look primarily to Father for
comfort or assistance during the visits.
Father's reliance on In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289 is unhelpful. In S.B.,
this court found the court erred in terminating parental rights where the evidence showed
the father had been his child's primary caretaker for three years, and after one year apart
the child maintained a strong attachment to her father and would be "greatly harmed" by
the termination. (Id. at pp. 300-301.) There was no evidence that Y had a similarly
strong attachment to Father.
In his reply brief, Father contends that to satisfy the statutory exception a parent
need not show he or she was the primary caretaker or that the child has a "primary
attachment" to the parent. We agree with these assertions. In unusual cases, the courts
have applied the statutory exception despite that the parent did not have daily contact
with the child and/or where the child had a strong attachment to the current caregiver.
(See In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621; In re Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th
452, 470-472; In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 689-691; In re Casey D.
(1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51.)
But there is no showing the court misunderstood these concepts. The record of the
section 366.26 hearing makes clear the court applied the correct legal principles to the
facts before it. The court quoted the Autumn H. language, emphasized the need for
12
Father to show "a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that [Y] would be
greatly harmed" if rights were terminated, and properly focused on the relationship
between Father and Y. In so doing, the court did not err in also evaluating Y's
relationship with her maternal aunt. A child's status at the time of the section 366.26
hearing is relevant in determining whether the child's emotional bond with his or her
parent outweighs the benefits that an adoption would provide.
Finally, we reject Father's argument that the court abused its discretion in not
selecting guardianship with the maternal aunt as the proper plan. Because the court
found the beneficial parent-child exception asserted by Father was inapplicable and there
were no other compelling reasons that Y would suffer detriment from the termination, the
court did not have discretion to select a lesser plan.
DISPOSITION
Affirmed.
HALLER, J. WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P. J.
O'ROURKE, J.
13
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the juvenile court did not err in terminating parental rights because the father failed to establish that he maintained a beneficial parent-child relationship that would outweigh the benefits of adoption for the child.
Issues
Whether the juvenile court erred in finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to the termination of parental rights inapplicable under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“Substantial evidence supports the court's finding Father did not have a beneficial parent-child relationship with Y and therefore the court did not abuse its discretion in finding the statutory exception inapplicable.”