Aldana v. Stillwagon

Filed 8/3/16 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

GERARDO ALDANA, 2d Civil No. B259538 (Super. Ct. No. 56-2013- Plaintiff and Appellant, 00440994-CU-PA-VTA) (Ventura County) v.

MIKE STILLWAGON,

Defendant and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION Mike Stillwagon, a paramedic supervisor, was driving his employer’s pickup truck. He was en route to the location of an injured fall victim to supervise the responding emergency medical technicians (EMTs) and, if necessary, provide assistance. At an intersection in Oxnard, he collided with a vehicle being driven by Gerardo Aldana. A year and a half later, Aldana sued him for negligence. The Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) limits the time to file suit against a health care provider for professional negligence to one year from the date the injury is discoverable.1 (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.5.)2 The trial court found that

1 MICRA “creates two separate statutes of limitations, both of which must be satisfied if a plaintiff is to timely file a medical malpractice action. First, the plaintiff must file within one year after she first ‘discovers’ the injury and the negligent cause of that injury. Secondly, she must file within three years after she first experiences harm from the injury.” (Ashworth v. Memorial Hospital (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1046, 1054, italics omitted.) Only the one-year limit is at issue here. 2 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise stated.

Aldana’s suit was subject to MICRA’s one-year statute of limitations rather than the two- year limitations period for general negligence (§ 335.1), and therefore was time-barred. After briefing was complete and before we heard oral argument, our Supreme Court decided Flores v. Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (2016) 63 Cal.4th 75 (Flores), which clarified the issue. Flores held that “the special statute of limitations for professional negligence actions against health care providers applies only to actions alleging injury suffered as a result of negligence in rendering the professional services that hospitals and others provide by virtue of being health care professionals: that is, the provision of medical care to patients.” (Id. at p. 88.) Aldana contends that the trial court erred in applying MICRA because he had no connection to the professional services being rendered and because Stillwagon was not rendering professional services at the time of the accident. We agree with the latter contention. While Stillwagon’s status as a paramedic may demonstrate that he was a medical professional, the automobile collision remains a “garden-variety” accident not resulting from the violation of a professional obligation but from a failure to exercise reasonable care in the operation of a motor vehicle. (Flores, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 87, fn. 4; see Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1237.) The obligation was one that he owed to the general public by virtue of being a driver and not one that he owed to a patient by virtue of being a paramedic. Therefore, we reverse. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Stillwagon was on duty as a paramedic supervisor at the Gold Coast Ambulance station. Around 1:30 a.m., he heard on his radio scanner that an ambulance had been dispatched in response to a 911 call regarding an unconscious fall victim. He decided to respond to the call as an additional resource due to the indeterminate nature of the victim’s condition and because he “was up and ready to go, and sometimes those calls are the best calls to provide a little evaluation on how the crews are performing in the early hours of the morning.” Stillwagon was certified as an ambulance driver. He got into the supervisor’s vehicle, a Ford F-150 truck. It had an emergency vehicle permit but was not