California Court of Appeal Aug 1, 2016 No. E064419Unpublished
Filed 8/1/16 P. v. Delara CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E064419
v. (Super.Ct.No. INF1301675)
ROBERTO SOLIS DELARA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Anthony R. Villalobos,
Judge. Affirmed.
Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Minh U.
Le, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Defendant Roberto Solis Delara appeals from an order denying his motion for
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1170.18.1 We find no error and affirm.
I
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 29, 2013, defendant withdrew his plea of not guilty and pleaded guilty
to possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)) and
admitted a prior “strike” conviction alleged under Penal Code section 667,
subdivisions (c) and (e)(1). He received the agreed term of six years at sentencing, at
which time seven prior prison term enhancements (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) were
dismissed.
Shortly after the adoption of Proposition 47 and section 1170.18, defendant filed a
petition for resentencing under that statute with respect to the 2013 conviction. The
petition set out three of his prior felony convictions as also qualifying for reduction.2
The district attorney opposed the petition and requested a hearing on the issue of
whether defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (§ 1170.18,
subdivision (b).) Eventually the district attorney filed a formal opposition in which they
listed defendant’s extensive criminal history. As related, this history began in 1993 and
consisted of petty theft (1993), burglary (1993), petty theft (1993), felony assault under
1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
2 Two additional possession charges under Health and Safety Code section 11377 and a conviction for receiving stolen property under Penal Code section 496.
2
section 245 (1994), grand theft (1994), escape (1995), driving under the influence (DUI)
causing injury (1996, two years state prison), spousal battery (1997, two years state
prison), another spousal battery (1998, two years state prison), bringing a controlled
substance into jail and resisting an officer (1999, two years state prison; defendant twice
violated parole after that prison commitment), two first degree burglaries (that is,
“strikes”) (2001, two years state prison), possession of a controlled substance (2003, 16
months state prison), disturbing the peace (2004), receiving stolen property (2008, five
years state prison; two more violations of parole), criminal threats (2012, also noted as a
“strike”), and the current drug conviction from 2013.
At the hearing counsel for defendant argued that his prior history did not indicate
that he was at risk of committing a super strike and that his age of approximately 45 years
made violence less likely. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion.
II
DISCUSSION
If a defendant establishes that he qualifies for resentencing under section 1170.18,
the court must resentence the defendant unless it “determines that resentencing the
petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (§ 1170.18,
subd. (b).) Subdivision (c) describes the type of risk that will disqualify a defendant: “an
unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning
of clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667.”
(§ 170.18, subd. (c).)
3
That provision lists what are known as “super strikes” (see People v. Johnson
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 674, 682) and includes those offenses considered to be most
heinous or violent.3 A catch-all provision also includes “[a]ny serious and/or violent
felony offense punishable in California by life imprisonment or death.”4 (§§ 667,
subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(VIII), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iv)(VIII).) Hence, defendant was
entitled to be resentenced unless the court properly found that he presented an
unreasonable risk of committing such an offense.
The first issue raised by defendant concerns the appropriate standard of proof. He
argues that the prosecution was required to establish his dangerousness within the
meaning of the statute under the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.5 He argues that
once a defendant establishes his basic eligibility for resentencing, he should be
considered as in fact subject only to that shorter term unless the prosecution proves
dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt. He therefore analogizes “dangerousness” to
an enhancement factor or a factor used to impose a sentence above the minimum. (See
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490.)
3 The specifically listed offenses are any “ ‘sexually violent offense’ ” within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600, subdivision (b), certain child sex offenses, any homicide offense, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a peace officer or firefighter, and possession of a weapon of mass destruction.
4 One specific example would be a conviction for aggravated kidnapping under sections 209 and 209.5.
5 It is not disputed that the burden is on the People to establish dangerousness and disqualification from resentencing.
4
This argument was rejected in People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 1279, 1301-1305 (Kaulick). The court there reasoned that “dangerousness is
not a factor which enhances the sentence imposed when a defendant is resentenced under
the Act; instead, dangerousness is a hurdle which must be crossed in order for a
defendant to be resentenced at all. If the court finds that resentencing a prisoner would
pose an unreasonable risk of danger, the court does not resentence the prisoner, and the
petitioner simply finishes out the term to which he or she was originally sentenced.” (Id.
at p. 1303; accord, People v. Blakely (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1060-1062.)
Pertinently, the Kaulick court relied on Dillon v. United States (2010) 560 U.S. 817, 828-
829 which found that decisions made under a statute designed to give prisoners the
benefit of later-enacted reductions to a sentencing scheme did not implicate the Sixth
Amendment right to have essential facts found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
We agree with Kaulick and reject defendant’s assertion that once he established
basic eligibility, his sentence immediately became that for a misdemeanor. (Obviously
there was no such actual resentencing.) He was not entitled to resentencing until the
court concluded that he was not dangerous, and the court could make that yea-or-nay
decision based on a preponderance of the evidence.
5
The next question is whether the trial court’s decision was correct. We review for
abuse of discretion, which in this context also implicates the “substantial evidence” rule.
(See People v. Esparza (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 726, 744-745 (Esparza).)6
In this context defendant first argues that the trial court improperly considered the
hearsay recitation of his criminal history. No objection was made in the trial court and
defendant does not here even argue that he had not suffered those priors. Hence, we
deem the issue waived and any error not prejudicial. (See People v. Panah (2005) 35
Cal.4th 395, 476.)
The People point out that if defendant commits any serious or violent felony in the
future, he will be subject to a sentence of 25 years to life as a third striker. (§ 667,
subd. (e)(2)(A).) Hence, in the People’s view, he falls within the catch-all of
section 1170.18, subdivision (c), even if he is unlikely to commit a super strike.
The People do not address the potential problem that this would in effect create
two classes of inmates seeking to have prior felony convictions reduced to misdemeanors
and resentencing thereon. That is, the dangerousness analysis for defendants with one or
no prior “strikes” would be limited to whether they were likely to commit a super strike;
those with two strikes would be evaluated with respect to whether they were likely to
commit any serious or violent felony within the meaning of sections 1192.7 or 667.5.
Arguably the distinction would be valid because those with two prior serious or violent
6The court in that case also agreed with Kaulick on the “preponderance of the evidence” point. (Esparza, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 741.)
6
felony strikes are presumptively more likely to commit very serious crimes than
defendants who have no such convictions, and may therefore properly be denied
resentencing based on a lesser additional showing of dangerousness.
However, we need not resolve the question because we find the trial court’s
decision was supported by substantial evidence even as to the super strikes.
While it is quite true that defendant has not committed a super strike in the past, he
has committed several crimes of violence and, most recently, the offense of making
criminal threats of violence. Defendant’s multiple convictions for spousal abuse are
perhaps the most troubling.7 It is common knowledge that such situations are incendiary
and subject to escalation. It is also obvious that such offenses often revolve around
sexual relationships. The trial court was not required to find that defendant had
committed a fatal assault or a violent sexual assault against a spouse or cohabitant in the
past before concluding that he represented an unreasonable risk of doing so in the future.
We also note that defendant has been convicted of DUI with injury, and that vehicular
homicide under section 191.5 is included as a super strike. Given defendant’s continued
abuse of narcotics, the risk of such an offense is also of legitimate concern. Finally, we
note that defendant’s consistent and uninterrupted8 history of lawlessness reflects a lack
of ability or intention to conform or change his approach to life and society. There was
substantial evidence to support the finding of dangerousness.
7 The record does not reflect who the victim of the criminal threats offense was.
8 Except during periods of incarceration (and not always even then).
7
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER Acting P. J. We concur:
MILLER J.
CODRINGTON J.
8
AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.18, as there was substantial evidence that the defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The court further held that the prosecution's burden of proof for establishing dangerousness under the statute is by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.
Issues
Whether the prosecution must prove dangerousness under Penal Code section 1170.18 beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence.
Whether the trial court's finding that the defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety was supported by substantial evidence.
Disposition. Affirmed
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“dangerousness is a hurdle which must be crossed in order for a defendant to be resentenced at all.”
“He was not entitled to resentencing until the court concluded that he was not dangerous, and the court could make that yea-or-nay decision based on a preponderance of the evidence.”
“There was substantial evidence to support the finding of dangerousness.”