Smith v. EMC Mortgage CA3

Filed 7/26/16 Smith v. EMC Mortgage CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (San Joaquin) ----

WENDELL SMITH, C078532

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 39-2013- 00298237-CU-FR-STK) v.

EMC MORTGAGE LLC et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

Plaintiff Wendell Smith (Smith) appeals from a judgment of dismissal after the trial court sustained without leave to amend a demurrer by EMC Mortgage LLC and JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A, (collectively Chase). Smith’s briefing is very difficult to decipher, but appears to fault the trial court for expunging a lis pendens and sustaining the demurrer without being told by Chase that certain underlying property had already been sold. His opening brief fails to set forth the pleaded allegations, the bases of the demurrer, the bases for the trial court’s ruling, or an

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intelligible explanation of the law applicable to the pleaded issues. His reply brief is similarly deficient. On appeal, a party challenging an order has the burden to show error by providing an adequate record and making coherent legal arguments, supported by authority, or the claims will be deemed forfeited. (See Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574-575; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 482, fn. 2; In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408; In re Marriage of Nichols (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 661, 672-673, fn. 3.) A party who appears without counsel must be held to the same standards and procedural rules as a litigant who employs counsel. (See Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984- 985; Doran v. Dryer (1956) 143 Cal.App.2d 289, 290.) We have read and reread Smith’s briefs and we find neither satisfies these settled appellate rules. Although Smith does provide some record citations, and he does cite to some legal authorities, he does not tie the two together with coherent legal arguments. For example, he recites the standards applicable to demurrers, and seems to argue the trial court improperly declined to consider his opposition, purportedly because it was not timely filed. But he fails to explain what difference the opposition would have made. The appellant bears the duty of spelling out in the opening brief exactly how a procedural error caused a “miscarriage of justice.” (See Vaughn v. Jonas (1948) 31 Cal.2d 586, 601; Santina v. General Petroleum Corp. (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 74, 77.) Further, Smith’s claim about the rejection of his opposition by the trial court is not fairly embraced within his argument heading, and is forfeited for that reason, too. (See Loranger v. Jones (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 847, 858, fn. 9; Opdyk v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1826, 1830-1831, fn. 4.) Smith quotes a deed of trust and cites certain statutes, but nowhere does he tether his claim to the allegations of his complaint, nor does he provide any legal authorities explaining the elements of any particular cause of action he seeks to pursue against Chase.