California Court of Appeal Jul 13, 2016 No. E063966Unpublished
Filed 7/13/16 P. v. Shields CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E063966
v. (Super.Ct.Nos. FSB031656, FSB07472 & SCR41932) ROBERT CHRIS SHIELDS, OPINION Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. John M. Pacheco,
Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Richard Power, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Marvin E.
Mizell and Allison V. Hawley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Defendant Robert Chris Shields appeals from the denial of his petition under
Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. (Pen. Code, § 1170.18; unless
otherwise indicated, all additional statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Defendant
argues he is entitled to have his prior convictions for petty theft with a prior designated as
misdemeanors (former § 666), and that he is entitled to be resentenced in his current
convictions for offenses that are now misdemeanors by creating two mechanisms for
relief: (1) reclassification and resentencing for defendants currently serving sentences for
eligible offenses (§ 1170.18, subds. (a), (b)), and (2) designation as misdemeanors for
defendants who have already completed their sentences for eligible offenses (§ 1170.18,
subds. (f), (g)). Proposition 47 did not, however, create a mechanism for obtaining
resentencing on a felony not affected by Proposition 47 simply because an offense
underlying one or more of its enhancements is so affected. We find this omission to be
significant because Proposition 47 expressly provides that the relief it creates is meant to
be exhaustive, not merely illustrative: “Nothing in this and related sections is intended to
diminish or abrogate the finality of judgments in any case not falling within the purview
of this act.” (§ 1170.18, subd. (n).)
Defendant contends the resentencing provision under section 1170.18,
subdivisions (a) and (b), applies retroactively to prior convictions used to enhance the
sentence on non-Proposition 47 eligible felonies because, by its terms, a felony wobbler
that is reclassified or designated as a misdemeanor “shall be considered a misdemeanor
for all purposes.” (§ 1170.18, subd. (k).) We are not persuaded. Section 1170.18,
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subdivision (k), borrowed language from section 17, which provides that when a trial
court exercises its discretion to declare a felony wobbler to be a misdemeanor, the offense
“is a misdemeanor for all purposes . . . .” (§ 17, subd. (b)(3).) The courts have
consistently interpreted section 17 to apply prospectively only. “[W]hen a wobbler is
reduced to a misdemeanor [under section 17], the offense thereafter is deemed a
‘misdemeanor for all purposes . . . .’” (People v. Park (2013) 56 Cal.4th 782, 795, italics
added; see People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 381-382; People v. Pryor (1936) 17
Cal.App.2d 147, 152.) Put differently, redesignation under section 17 makes the wobbler
“a misdemeanor from that point on.” (People v. Feyrer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 426, 439, 443,
fn. 8; see People v. Marshall (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 502, 504 [redesignated offense is
treated as a misdemeanor after redesignation]; Gebremicael v. California Com. on
Teacher Credentialing (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1477, 1482-1483, 1487 [same]; People v.
Camarillo (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1390, 1394 [same]; People v. Rowland (1937) 19
Cal.App.2d 540, 541-542 [same].) Critically, however, this “misdemean[or] status [is]
not . . . given retroactive effect.” (People v. Moomey (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 850, 857;
see Feyrer, at p. 439 [“the offense is [made] a misdemeanor from that point on, but not
retroactively” (italics added)]; People v. Bozigian (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 373, 379 [felony
wobbler reduced to misdemeanor for sentencing “has no retroactive effect”].)
“‘When legislation has been judicially construed and a subsequent statute on a
similar subject uses identical or substantially similar language, the usual presumption is
that the Legislature [or the voters] intended the same construction, unless a contrary intent
clearly appears.’ [Citation.]” (Rivera, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1100; see People v.
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Medina (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 643, 650.) We find nothing in the text, history, or
purposes of Proposition 47 that would lead us to conclude the voters intended section
1170.18, subdivision (k), to be interpreted differently than section 17, subdivision (b)(3).
Therefore, we conclude defendant is not entitled to be resentenced on ineligible offenses
in his current case based on redesignation of his prior convictions as misdemeanors.
Finally, because we conclude defendant is not entitled to be resentenced in his
current case, we also conclude defendant’s appointed attorney did not render ineffective
assistance of counsel by failing to interpose an objection to the denial of defendant’s
request for resentencing. (People v. Bradley (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 64, 90 [“Failure to
raise a meritless objection is not ineffective assistance of counsel.”].)
III.
DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s petition to designate as misdemeanors his
convictions for petty theft with a prior in case Nos. SCR41932 and FSB07472 is reversed.
On remand, the trial court shall grant the petition. (§ 1170.18, subds. (f), (g).)
The order denying resentencing in case No. FSB031656 is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
McKINSTER J. We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
MILLER J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The court held that while a defendant is entitled to have prior petty theft convictions designated as misdemeanors under Proposition 47, such designation does not retroactively invalidate prior prison term enhancements on a current felony sentence.
Issues
Are prior convictions for petty theft with a prior eligible for designation as misdemeanors under Proposition 47?
Does the designation of a prior conviction as a misdemeanor retroactively negate a prior prison term enhancement on a current felony sentence?
Did the trial court err in denying the petition for resentencing and redesignation?
Disposition. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“defendant’s prior convictions for petty theft with a prior are eligible to be designated as misdemeanors”
“designation of a prior conviction as a misdemeanor does not operate retroactively to negate a prior prison term sentence enhancement imposed on a felony that is not governed by Proposition 47”
“The order denying defendant’s petition to designate as misdemeanors his convictions for petty theft with a prior in case Nos. SCR41932 and FSB07472 is reversed.”