Silva v. Burrtec Waste Industries CA4/2 (2016) · DecisionDepot
Silva v. Burrtec Waste Industries CA4/2
California Court of Appeal Jul 6, 2016 No. E062866Unpublished
Filed 7/6/16 Silva v. Burrtec Waste Industries CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
LEONEL SILVA,
Plaintiff and Appellant, E062866
v. (Super.Ct.No. CIVDS1212541)
BURRTEC WASTE INDUSTRIES, INC., OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. David Cohn, Judge.
Affirmed.
Collins Muir + Stewart, Nicole A. Davis Tinkham, Christian E. Foy Nagy and
Ryan Stenzel for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Littler Mendelson and Diane Kimberlin for Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant Leonel Silva, represented by the law firm of Collins,
significantly reduced the amount that was requested by him.
Silva contends on appeal that the trial court “slashed” reasonable hours expended
on litigation for no stated reason. The reduction of partner, associate, paralegal and clerk
time was an abuse of its discretion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. COMPLAINT AND JUDGMENT
On December 5, 2012, Silva filed a complaint for recovery of unpaid wages
pursuant to section 201 and Industrial Welfare Commission Order No. 4. Silva was
employed with Burrtec. Silva alleged that he was not paid for 342 hours of “double-
time,” or 3,460 hours of overtime pay between 2008 and 2011. Also, he was not paid the
statutorily required rest periods for 886 days between September 16, 2008, and May 16,
2011.
A jury trial commenced on March 3, 2014, in San Bernardino County Superior
Court. The jury returned its verdict in favor of Silva on March 19, 2014. The jury found
Silva was not properly classified by Burrtec as an exempt employee. Based on this
determination, the jury concluded that Silva was entitled to overtime hours, rest breaks
and that Burrtec willfully failed to pay Silva overtime wages. The jury awarded Silva
$75,802.35 in overtime wages and $12,959.40 in penalties.
1All further statutory references are to the Labor Code unless otherwise indicated.
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B. SILVA’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS
On September 26, 2014, Silva filed his Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
(Motion). Silva requested $526,634.50 in attorneys’ fees and $43,778.03 in costs. Silva
requested fees pursuant to sections 98.2, subdivision (c), 218.5, and 1194. Silva argued
in the motion that the case presented a “significant financial risk to counsel” because it
was based on a contingency. Silva also argued that the verdict amount did not limit the
attorneys’ fees award. Silva cited to numerous cases that involved small verdict amounts
and high attorneys’ fees awards. Silva attached the background and experience of each
of the attorneys who worked on the case. This included senior partner and trial attorney
Brian K. Stewart, who Silva calculated at an hourly rate of $495 per hour and Nicole
Tinkham, partner, who billed at $465 per hour. The associates who worked on the case
were billed at $365 per hour and the paralegals/law clerks were billed at $190 per hour.
Silva argued that multiple attorneys could work on a case. The high attorneys’ fees were
based on the fact it was a contingency case.
Tinkham provided a declaration. Burrtec provided one banker’s box of documents
and plans for the dump in discovery. Review of the plans required an engineering
professional. Tinkham defended Silva’s two-day deposition, and deposed two other
witnesses. Other associates handled two other depositions. A full day of mediation was
handled by Tinkham and was unsuccessful. Tinkham prepared for trial, including
meeting with witnesses, and preparing motions in limine and exhibits. She attended the
three-week trial. A paralegal had to provide translation for Silva and other witnesses who
only spoke Spanish.
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Tinkham provided a summary of her time working in prelitigation, filing,
discovery, pretrial, trial and posttrial as 371 hours. Tinkham requested $172,515 in fees
for the portion of work completed by her. Tinkham had been an attorney at Collins since
2003 and became a partner in 2012. She had tried, arbitrated and mediated six cases;
three were as first chair. Silva attached a two-page timekeeping summary. It included
only codes for work done. It also had a summary of time for each attorney, with codes
for the attorneys.
Stewart also provided a declaration. He had 28 years of experience as a practicing
attorney and had tried over 30 jury trials. He was an associate of the American Board of
Trial Advocates. He spent over 200 hours working on prelitigation, pretrial, trial and
posttrial phases in the instant matter. He met with the client, witnesses, reviewed
thousands of pages of evidence, reviewed depositions, assisted with motions in limine,
and attended the nine-day trial from March 3, 2014, through March 17, 2014. He was
requesting $99,198 for the 200.40 hours spent on the case.
Valerie Gallo was an associate who worked for Collins. She had spent “well
over” 481 hours on Silva’s case in prelitigation, filing, discovery, pretrial, trial and
posttrial phases. She took the depositions of two witnesses and attended the Silva
deposition. She was “on-call” during the mediation. She worked on the trial and drafted
the judgment order. She had been an associate since 2013. Gallo had spent 498.4 hours
on the case and anticipated 50 more hours. She was requesting $200,166 for her work.
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C. BURRTEC’S OPPOSITION TO SILVA’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’
FEES AND COSTS
On September 15, 2014, Burrtec filed its Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Opposition). Burrtec argued that Silva had to show that the
hours he sought to be compensated for were reasonable and necessary. Further, Silva had
provided only vague descriptions of the categories of tasks performed. These “vague,
block-billed attorney time entries” warranted cutting the time. The declarations
submitted by the attorneys did not adequately address the time spent on what tasks. Silva
had provided no information defining the codes that were used to calculate hours. It was
impossible for the trial court to determine whether the time spent was reasonable or
necessary.
It was also difficult to determine if there was duplicate work done by the
attorneys, paralegals and law clerks. Further, Silva’s attorneys could only recover those
amounts incurred with the court action, and none for any administrative proceedings that
preceded filing the complaint. There was no evidence to justify the hourly rates of
Samuel Muir, David Barker and Christian Nagy, who were also attorneys on the case.
D. SILVA’S REPLY TO THE OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Silva filed a Reply to the Opposition to the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (Reply).
Silva contended that a proper showing had been made that the attorneys’ fees requested
were reasonable given the complexity and importance of the case.
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Silva argued that the declarations of the attorneys clearly set out the tasks and
amounts spent on each task. Further, Silva’s attorneys would allow the trial court to
review all of the billing records. There was little or no duplication of tasks performed.
Every attorney, paralegal and law clerk had their own role. Silva was not seeking
compensation for any administrative proceedings. The declarations by the attorneys who
worked on the case were enough to support payment for the work of non-attorneys.
Tinkham prepared an additional declaration. Tinkham declared that the general
practice of Collins was to divide tasks among the attorneys in order to avoid double
billing. Further, Burrtec’s counsel had more than one attorney at each of the depositions.
Stewart also provided an additional declaration. The law clerks were named. Based on
the work they performed for Collins, they merited $190 per hour.
There were two paralegals who worked on the case. One had 10 years experience
as a paralegal and 20 years as a legal assistant. The other had six years experience as a
paralegal and 15 years as a litigation assistant. One of the paralegals, Veronica Chavez,
served as an interpreter because Silva and some of the witnesses only spoke Spanish.
Gallo prepared an additional declaration. She was an associate with Collins. She
attended a portion of Silva’s deposition. She conducted other work on the case while at
the deposition. She attended one of the witness depositions with Tinkham in order to be
properly prepared for the two other depositions she was to conduct by herself. Gallo also
attended a deposition of Burrtec’s expert. She worked on other billable tasks pertaining
to the trial during the deposition. Further, two attorneys representing Burrtec attended
“nearly every deposition.” Gallo had spent 10 hours working on the Reply.
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Christian Foy Nagy also submitted a declaration. Nagy had been an appellate
lawyer at Collins since 2007 and had filed numerous successful appeals. She reviewed
several law and motion matters in the case. Her rate was $345 per hour. She spent 47.3
hours on the case.
E. HEARING ON MOTION
On October 21, 2014, the trial court heard the motion. At the hearing, the trial
court determined that it did not have sufficient information regarding what time was
incurred on various tasks so it could determine whether the fees were reasonable and
necessary. Silva was granted the opportunity to provide supplemental information on the
billing. The trial court did not need further legal argument; it only wanted evidence of
the amount of hours spent on each task.
F. SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING AND RESPONSE
Tinkham filed a declaration in support of supplemental briefing to provide the trial
court with additional information on the tasks performed by each attorney, paralegal and
law clerk who worked on the case. She had spent over 389 hours working on the case.
She billed at $465 per hour. She asked for $181,210.50. Tinkham provided a breakdown
of the hours she spent on prelitigation, discovery, meeting with Silva, reviewing
documents, preparing for depositions, attending depositions, mediation, preparing for
trial, trial that took place over nine court days, and posttrial work on recovery of
attorneys’ fees and costs.
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Tinkham attached a chart that listed the attorneys, paralegals and law clerks who
worked on the case, their reasonable rates and the hours they billed on the case. Tinkham
also provided a new timekeeper document that included descriptions of each of the tasks
performed by each of the attorneys, paralegals and law clerks. Also attached was a
breakdown of all of the costs expended.
Stewart also filed a declaration. Stewart insisted that taking the case on a
contingency basis increased the risk to the law firm. They were entitled to a higher
hourly rate because it was a contingency case. Stewart worked with Tinkham because of
his many years of trial experience. He was involved with meeting with Silva and
witnesses, reviewing thousands of pages of documents, and assisting with all strategy and
processes at trial. He provided a detailed chart of the tasks he performed and the time
incurred. He also provided that the law clerks and paralegals were well-trained and
provided essential assistance on the case.
Gallo also submitted a new declaration. In 2012, Gallo was a law clerk at Collins.
She spent over 14 hours working on the case. She became an attorney that same year and
continued to work on the case. Gallo spent well over 500 hours working on the case.
She set forth detailed statements regarding the hours she spent on the case and the tasks
performed including prelitigation, discovery, depositions, mediation, pretrial, trial and
posttrial.
Nagy submitted another declaration. She reiterated that she was tasked with
reviewing law in motion, pretrial and trial matters to determine possible appellate issues.
Nagy stated that due to the unique issues in the case and recent case law developments it
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was anticipated that the case may be appealed. She spent 47.3 hours drafting or
reviewing motions in limine, doing research for the trial and preparing posttrial motions.
Burrtec filed a response to the supplemental briefing. Burrtec responded that the
declarations submitted only provide “lump-sum totals” of hours billed categorized by the
phases of the case. The declarations did not provide detailed information about the total
amount of time spent by each attorney on specific tasks. Further, attaching the 137-page
billing entries was not sufficient. It was Silva’s burden to “‘prune the fee request to
comply with the law.’”
Burrtec criticized Silva for providing no information regarding the qualifications
of the law clerks or paralegals to justify their hourly rate of $190. There was no way to
discern if their work was duplicative or unnecessary. Burrtec provided a breakdown on
how the amount should be adjusted downward for the paralegals and law clerks. Burrtec
also contended that it should not be responsible for time Nagy spent preparing for an
appeal that was never filed. Further, the trial court could not determine if work
performed prior to December 5, 2012, on the case pertained to the administrative
proceedings. Again, Burrtec provided a chart detailing the amount the bill should be
reduced for prelitigation tasks.
Burrtec insisted the descriptions for work on discovery were vague, and
impossible for the trial court to determine if they were necessary or reasonable. The trial
court could try to discern from the 137-page billing entries but the court was not required
to conduct such review. Further, the descriptions of preparing for depositions were too
vague. Further, there were duplicative billings for depositions. The amount billed for
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meeting and conferring on discovery issues was excessive; there were very few issues.
The experts were deemed unnecessary. The billing for the experts should be adjusted
downward. Burrtec set forth charts of how the bill should be reduced for discovery and
the experts.
Burrtec also disputed the mediation hours. Three attorneys worked on the
mediation briefing. Gallo billed for being “on-call” for the mediation. However, in the
billing records, Gallo did not bill any time for the day of the mediation. This raised a
question of accuracy of the billing and Gallo’s declaration. Burrtec provided the amount
that the bill should be reduced.
As for pretrial billing, Burrtec faulted Silva for failing to delineate in a
comprehensive manner what tasks each attorney performed. Further, the amounts were
duplicative and excessive. Burrtec also provided a chart of the amount requested by
Silva for the trial. It was a total of over 300 hours for a nine-day trial for three attorneys.
This would total 33 hours each day. In fact, based on Tinkham’s declaration, she billed
15.32 hours each day for the trial. This amount was excessive, redundant and otherwise
unnecessary.
Finally, for the posttrial hours, Silva was requesting 146 hours. This totaled
$60,060 for posttrial briefing to recover attorneys’ fees and costs.
G. RULING
The matter was heard on December 5, 2014. The trial court initially stated, “I
must confess I’m experiencing what could only be characterized as sticker shock. I think
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the amount of fees that are claimed are nothing short of exorbitant. We have in excess of
half a million dollars sought in attorneys’ fees.”
The trial court noted that the hourly fee, based on San Bernardino County, was
“excessive.” However, since Burrtec had not disputed the amount, the hourly rate would
remain. The trial court however looked at the amount and determined what the total fee
would be taking into account the fee that is normally charged in the community, which
was half. However, the trial court stated, “keep in mind I’m not considering cutting your
hourly rates by half, but this was just to give myself sort of a reality check.” When
divided in half, the total fees amounted to $272,737 “which I still think just sort of shocks
the conscience here.”
The trial court noted it was only a 10-day trial from jury selection through the
deliberations. The trial court stated, “This not a complicated area of the law. The legal
issues are not novel. This is the area of the law that all of you practice in, this wage-an-
hour litigation. You know what the law is. It’s simple and straightforward. [¶] The
issue in the case was a very simple issue. What was Mr. Silva doing at the dump on a
day-to-day basis? Was he a bona fide supervisor? Or was he a laborer with glorified title
that enabled his employers to avoid having to pay overtime and grant rest breaks and so
forth?”
The trial court did not understand the “apparent extreme complexity” that the
billing in the case suggested. It required a deposition of Silva, his coworkers and a
review of the time records. “It seems to me that there is an extreme duplicative effort
here of the attorneys.” The trial court noted, “I started going through the bills line by
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line: This charge is reasonable, this charge seems to be a little excessive, this charge
seems to duplicate what Ms. Davis Tinkham did and so forth. And I was just spinning
my wheels on it.” The trial court had hoped that Burrtec’s counsel could provide some
clarity but it was apparent “she struggled with it the same way that I did.” However, it
was apparent there was a lot of “duplicative effort.”
The trial court then stated, “So what I did is I read through the bills and I sort of
got, I guess, what I’d call more of a gestalt sense about how much duplication and
unnecessary effort there was.” The trial court felt that Tinkham was the primary attorney.
The court determined that 75 percent of the work she performed was reasonable and
necessary. This amounted to an award of $135,919.50.
The trial court noted, “And I sort of stop there and think good heavens, this is even
more than the amount of the judgment in the case. But of course I realized when thinking
about it, that’s not the issue. . . . And so the fact that the attorneys’ fees are more than the
actual judgment really doesn’t make any difference.”
The trial court then looked to the bill for Stewart. The trial court determined that
Stewart played a secondary role. The trial court stated, “I think that a great deal of the
time that he spent, as I looked through the billing record, I thought was duplicative and
unnecessary.” This was especially in light of the simplicity of the case. The trial court
found, “So I got a sense looking through the billing entries that at the most 50 percent of
what Mr. Stewart did was necessary and appropriate.” The trial court awarded $51,975,
commenting, “which I must confess stopped my heart for a second-chair attorney on the
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case. But I think that’s a function of the hourly rate, which [Burrtec’s attorney] does not
dispute.”
The trial court had an issue with the hourly rates for Gallo, the paralegals and law
clerks. The trial court felt that Burrtec’s counsel was only conceding the hourly rates for
the “highly competent” counsel of Tinkham and Stewart. As for Gallo, the trial court
noted that she was only a law clerk and a brand-new associate. The trial court found she
should be billed only at a rate of $175 per hour. Further, some of her time was
duplicative and unnecessary given the work by Tinkham and Stewart. The trial court felt
that 25 percent of the 504.3 hours requested was reasonable. This amounted to $22,064.
The trial court felt that the work done by the paralegals and law clerks was “de
minimis.” It recognized a person named “Ghavimi” spent about 40 hours which seemed
legitimate. Further, an appropriate rate was $75 per hour for a total of $3,000.
Tinkham, who represented Silva at the proceeding, objected that the case was
simple. The case involved the examination of all the records at the dump for the time
spent on tasks by Silva and other workers. Further, Burrtec’s defense was that Silva
spent time working with San Bernardino County on regulatory issues, which was a
supervisor duty and all of the regulations had to be reviewed.
Tinkham also addressed the lodestar figure. The trial court had to look at what a
fee-paying client would be charged and would pay. Collins’s bill was in line with what it
would normally receive in a case such as this. Tinkham had personally worked on
similar cases and charged the rates set forth in the motion and supplemental briefing. The
trial court inquired, “Mr. Silva, who worked at the dump, would pay you in excess of half
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a million dollars?” Tinkham denied she was talking about Silva. The trial court retorted,
“Similarly situated dump workers would pay your firm in excess of half a million
dollars?” Tinkham stated that the standard was what any paying client would pay; the
trial court responded that the rate of $495 was not disputed.
Tinkham also argued that it was permissible to use multiple attorneys if the
“demands of the case warrant it.” There was too much information for one attorney.
Moreover, Tinkham argued that sufficient evidence had been presented as to the need for
multiple attorneys at the depositions. Burrtec also had multiple attorneys at the
depositions.
The trial court stated that Tinkham had presented a “very compelling
presentation,” and asked for response from Burrtec’s counsel. Burrtec’s counsel stated
that even if they had two attorneys at the depositions, that did not mean that they were
both being paid for by the client. Burrtec again argued it was difficult to pinpoint the
duplication of tasks based on the records provided by Collins. Further, Burrtec argued
this was not a complex case. There were really only issues pertaining to what Silva did at
work.
Burrtec’s counsel also clarified that the agreement of hourly rates was for Stewart
and Tinkham only. Counsel gave no consideration to the hourly rates of the other
attorneys. Burrtec’s counsel stated, “And your Honor is correct that in the community in
which we practice the rates were not jaw dropping. They would compare with my own.
So I would not have—so I did not raise the issue.”
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Stewart stated that is was not “very fair” to cut his time in half. He had more
experience than Tinkham. To cut his time would compensate him only for the time at the
trial, which did not take into account his review of documents that had to be done to
prepare for trial.
Tinkham also stated that the paralegals and law clerks were critical to the case.
The trial court then criticized Collins for claiming a rate of $190 per hour for Gallo, who
was essentially reviewing payroll stubs. Tinkham indicated that it required determining
what was time that was overtime and calculating rest periods and meal periods, which
required legal analysis. Collins charged paying clients $190 per hour for law clerks.
The trial court took the matter under submission. “This is a heck of a lot of
money, whether it’s 200,000 or whether it’s 500,000, it’s a lot of money. And I think the
parties on both sides deserve a really careful look at this. And I’m going to look at these
bills some more, and I’m going to take into consideration all of the arguments that have
been raised by both sides.”
On December 10, 2014, the trial court ruled that Tinkham would be allowed
$135,919; Stewart would be allowed $51,975; Gallo would be awarded $22,064; and the
paralegals would be awarded $3,000. The total award of attorneys’ fees was
$212,958.50.
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DISCUSSION
Silva contends that the trial court abused its discretion in “slashing” the amount of
fees requested from $545,574 to $212,958.50 in a matter brought under section 1194.
Section 1194 provides as follows: “(a) Notwithstanding any agreement to work
for a lesser wage, any employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal
overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action
the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation,
including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.” Section 218.5
provides, “[i]n any action brought for the nonpayment of wages, fringe benefits, or health
and welfare or pension fund contributions, the court shall award reasonable attorney’s
fees and costs to the prevailing party.”
“[S]ection 1194 is a ‘“one-way” fee-shifting statute,’ the purpose of which is to
provide a ‘“‘needed disincentive to violation of minimum wage laws.’ [Citation.] An
analysis of the bill submitted to the Senate in advance of the vote stated that, ‘[t]hese
additional remedies are especially necessary in situations where the employees
themselves pursue a private action to recover unpaid wages or overtime.’”’” (Eicher v.
Advanced Business Integrators, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1381.) Burrtec does
not dispute that Silva was entitled to some attorneys’ fees under section 1194.
We review the trial court’s attorneys’ fee award for an abuse of discretion.
(PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1094-1095 (PLCM); Serrano v.
Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.) “The ‘experienced trial judge is the best judge of the
value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his judgment is of course
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subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is
clearly wrong.’” (Serrano, at p. 49; see also PLCM, at p. 1095.) The Supreme Court has
held, “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the
bounds of reason.” (Shamblin v. Brattain (1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478-479.)
“‘The value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial
court has its own expertise. [Citation.] The trial court may make its own determination
of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony.
[Citations.] The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of
factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill
required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and
other circumstances in the case.’” (PLCM, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1096.) However, the
Supreme Court has stated, “‘“We do not want ‘a [trial] court, in setting an attorney’s fee,
[to] become enmeshed in a meticulous analysis of every detailed facet of the professional
representation. It . . . is not our intention that the inquiry into the adequacy of the fee
assume massive proportions, perhaps dwarfing the case in chief.’”’” (Id at p. 1098.)
The fees requested under section 1194 must be reasonable. (Harrington v. Payroll
Entertainment Services Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 589, 594.) In Harrington, an off-
duty police officer provided traffic and crowd control on a movie set. The officer
claimed he was shorted $44.63 in overtime compensation. After an unsuccessful attempt
to obtain class certification, the officer settled his individual claim for $10,500, then
sought an award of attorney fees of $46,277, under the mandatory fee clause of section
1194. The trial court found the request “‘unreasonable and excessive’” and even
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“‘confiscatory and unfair,’” given that the lawsuit was not certified as a class action and
the value of the plaintiff’s claim was $44. The officer was denied all attorneys’ fees.
(Harrington, at pp. 591-593.)
The appellate court agreed that the fee request was absurd; however, section 1194
mandates a fee award as a matter of right. It found, “the most that [the officer] is entitled
to is his reasonable fee.” (Harrington v. Payroll Entertainment Services Inc., supra, 160
Cal.App.4th at p. 594.) The appeals court determined that a “reasonable fee” could not
be more than $500. It directed the trial court to enter a new order awarding the officer
attorney fees of $500. (Id. at pp. 594-595.)
In Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, a case involving a mandatory
attorney-fee statute under the anti-SLAPP law, the Supreme Court found, if “a trial court
is concerned that a particular award is excessive, it has broad discretion to adjust the fee
downward or deny an unreasonable fee altogether.” (Id. at p. 1138, fn. omitted.)
At most, a trial court in assessing the appropriate fee, determines a “‘lodestar,’ i.e.,
the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.”
(PLCM, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1095.). The lodestar amount can be “increased or
decreased by the trial court depending on other factors involved in the lawsuit.” (Maria
P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1294, fn. omitted; see also Ketchum v. Moses, supra,
24 Cal.4th at p. 1138 [“the trial court is not required to include a fee enhancement to the
basic lodestar figure for contingent risk”].) However, “No specific findings reflecting the
court’s calculations [are] required. [Citation.] ‘The record need only show that the
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attorney fees were awarded according to the “lodestar” or “touchstone” approach.’”
(Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 224, 254.)
Here, the trial court properly exercised its discretion. It accepted that the hourly
fee for Tinkham and Stewart was appropriate despite its reservations as to the charged
amount. It then determined that the amount charged for Gallo, the other associates,
paralegals and law clerks was excessive, and within its discretion, reduced the fee. The
trial court stated it was taking the matter under submission and was going to review all of
the billings, and consider all of the arguments of counsel, and then reach a decision
because it determined that both sides “deserve a really careful look at this.” There is
nothing in the appellate record that shows the trial court failed to conduct such analysis.
The trial court did not need to provide a detailed analysis of those fees it found
reasonable, and those it found unnecessary in its decision. It merely was tasked with
reviewing all of the records and making a determination as to the reasonableness of the
fees. We cannot say that the determination was wrong. As such, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in determining the reasonable attorney fees.
On appeal, Silva distorts the record to support his argument that the trial court
ignored the billing, decided that since Silva was only a sanitation worker the attorneys’
fees were too exorbitant, and that the trial court improperly calculated the lodestar.
However, we have thoroughly examined the record, as set forth in detail ante, which
provides the trial court engaged in a conscientious review of the billing records,
determined the fees based on what was reasonable for the issues involved in the case, and
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appropriately found that the fee should be set at $212,958.50. Silva has failed to show
that the trial court abused its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The award of attorneys’ fees is affirmed. The parties are to pay their own costs on
appeal, including their own attorneys’ fees.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MILLER J.
We concur:
McKINSTER Acting P. J.
SLOUGH J.
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AI Brief
AI-generated · verify before citing
Holding. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in reducing the requested attorneys' fees, as the court properly exercised its expertise to determine the reasonable value of services and identified excessive, duplicative, and unnecessary billing entries.
Issues
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in reducing the amount of attorneys' fees awarded to the prevailing plaintiff under Labor Code sections 218.5 and 1194.
Disposition. Affirmed.
Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion
“The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.”
“The trial court may make its own determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the necessity for, expert testimony.”