Haughawout v. Percival

California Supreme Court Dec 6, 1911 No. L.A. No. 2768.Published

Before: Sloss

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Holding. The court held that the statutory requirement to post notices "near" the council chamber door is a relative term to be determined by the facts of each case, and that the trial court's finding of compliance was supported by evidence where the notices were posted on a customary bulletin board in the city hall.

Issues

Whether a bulletin board located on the portico of the city hall satisfies the Vrooman Act requirement that notices be posted "near" the council chamber door.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The word “near” does not signify any precise measure of distance. It is a relative term, and its meaning must be determined with reference to the subject-matter.”

“Whether the place be “near” such door or not, is, in each case, a question of fact, to be decided upon the considerations suggested.”

“The use by the legislature of the indefinite term “near” necessarily left to the officials conducting the posting a measure of latitude.”

Synopsis

Street Assessment—Posting Notices near Doob op Council Chamber —Bulletin Board adjacent to Main Entrance to City Hall.— The provisions of the so-called Vrooman Act (Stats. 1885, ,p. 147; 1891, pp. 196, 199, 200), requiring that in proceedings for street improvements, the resolutions of intention and notice inviting sealed proposals for the work shall be posted “on or near the chamber door” of the city council, is sufficiently. complied with by a posting on a bulletin board customarily used for public notices, placed in plain view in a portico leading to and about twenty feet from the main entrance door of the city hall in which such council chamber was situated, and about ninety-six feet by stairway and halls, and eighty-six feet by elevator, from the door of the council chamber.

Id.—Street Assessment Proceedings—Strict Compliance with Statutory Requirements.—Proceedings for street assessments, being m invitwm must, in order to charge the property of the owner, be based upon a compliance with the provisions of the statute authorizing the assessment, in so far, at least, as those provisions have to do with the giving of notice or other steps precedent to the jurisdiction of the board to order the work done.

Id.—Meaning of Word “Near.”—The word “near,” as used in the statute, does not signify any precise measure of distance. It is a relative term, and its meaning must be determined with reference to the subject-matter.

Id.—Liberal Construction of Vrooman Act.—In view of the rule of construction contained in section 25 of the Vrooman Act, that its provisions “shall be liberally construed to promote the objects thereof,” the provisions regarding the posting of notices, and the like, aré to be read in the light of the purposes sought to be accomplished.

Id.—Object of Posting Notices—Nearness of Place Question of Fact.—The object of the posting is to give notice of the steps taken to owners of property to be affected by the work, and as the law prescribes no exact place for the posting, it is reasonable to interpret its language as requiring a posting in such location, convenient to and in the vicinity of the council chamber, as would be likely to catch the eye of any ono approaching the chamber. Whether the place of posting be “near” the door of such chamber or not, is, in each ease, a question of fact, to be- decided upon such considerations.

SLOSS, J.

The defendant appeals from a judgment foreclosing the lien of a street assessment for sewer work done in the city of Los Angeles. The proceedings were had under the Vrooman Act. (Stats. 1885, p. 147.) Section 3 of that act, as amended in 1891 (Stats. 1891, p. 196), provides that the resolution of intention passed by the city council shall be “posted conspicuously for two days on or near the chamber door of said council.” Section 5 requires that the notice inviting sealed proposals shall be “posted conspicuously for five days on or near the council chamber door of said council,” and that notice of award of contract shall be posted in the same manner. (Stats. 1891, pp. 199, 200.) The complaint alleged a posting of the various documents for the required time “conspicuously near the chamber door of the council.” The answer denied such posting. The finding was in favor of the plaintiff. The appellant attacks this finding as unsupported, and the only question argued is whether the court was justified in determining that the various postings were made near the council chamber door.

The case was submitted on a stipulation of facts, which described with particularity the place where the resolution and notices were posted. The room or chamber in which the city council met is on the second floor of the city hall of the said city of Los Angeles. The city hall is situated on the easterly line of Broadway. The main entrance of the building is on the Broadway frontage, access to the interior being had through a door opening from a porch or portico, which runs for a length of some fifty-five feet in a northerly and southerly direction along the outer side of the front wall of the building. To reach the council chamber it is necessary to enter the building through said door, and then, after proceeding to the stairs or elevator, ascend to the second floor, and walk to said chamber from the head of the stairs or the place where the

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elevator stops. By way of the stairs this would require a journey of about forty feet from the main entrance door of the building to the foot of the stairs, twenty-six feet in mounting the stairway and thirty feet on the second floor from the stairs to the door of the council chamber. One going by elevator would be required to walk fifty-six feet on the main floor, and, after ascending eighteen feet in the elevator, he would land on the second floor at a point twelve feet from the council chamber door. Either route involves several turns or changes of direction. The resolution and notices were posted upon a bulletin board situated upon the portico above referred to, at a point about twenty feet northerly from the main entrance door of the building. All notices required to be posted by city officials were during the time of these proceedings, and for several years theretofore, posted upon this board. Any paper so posted would be in plain view of any one entering the city hall through the main entrance door, but notices could not be read by one standing at said door. There is a side entrance to the city hall, which is occasionally used by some of the public but mainly by city officers and employees. The bulletin board would not be visible from this side entrance door, but the Broadway entrance is the one generally used by the public, and the customary and usual way by which the public reached the room in which the city council met is to pass through said Broadway or front entrance, and thence, by way of the stairs or the elevator, to the upper floor.

Haughawout v. Percival

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Synopsis

SLOSS, J.

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