People v. Rushing

California Supreme Court Nov 8, 1900 No. Crim. No. 591.Published

Before: Cooper

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Holding. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain a forgery conviction where the defendant knowingly uttered a power of attorney signed by a person with the same initials as the intended victim to fraudulently obtain funds. The court further affirmed that a person may be guilty of forgery by signing their own name if done with the intent to make the instrument purport to be that of another.

Issues

Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a verdict of forgery.
Whether the defendant's act of signing a power of attorney in the name of a person with the same initials as the intended victim constitutes forgery.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting rebuttal testimony and denying a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“Because the initial of Elmer Geddes’ name is “E,” he will not be allowed to forge the name of every other Geddes in the state whosb initial might be “E,” and in defense claim that he was only signing his own name.”

Synopsis

Criminal Law—Forgery—Uttering False and Forged Power of Attorney — Fraudulent Sale of Bank Account.—A power of attorney to the defendant executed by Elmer Geddes, under the name of “E. Geddes,” with intent that it should thereby bind and represent Edwin Geddes, for a fraudulent purpose, is false and forged; and the uttering thereof by the defendant by signing the name “E. Geddes, by his attorney in fact, W. E. Rushing,” to an assignment of a bank account kept in the name of “E. Geddes,” by Edwin Geddes, upon a sale thereof at a discount, with intent to defraud -the purchaser, and with guilty knowledge of ail the facts, constitutes the crime of forgery by the defendant under section 472 of the Penal Code.

Id.—Forgery in Signing One’s Own Name.—One may be guilty of forgery in signing one’s own name to an instrument with the fraudulent intent of making the instrument appear to hind another, and of making the writing purport to be the writing of another bearing -the same name, or the same family name and initial.

Id.—Fraudulent Intent and Guilty Knowledge of Defendant — Support of Verdict.—Where the circumstances of the case and the proofs are such that the jury could readily infer therefrom that the power of attorney was false and forged, and that the defendant uttered the same with fraudulent intent and guilty knowledge, the verdict of guilty of forgery will not be disturbed.

Id.—Evidence—Conversation of Defendant—Impeachment—Rebuttal. Where the defendant on cross-examination denied ever having had a conversation with witnesses named or with any person to the effect that he and Geddes were going on a bank deal, and that if it went through they would have money to burn, the witnesses named may be allowed in rebuttal to testify to such conversation for the purpose of impeachment.

Id.—Instruction—Hypothesis of Guilt and of Innocence—Circumstantial Evidence—Criticism—Error Corrected.—Where the jury were properly instructed that “every fact essential to sustain the hypothesis of guilt and to exclude the hypothesis of innocence must be fully proved,” such instruction corrects any error or vice in the remainder of the instruction copied from the opinion in People v. Cronin, 34 Cal. 202, relative to a case of circumstantial evidence, since criticised as “inexact and illogical.”

Id.—Misconduct of District Attorney and Judge—Conflicting Affidavits—Province of Judge — Discretion—Appeal.—Where there were conflicting affidavits as to alleged misconduct of the district attorney and of the judge, the duty of ascertaining the truth therefrom was peculiarly the province of the judge who . tried the case, and his decision thereupon will not be interfered with upon appeal, unless it clearly appears that his dis- . cretion was abused.

Id.—Newly Discovered Evidence — Discretion—Presumption.—A motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is addressed to the discretion of the court, and the presumption is that the discretion was properly exercised in denying the motion, when the affidavits were conflicting, and a strong case was not made by the moving party, both in respect of diligence and as to the truth and materiality of the newly discovered evidence.

COOPER, C.

The defendant was charged in the information with the crime of forgery in having, on the thirty-first day of January, 1899, willfully and knowingly uttered and passed as true and genuine a certain false, forged, and counterfeit power of attorney, with intent to cheat and defraud one Levy. He was convicted and judgment entered accordingly. This appeal is from the judgment and from an order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.

1. The main point urged upon this appeal is that there is not sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. It is the settled rule that if the verdict of the jury is based upon substantial evidence it will not be disturbed, although it may not be supported by a preponderance of the testimony. All questions of conflict of testimony and of credibility of witnesses are wisely left to the judgment of the jury, they being the exclusive judges of all questions of fact.

[451]

In this case, after a careful consideration of the 'evidence, we think it supports the verdict. It appears that some time prior to the date of the alleged offense one Edwin G'eddes had an account amounting to several hundred dollars with the Fresno Loan and Savings Bank, which afterward suspended business and went into liquidation. The account of said Edwin Geddes was evidenced by a bank-book, and the account and book contained the name “E. Geddes.” This book and account were, after the suspension of the said bank, assigned by said Edwin G'eddes to the First National Bank of Fresno city for collection. The defendant procured a power of attorney from one Elmer Geddes, signed and acknowledged under the name of “E. G'eddes.” Under this power of attorney the defendant sold the account to one Levy for sixty-five cents on the dollar and received a check from Levy for the amount of eleven hundred and three dollars and seventy Cents. The check was drawn payable to the order of E. Geddes. The defendant took the check to the bank, indorsed it “E. G'eddes, by his attorney in fact, W. E. Bushing,” and the check was paid to defendant. That the money was procured under an assignment made by defendant as attorney in fact of Elmer Geddes, who had no account at the bank, is not disputed. That the power of attorney was signed “E. Geddes,” and the assignment to Levy made in the name “E. G'eddes,” is conceded. Defendant received the money from Levy upon the representation that he was selling the account of “Edwin Geddes” and that he had the genuine power of attorney of said Edwin Geddes. There is no question 'but that defendant was guilty if he knew that Elmer Geddes, whose power of attorney he held, was not the owner of the account at the bank. The question as to his guilty intent was for the jury, and, if the evidence was such that it could reasonably draw therefrom the inference of guilt, its verdict will not be disturbed.

People v. Rushing

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Synopsis

COOPER, C.

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