Tidewater Southern Ry. Co. v. Jordan
Before: Sloss
Synopsis
APPLICATION for a Writ of Mandate directed to the Secretary of State of the State of California.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Arthur L. Levinsky, J. G. De Forest, and Heller, Powers & Ehrman, for Petitioner.
SLOSS, J.
Mandamus.
The petitioner, a railroad corporation, institutes an original proceeding in this court to compel the secretary of state to file in his office a certified copy of a certificate of creation of bonded indebtedness by petitioner. The facts are undisputed, the only return to the alternative writ heretofore issued being in the form of a demurrer for want of facts. The respondent urges but one ground in support of his refusal to file the certificate, and it is conceded that, unless this ground be well taken, the petitioner is entitled to the relief sought.
The proceedings for creating a bonded indebtedness were taken under subdivision 5 of section 359 of the Civil Code. That subdivision provides that arty corporation desiring to
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create a bonded indebtedness may, in lieu of calling and holding a stockholders’ meeting as provided in earlier subdivisions, create such indebtedness “by a resolution adopted by the unanimous vote of its board of directors or trustees at a regular meeting or at a special meeting called for that purpose, and approved by the written assent or assents of the stockholders holding two-thirds of the subscribed or issued capital stock. ...” The certificate here involved shows that the petitioner has thirteen directors, and that at a regular meeting of the board of directors, attended by only seven directors, all of those present concurred in adopting a resolution for the creation of a bonded indebtedness. Seven constitutes a quorum of the board. The only question is whether this was a compliance with the code provision above quoted, the respondent taking the position that the requirement that the resolution be adopted “by the unanimous vote of its board of directors” can be satisfied only by the affirmative votes of the thirteen directors, all of whom must be present at the meeting.
We entertain no doubt of the soundness of petitioner’s contention that the vote of the seven who attended the meeting was all that was required. The statute does not demand the “unanimous vote of all the directors,” nor the “unanimous vote of all the members of the board.” What is called for is the “unanimous vote of the board.” The provision looks to the body constituting a board of directors, rather than to the individuals of whom that board is composed. Section 308 of the Civil Code provides that “a majority of the directors is a sufficient number to form a board for the transaction of business. ...” Accordingly, the seven directors, duly assembled in regular meeting, constituted the board of directors and a resolution adopted by the affirmative votes of all such directors was “adopted by the unanimous vote of the board of directors.”
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