The L. W. Blinn Lumber Co. v. McArthur (1907) · DecisionDepot

The L. W. Blinn Lumber Co. v. McArthur

Name: California Superior Court Tentative Rulings
Creator: DecisionDepot
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

California Supreme Court Mar 1, 1907 No. L.A. No. 1736.Published

Before: Sloss

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Holding. The court held that the substitution of the successor in interest was proper under the Code of Civil Procedure and that the evidence supported the trial court's finding that the promissory note and mortgage remained unpaid.

Issues

Whether the substitution of the successor in interest was legally permissible under Code of Civil Procedure section 385.
Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for nonsuit.
Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the finding that the note and mortgage were not paid in full.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“it was perfectly competent for the original plaintiff to consent to her substitution after her husband’s death, and perfectly proper for her to be so substituted as a ‘successor in interest.’”

“The plaintiff had by the introduction of the assignment of the note and mortgage to Dr. Moore and of the decree of distribution to herself, made out a prima facie case, and the motion for a nonsuit was properly denied.”

Synopsis

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

[611]

SLOSS, J.

Appeals were taken to this court by the defendant and the intervener from a judgment for the plaintiff and an order denying a motion for new trial. These appeals were subsequently ordered transferred to the district court of appeal for the second appellate district for hearing and determination. The justices of that court were unable to agree, and, upon their disagreement, the cause again came to this' court.

Upon the hearing in the district court of appeal the following opinion, prepared by Gray, P. J., and concurred in by Allen, J., was filed:—

“Action upon a promissory note and to foreclose a mortgage given to secure said note. After the suit was commenced the note and mortgage were regularly assigned to P; R. Moore, and the land mortgaged was conveyed to the intervener, Gould. Subsequently, Moore died, and his estate having been distributed to his widow, Rebecca W. Moore, the latter was substituted as plaintiff in the case. The judgment was for the plaintiff, and the defendant and intervener appeal from said judgment and from an order denying a new trial.

“1. Rebecca W. Moore having, by means of the assignment of the note, and mortgage in suit to her husband and the subsequent decree of distribution, regularly succeeded to all the interest of plaintiff in the subject of the action, it was perfectly competent for the original plaintiff to consent to her substitution after her husband’s death, and perfectly proper for her to be so substituted as a ‘successor in interest.’ (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 385.) The fact that her husband in his lifetime, and his representative after his death, had neither of them been substituted as plaintiff in no way affected her right of substitution.

“2. The principal contention of appellant is directed at the evidence, it being contended,—1. That the court should have sustained appellant’s motion for a nonsuit; and 2. That the evidence shows that the note and mortgage were paid in full on the twenty-ninth day of August, 1894, by Gould, and that ever since that date Gould has been the owner thereof.

“On April 17, 1894, the note in suit, upon which there appears to. have been then due $487.29, was assigned to Doctor Moore. On the same date Gould and his wife executed

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another note and mortgage on another piece of real estate for the sum of, three hundred dollars. The testimony of Mr. Shankland, one of the attorneys for the original plaintiff, shows that he received Dr. Moore’s check for $487.29 on said seventeenth day of April. The transcript of Moore’s account with the Farmers’ and Merchants’ Bank for the said month of April shows clearly, when considered with Shankland’s evidence, that' this check was applied as the full purchase price of the note and mortgage in suit, that day assigned to Dr. Moore; and the said amount was charged to him by the bank. The books of that same bank also show that on the same day Dr. Moore drew out of his account by means of a check the specific additional sum of three hundred dollars, and Gould’s account was credited with exactly three hundred dollars that day deposited. This sum of three hundred dollars was not drawn out of Gould’s account that day, but remained on deposit and was thereafter checked out by him from day to day during the month in small sums ranging from eighteen dollars to one hundred dollars. It is conceded that Dr. Moore held possession of the note and mortgage in suit from April 17th down to August 29, 1894. Gould testifies that on April 17th he paid $187.29 on account of the note here in suit. He also testifies, and a check is introduced in evidence to show, that he paid the whole of the three-hundred-dollar note, and it is shown also, I believe, that the mortgage securing that note was satisfied of record. There is no evidence at all, however, to show that the remaining three hundred dollars left unpaid on the note in suit on April 17th was ever thereafter or theretofore paid, except the fact of the possession thereof being in Gould from and since August 29, 1894. But the testimony of Gould, fairly construed, shows that nothing was paid on the note in suit on August 29th, or thereafter. Gould’s theory is, as we gather it from a careful examination of his testimony, that the note in suit was held merely as collateral security for the payment of the three hundred dollars, and that when he paid the latter note he received both notes. The final position taken by him in his testimony is to the effect that he came out of the transaction of April 17th owing nothing on account of the note in suit to anybody, but that it was on that date satisfied and extinguished in fact, but that the mortgage securing it was left unsatisfied and the note

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Synopsis

SLOSS, J.

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