Reilly v. Police Court

THE COURT.

This is an application for a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent court from proceeding with the trial of the petitioner upon a charge of criminal libel now pending before it, upon the ground that the complaint therein does not state facts sufficient to charge a criminal offense and upon the further ground that the respondent court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof in that the Whitney Act (Stats. 1885, p. 213) and the act of 1901 (Stats. 1901, p. 576) are unconstitutional and void. The facts of this ease are stated by petitioner as follows:

“This is an application for an alternative writ of prohibition, in the Supreme Court to prohibit a third successive trial on a void complaint in a Police Court of Alameda County, for the crime of libel. On the first trial on the same set of facts the Superior Court issued an alternative writ of prohibition, staying all proceedings until final determination of said special proceeding. A demurrer to petition was interposed by respondents, that the Police Court complaint was sufficient to sustain a conviction, which demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, judgment entered on demurrer and appeal duly taken and perfected, transcript filed in District Court of Appeal, a stay on said appeal was refused by the Superior Court, after appeal perfected and a writ of Supersedeas refused by the District Court of Appeal and a writ of Prohibition refused by the

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District Court of Appeal each and all based on the ground that petitioner would have to submit to be tried upon said void complaint and that if he was convicted he would have a remedy " by an appeal from the judgment to the Superior Court. ’ ’

Upon the facts thus stated we must conclude that the questions which petitioner is here asking us to consider and determine are

res adjudicata

as against him. He shows that he has heretofore applied to the district court of appeal for a writ of prohibition for the purpose of preventing these respondents from proceeding with the trial of the same prosecution based upon the same complaint which is involved herein. That application of necessity involved the same legal and constitutional questions which would be involved herein. The refusal of that court to grant the writ prayed for was an adjudication that upon such a state of facts (identical with the facts herein) petitioner was not entitled to the relief prayed for. It would be useless for us now to inquire whether that judgment was correct or erroneous. Having become final, it is now conclusive upon the parties thereto and upon all other courts in a proceeding between the same parties involving the same questions. In