Thompson v. Bell
Before: Henshaw
Synopsis
Estates or Deceased Persons—Temporary Family Allowance— Effect of Inventory—“Further Order of Court.”—A temporary family allowance made before the return of the inventory of the estate by the executors ceases to be operative upon such return, and is not prolonged by the words “until further order of this court,” inserted in the order making the allowance.
Id.—Subsequent Payments—Settlement or Accounts—Order not Eevived—Unsettled Payments—Final Account.—Payments made by the executors, which were allowed and settled in their accounts, as and for a family allowance, after return of the inventory, and prior to a subsequent order for family allowance, cannot be attacked after the expiration of the time of appeal therefrom; but such settled payments could not have the effect to revive the temporary order; and unsettled payments made under such temporary order by the widow to herself as special administratrix, appointed to close up the estate, after removal of the sole surviving executor, must be disallowed in the settlement of her final account.
Id.—Ex Parte Orders oe Court to Depositary op Eunds.—TSx parte orders of the court in the nature of drafts on the custodian of the funds of the estate, authorizing the depositary to pay certain sums to Teresa Bell, the widow, after her appointment as special administratrix, “upon account of family allowance,” under a mistaken belief entertained by the court, that an unpaid family allowance had accrued under the order for temporary allowance, after return of the inventory, could not have the effect to justify or validate illegal payments which did not and could not so properly accrue.
Id.—Contesting Creditors not Estopped.—The fact that certain creditors of the estate, under a mistaken belief of the continuance^ of the order, did not oppose the settlement of the first accounts of the executors, which included payments made after the return of the inventory, cannot estop the creditors from contesting the final accounts of the special administratrix in which she made illegal payments of family allowance to herself, the settlement of which had not before been passed upon.
Id.—Attack by Administratrix upon Settled Account—Improper Evidence.—An amount paid on account of family allowance, which was settled in an account filed by the executors, and had become final and conclusive, could not be attacked by the administratrix upon the settlement of her final account; and evidence to prove that such allowance was not in fact expended for family allowance, but was paid upon certain assessments and claims against properties of the estate, and that the amount so allowed was still due and unpaid, was inadmissible to impeach the verity of the account as settled, and was improperly allowed.
HENSHAW, J.
This is an appeal by certain creditors of the estate of Thomas Bell, deceased, from the order of court settling the final account of the special administratrix of the estate. The attack upon the account goes to the allowance to the special administratrix of payments amounting to over twenty thousand dollars, made to herself as widow of the deceased upon account of family allowance.
Upon January 12, 1893, and before the return of the inventory in the matter of the estate of the deceased, the court made its order directing that the sum of two thousand dollars per month should be paid to Teresa Bell, the widow, from the date of the decedent’s death “until further order of the court.” The inventory was returned upon June 17, 1893. On October 14, 1895, the court made its second order “modifying” the order of 1893, and directing the executors to pay the widow on and after that date “as family allowance the sum of fifteen hundred dollars per month, instead of the monthly allowance of two thousand' dollars theretofore ordered to be paid.” Later the court made its third order, providing that on and after the sixteenth day of May, 1898, the sum of one hundred dollars a month should be paid for family allowance. All of the family allowance accruing under the last two orders has admittedly been paid. The moneys in controversy are payments made under the first order, sums asserted to have
[100]
accrued between the date of the return of the inventory and that of the order of 1895.
Upon the authority of
In re Lux,
100 Cal. 593, and
Crew
v.
Pratt,
119 Cal. 131, it is not to be disputed that the temporary order for family allowance made before the return of the inventory ceased to be operative when that return was made. The words “until the further order of this court” found in the order here under consideration did not and could not have the effect to prolong the life of the order beyond the return of the inventory.
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)