Patterson v. Doe

Statute of Limitations — Oral Contract—Deed of Mine—Verbal Agreement to Pay Upon Resale.—A cause of action upon an oral contract to pay a specified sum upon the resale of a mine deeded by the promisee to the promisor, together with the sale of other mines belonging to the promisor, accrued at the time of such resale, and is barred within two years thereafter, under subdivision 1 of section 339 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Id.—Action Against Executors—Nonsuit.—In an action upon such cause of action against the executors of the deceased promisor, the executors are entitled to a nonsuit, on the ground that the action is barred by the statute.

In.—Effect of Deed of Mine—Instrument in Whiting.—The deed of the mine cannot be considered as a written instrument taking the oral agreement out of the statute, there being no acknowledgment or promise contained in the deed relative to the verbal understanding between the parties. The cause of action is not founded upon an instrument in writing, within the meaning of the code, merely because such an instrument would be a link in the chain of evidence establishing the cause of action, if it does not contain or prove the contract sued upon.

Id.—Letter Upon Previous Unconsummated Transaction—Absence of Promise—Irrelevancy.—A letter from the decedent written in relation to a previous unconsummated transaction for the transfer of the mine by plaintiff directly to another party, to the effect that “if the sale goes through, the money comes through me,” does not contain a promise, and has no relevancy to the verbal contract made at the time of the deed to the decedent.