Town of Susanville v. Long
Before: Cooper
Synopsis
The complaint alleged that the defendant carried on the business of selling liquor without a license from the first day of April, 1902, to find including the thirtieth day of June following, after having refused to take out the license-fee of fifty dollars therefor, as required by the ordinance pleaded, and demanded judgment therefor. The court found that the fee of fifty dollars per quarter was imposed by the ordinance, and that the quarters were fixed so as to begin with the first days of January, April, July, and October, and found in favor of the allegations of the complaint and that the defendant is indebted to plaintiff in the sum of fifty dollars.
Further facts are stated in the opinion.
COOPER, C.
Action to recover fifty dollars claimed to be due the plaintiff from defendant as a license for carrying on the business of selling intoxicating liquors within the corporate limits of plaintiff, under ordinance No. 7, in force at the time of carrying on such business.
Findings were filed and judgment ordered and entered in favor of plaintiff as prayed. Defendant prosecutes this appeal from the judgment on the judgment-roll, accompanied by a bill of exceptions.
It is contended that the suit should have been commenced by the marshal of the town, and not by the trustees. The ordinance provides that the marshal shall commence suit in
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the name of the “Town of Susanville.” The marshal testified that he consulted with the attorney for the plaintiff and gave him a list of those persons refusing to take out a license, for the purpose of having this and other actions instituted. This was sufficient to show the institution of the suit by the marshal. But were it otherwise the defendant did not raise the question as to the legal capacity of plaintiff to bring the suit, either by demurrer or answer, and is therefore deemed to have waived it. (Code Civ. Proc., sees. 430, 433, 434.)
It is next argued that the evidence is insufficient to support the finding of the court “that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of fifty dollars.” The bill of exceptions shows that “defendant engaged in the business of selling liquor within the corporate limits of said town of Susanville between the dates mentioned in plaintiff’s complaint, and that he carried on such business without having secured a license therefor, or paying the fee or charge therefor as required by ordinance No. 7 of said town, although a demand to take out and pay for such license had been made upon him by the marshal of said town. ’ ’
It also shows that the ordinance required a license-fee of fifty dollars per quarter to be paid before carrying on the business of selling intoxicating liquors within the corporate limits of plaintiff. This is sufficient to support the finding.
Finally, it is claimed that the ordinance involved is void, because not passed by trustees who were such
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