Smith v. Industrial Accident Commission

LAWLOR, J.

This is a proceeding under a writ of review to annul an award made in favor of Charles Rives, the employee of the petitioner. The commission found that Rives was injured by accident in the course of his employment by straining his wrist while endeavoring to release a clamp. It is admitted by the respondent that no written notice of the injury was served upon the defendant employer, and the sole question presented is whether he had actual knowledge of the injury, within the meaning of section 20 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. It was denied by the petitioner in his answer and in bis testimony at the hearing that he had any such knowledge of the injury.

We are convinced that the contention of the petitioner must be upheld. The only finding made by the commission touching the question of knowledge is in these words: ‘ ‘ That said defendant employer had knowledge or notice of the happening of said accident within the time prescribed by law.” We do not think that this finding on the point of "knowledge is

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sufficient. The statute calls for “actual knowledge,” while the word “knowledge” may include that which is imputed. Section 20 provides that “notice in writing, stating the name and address of the person injured, the time and the place where the accident occurred, and the nature, of the injury, . . . shall be served upon the employer; provided,

hoivever,

that actual knowledge of such accident and injury on the part of such employer, or his managing agent or superintendent in charge of the work, upon which the injured employee was engaged at the time of the injury, shall be equivalent to such service. ’ ’ It is clear from these provisions that any kind of knowledge, other than actual, or first hand knowledge, would be insufficient, for the statutory equivalent of the information required to be given in the notice is actual knowledge.

But even assuming that the word “knowledge,” as it appears in the finding, imports actual knowledge, and is sufficient under the requirements of section 20, yet we do not think that the finding is supported by the evidence. It is to be noted in this behalf that the finding only refers tó the knowledge of the petitioner, and is silent as regards the “managing agent or superintendent.” The question then is whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a finding that the petitioner himself had actual knowledge of the injury.