Alaska Salmon Co. v. Standard Box Co.
Before: Henshaw
Synopsis
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Opinion
The action was for damages for breach of contract. The case was tried before a jury whose verdict was given for plaintiff. From the judgment which followed and from the order of the court denying defendant's motion for a new trial it appeals. *Page 569
The complaint charged that in October, 1905, plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract whereby defendant agreed to manufacture for plaintiff one hundred thousand wooden boxes to be delivered during the canning seasons of 1906 and 1907 as called for by plaintiff for its use in the business of manufacturing and selling canned salmon. Defendant supplied plaintiff for the canning season of 1906 with forty-four thousand boxes and plaintiff prior to the commencement of the canning season of 1907 demanded of defendant that it furnish the remaining boxes, to wit, fifty-six thousand, for use during the canning season of 1907. It is alleged that plaintiff has always been ready and willing to receive the said fifty-six thousand boxes and to pay for them at the price called for by said contract, and in accordance with the terms thereof, but that defendant has refused to deliver the boxes, whereby plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of $3,920. The answer was by general denial and for a special defense it is alleged "that the plaintiff is and for more than three years last past has been a corporation, organized, existing and doing business under and by virtue of the laws of the state of California." That plaintiff has at all times since its incorporation wholly failed to comply with the provisions of the act imposing a license-tax upon corporations and has wholly failed to pay the license or any of the licenses required by this act. The jury's verdict was for $3,640.30.
1. It is asserted that the complaint wholly fails to state a cause of action because it does not allege that the contract of October was in writing. The law will presume the contract to be valid and not invalid and thus, where required by the statute of frauds will presume it to be evidenced by writing. (Nunez v.Morgan, 77 Cal. 427, [19 P. 753]; Bradford Investment Co. v.Joost, 117 Cal. 204, [48 P. 1083].) If the defendant relies upon the statute of frauds against such a complaint he must plead it. (Broder v. Conklin, 77 Cal. 330, [19 P. 513].) Moreover, the execution of the contract was not denied and in the answer the written agreement is expressly set out in a counterclaim for damages; and finally, the contract was, in fact, in writing and was proved and legally evidenced by an interchange of business letters between the two corporations.
2. It is argued that because plaintiff did not affirmatively *Page 570 show the payment by it of the license-tax required, it cannot be permitted to maintain this action. It will be remembered that the defense pleaded such non-payment by plaintiff, but no evidence was introduced in support of the plea. The answer itself avers that the plaintiff is a corporation and is engaged in business as a corporation. This is an admission of the plaintiff's corporate capacity to sue and is a waiver of the proof contemplated by section 297 of the Civil Code to the effect that a certified copy of the articles of incorporation "must be received in all the courts of this state and in other places as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." The corporate existence and general capacity of the plaintiff thus being established by the admission of the pleadings it was a matter of affirmative defense for the box company to have shown the extraneous fact that plaintiff had failed to comply with the corporation license-tax law and therefore should not be permitted to proceed further. The burden of proving a negative thus being cast upon the defendant only slight evidence would be required. But, as has been said, defendant never undertook to furnish any evidence at all, and here rests merely upon the proposition that every corporation must itself affirmatively show a compliance with the corporation license-tax act before being permitted to prosecute an action. This view of the law, for the reasons given, cannot be upheld.
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