Matter of Application of Stephan

SHAW, J.

The petitioner was imprisoned on a charge of having violated the provisions of the act entitled, “An act to define personal property brokers and regulate their charges and business, ’ ’ enacted April 16, 1909, and amended April 21, 1911. (Stats. 1909, p. 969; Stats. 1911, p. 978.) He asks a release from custody on the claim that the law is unconstitutional.

Section 1 of the law provides that every person “engaged in the business of loaning or advancing money” on the secur

[50]

ity of chattel mortgages or other contracts by which personal property is hypothecated as security for such loan and the use and possession thereof is not to be in the lender, or on the, security of a lien upon, or assignment of, or power of attorney relating to “wages, salary, earnings, income or commissions,” shall be deemed a “personal property broker.” Sections 2 and 3 allow such brokers to charge and receive two per cent per month as interest on the money loaned on such security and provide that they shall not charge or receive more, either directly, or under any pretext, as for costs, expenses and the like. Section 5 requires such personal property broker, on making such loan or advancement, to give to the borrower a memorandum showing the name of the lender, the nature of the instruments taken as security, and certain other particulars of the transaction. It is further provided that contracts for such loans or advancements are void if a greater rate of interest or benefit than the statute allows is accepted therefor or provided for or agreed upon therein, and that a failure of the broker to give the memorandum required by section 5 is a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.

The petitioner was charged with being engaged in the business aforesaid and with having made such a loan upon the security of a chattel mortgage, without giving to the borrower the memorandum aforesaid.

Section 11 of article I of the constitution declares that “all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.” Section 21 of the article forbids the granting of special privileges or immunities to any citizen or class of citizens, which, upon the same terms, shall not be given to all. Under the rules now well established in this state we think it is clear that this statute does not controvert these provisions. It is not a violation thereof for the legislature to enact laws applying to persons throughout the state, but only to those of a specified class, provided the distinctions which mark the class are those which reasonably arise out of the nature of things and distinguish them from others not embraced within it in such a manner that the peculiar legislation is not arbitrary or unreasonable. The legislative judgment as to what is a sufficient distinction cannot be overthrown by the courts, unless it is, beyond rational doubt, erroneous. No authority need be cited in support of these propositions. It follows, also