Simmons v. Miller

California Supreme Court Aug 25, 1915 No. Sac. No. 2329.Published

Before: Melvin

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Holding. The court held that the right to receive the cash surrender value of a semi-tontine insurance policy is a property right distinct from the beneficiary's interest, and such right constitutes property 'standing in the name' of the insured, which was effectively transferred to the husband under the parties' property settlement agreement.

Issues

Whether the right to receive the cash surrender value of a semi-tontine insurance policy constitutes property 'standing in the name' of the insured husband under a property settlement agreement.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The part of the policy providing for insurance and payment of the principal sum to the beneficiary in the event of the death of the insured within a certain period of years is separate and distinct from the contract to pay the “surrender value””

“The right to receive the “surrender value” of the policy, whatever that might be, was a property right standing in his name—not in the name of the appellant.”

“The authorities cited above fully sustain the proposition that the interest of the assured may be assigned before maturity, and it follows inevitably that such interest must be property standing in his name.”

Synopsis

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

R. T. McKisick, and Downey, Pullen & Downey, for Appellant.

MELVIN, J.

Plaintiff and defendant were formerly wife and husband, but they were divorced in 1911. In 1913 a twenty-year semi-tontine policy of insurance on defendant’s life matured and exercising an option given him under the contract he surrendered the policy to the company which had issued it and received the sum of $3,174.53. The plaintiff sued for her alleged community interest in this money. At the trial of the cause, after issue joined, plaintiff’s proofs were offered and thereupon defendant’s motion for nonsuit was granted. Judgment was entered in defendant’s favor. From said judgment and from an order denying her motion for a new trial the plaintiff appeals.

The divorce was preceded by an agreement respecting the property of the husband and wife. By this contract they attempted to settle and adjust all of their property rights. It was an elaborate and carefully drawn document whereby each party surrendered all interest in certain properties in favor of the other. It is unnecessary to analyze this instrument as only the fourth stipulation is pertinent to this discussion. By it the agreement was made that all property, real or personal,

“standing in the name of”

Mr. Miller, except the properties “specifically described” in the foregoing part of the writing should be “treated and considered as his separate property,” and that his wife should have “no right or interest or ownership therein.” She also granted, bargained, sold, and conveyed, by the terms of the contract all of her “right, title, interest, and ownership in and to all property

standing in the name”

of her husband.

The contract of insurance was a semi-tontine policy. The tontine dividend period was twenty years. It contained the usual covenants and provided that if the insured, Dwight H. Miller, should die at any time within the existence of the policy the insurance company would pay to the beneficiary (the plaintiff here) the sum of five thousand dollars. But it was also provided by the terms of the policy that upon the completion of the tontine dividend period, provided the policy should

[25]

not have been terminated by lapse or death, the assured and

Simmons v. Miller

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Synopsis

MELVIN, J.

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