Patterson v. Chapman
Before: THE COURT.
Synopsis
Contracts—Consideration—Pleading.—At common law a seal was necessary in order to create the presumption that an executory contract was founded upon a valuable consideration, and, therefore, if it was not under seal, the rule of pleading was that the complaint or declaration must allege that the contract was executed for a valuable consideration; but as our code declares that a written instrument is presumptive evidence of a consideration, in an action in this state upon an unsealed written instrument as evidence of an obligation to pay money, the common-law rule applicable to sealed instruments prevails, and it is not necessary to make the additional allegation that it was made for a valuable consideration.
Id.—Claim Against Estate.—If an instrument creates a debitum in praesenti, an obligation existing in the lifetime of the obligor, the fact that it is not to be discharged until after the latter's death renders it hone the less enforceable as a demand against his estate.
Id.-—Creation op Debt.—Any memorandum in writing, regardless of its form, whether payable in money or specific property, whereby a debt is acknowledged by one as owing to another to whom the memorandum is delivered, is sufficient to create such obligation.
Id.—Implied -Promise.—Although an instrument contains no express promise to pay, where' the existence of an indebtedness based upon consideration is acknowledged, the law implies a promise to pay it, and the fact that payment is postponed until after the death of the party so acknowledging it is immaterial.
Id.—Construction op Instrument.—Every statement in a written instrument signed by one since deceased, instructing the administrator of his estate -to pay to a named person within a definite time after his death a certain sum “for value received,” must be considered as his declaration and given effect accordingly, and in the absence of any defense on the ground of fraud, mistake, or want of consideration, each declaration therein made, or necessarily implied from its language, must be .given the full effect that the meaning «arries; and such instrument creates a debitum in praesenti, for value, payable out of the estate of the deceased, and is not a gift.
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