Matter of Ruef
Before: THE COURT.
Synopsis
APPLICATION for a Writ of Habeas Corpus directed to W. J. Biggy, an elisor appointed by the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Henry Ach, Samuel M. Shortridge, Frank J. Murphy, and Charles H. Fairall, for Petitioner.
William H. Langdon, District Attorney, and Francis J. Heney, Assistant District Attorney, for Respondent.
THE COURT.
A petition for a writ of
habeas corpus
is presented by A. Ruef, who alleges that he is restrained of ■his liberty and held in custody under bench warrants issued by the superior court upon five indictments purporting to charge him with the crime of extortion.
Three grounds for the issuance of the writ are urged.
1. It is alleged that one of the members of the grand jury which found and returned the indictments was not competent, by reason of the fact that he had served and been discharged as a juror by a court of record of this state within a year of the time that he was summoned and impaneled to act as such grand juror. (Code Civ. Proe., sec. 199.) We are of opinion that this does not affect the validity of an indictment found by the grand jury. The Penal Code enumerates the grounds upon which an indictment may be set aside. (Pen. Code, sec. 995.) One of these grounds is “any ground which would have been good ground for challenge—to any individual grand juror.” The Penal Code (sec. 896) provides for a challenge to an individual grand juror for six specified grounds
only.
The particular incompetency here relied on is not included. We think that the legislature, in declaring that persons who had- been discharged as jurors within a year should not be competent, and at the same time denying to a defendant indicted by a grand jury including one or more such persons any remedy by way of motion or challenge, in effect provided that if the statutory .rule prohibiting the service of such persons were not obeyed, the departure should not invalidate any indictment found. (Cf. Pen. Code, sec. 901.) Any statutory incompetency which is not made a basis for a challenge under Penal Code section 896 must be regarded as a mere direction to the court impaneling the jury.
2. It is claimed that the indictments failed to state a public offense. On
habeas corpus
the inquiry into the sufficiency of an indictment is limited. We think the true rule is that where an indictment purports or attempts to state an offense
[667]
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