People v. Mohr

ANGELLOTTI, J.

The defendant was convicted of the offense defined by section 476a of the Penal Code, it being alleged in the information that he did willfully, with the intent to defraud one C. B. Rourk, draw, utter, and deliver to one Frank Harrington, a certain check for the payment of money, to wit: twelve dollars, on the Hanford National Bank of Han-ford, a banking association, knowing at the time that he had no funds in or credit with said bank to meet or pay said check upon its presentation. Upon this conviction he was adjudged to suffer imprisonment in the state prison for two years. This is an appeal from the judgment, the order denying a new trial, and the motion in arrest of judgment.

The last-named order is not appealable (Pen. Code, sec. 1237;

People

v.

Matuszewski,

138 Cal. 533, [71 Pac. 701]), but errors in connection with the motion in arrest of judgment may be considered on the appeal from the judgment.

We are satisfied that the information stated facts constituting the public offense defined by section 476a of the Penal Code, and that it was not subject to any of the objections specified in the demurrer. The demurrer was therefore properly disallowed, and the motion in arrest of judgment properly denied.

The evidence introduced was legally sufficient to support a conclusion on the part of the jury that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged. A careful review thereof, how

[734]

ever, satisfies us that the ease against the defendant was not of such a nature that we can say that he was not prejudiced by certain rulings of the trial court which we are satisfied were erroneous, in other words that the evidence as to his guilt of the offense charged was not so clear and convincing as to justify us in concluding that he was not prejudiced by such rulings.

The defendant was put upon the witness stand merely to identify a letter written by him to Harrington after the transaction as one written and signed by him. On his direct examination he merely stated that his name was H. J. Mohr, that he was the defendant, and that he wrote and signed the letter. On cross-examination, the district attorney was permitted by the court, apparently upon the theory that it was proper cross-examination in view of his statement that his name was H. J. Mohr; to ask such questions as “Did you ever go under the name of Harold Miller?” “Did you ever go by the name of W. J. Wilbur?” “Did you ever register during the month of October as H. 0. Miller?” “Did you ever go by the name of Harold Miller?” “Now, during the month of October, 1908, didn’t you register at the Victor lodging house under the name of H. 0. Miller?” “Did you ever go by the name of B. H. Moore?” “Did you ever go by the name of H. B. Moore?” “Did you ever go by the name of W. J. Wilbur ?” “Did you ever go by the name of B. J. King at Turlock, Stanislaus County, in this state?” These and other questions, equally subject to objection as not proper cross-examination, constituted the whole of the cross-examination, and all of them the defendant was required by the court to answer, although proper objections' were made thereto. It appears, too, that these questions were asked in such a manner as to indicate that the district attorney had in his hands at the time he asked the questions, written data to support the same. The conduct of the district attorney in asking these questions was objected to and excepted to by defendant’s counsel, but the court apparently approved such conduct, refusing to direct that officer to desist, and directing him to proceed.