Mitchell v. Henry

OLNEY, J.

The city of Glendale, by proceedings completed in the spring of 1919, endeavored to annex unto itself certain adjacent unincorporated territory. The petitioner in the court below and the appellant here owned land in the annexed district and after the completion of the annexation proceedings sought to have them annulled by writ of review from the superior court. The writ was denied him and he appeals.

Objection is made at the outset by the respondents that the annexation proceedings cannot now be annulled upon

certiorari,

since the writ was sought only after the annexation, or purported annexation, was complete. But this objection we need not consider in view of the conclusion we have reached that no grounds exist for declaring the annexation invalid either upon

certiorari

or otherwise.

Apparently contention was made in the lower court that while the annexation proceedings were taken under the statute of June 11, 1913 (Stats. 1913, p. 587), providing for the annexation of inhabited territory, the territory annexed was, in fact, uninhabited. The lower court, however, found that the territory was inhabited, and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain this finding is not attacked. With this objection removed, there is no contention that the proceedings taken did not in all respects meet the requirements of the annexation statute.

[268]

[1]

Before this court, the sole contention of the petitioner is that the annexation is invalid because it would result in a violation of the provisions of section 1576 of the Political Code, with reference to school districts. It seems that the city of Glendale is a city of the sixth class and that the annexed territory was a part of both a common school district and a high school district of which Glendale was not a part. The result of the annexation will therefore be that, if the annexed territory remains a part of the school districts of which it was formerly a part, the city of Glendale will, as to part of its territory, be within one school district, and as to part be within another. This result, it is claimed, is in violation of the section of the Political Code mentioned, the material portion of which reads: “Every city or incorporated town, except cities and towns of the sixth class, unless subdivided by the legislative authority thereof, shall constitute a separate school district . . . ; provided, however, that in no instance shall the territory within an incorporated city of the sixth class be in more than one school district.” The prohibitory proviso just quoted was added to the code by amendment in 1917, while the annexation statute was passed in 1913, and the contention of the petitioner is that the code section had the effect of impliedly repealing the annexation statute, or, more accurately, of amending it, so that it does not apply in any case where the territory sought to be annexed to a city of the sixth class is a part of a school district of which the city is not a part. In fact, if the petitioner’s contention be correct, we cannot stop with an implied amendment of this particular annexation statute, but must extend the amendment to all annexation statutes applicable to cities of the sixth class. Not only this, but we must extend it to the statutes for the incorporation of such cities in the first instance, so that no city of the sixth class may be formed whose proposed territory is not at the time wholly within a single school district. These are rather remarkable results. The code section is concerned only with school districts. It does not purport to touch upon and be concerned with the matter of incorporating cities or annexing territories to them. When it was amended it was certainly not contemplated that the statutes upon these wholly distinct matters were likewise being amended. That result can be justified only in case there is no reasonable construction which can be given the