Robert Sherer & Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n

LENNON,

J.

—Certiorari to review the action of the Industrial Accident Commission in awarding death benefits to Ruth Iris Haskell, the minor daughter of William A. Haskell, who was killed in an industrial accident. The issue presented is whether or not the commission was justified in finding that the applicant was wholly dependent for support upon the deceased employee.

It appears that the mother of the applicant, who appears as the guardian

ad litem

herein, obtained a decree of divorce in an action against Haskell. By this decree the mother was awarded the custody of the child, Haskell being ordered, however, to pay $20 a month for its support. The mother remarried, but the order requiring Haskell to pay

[490]

$20 a month for the support of the child was in force at the time of his death. It is conceded that under section 14 (a) (2) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Stats. 1917, p. 844), the applicant is to be presumed wholly dependent for support upon the deceased if, under the facts stated, he was legally liable for her maintenance.

[1]

Petitioner contends, in effect, that where the court merely requires the payment by the father of a certain specified sum at stated intervals it does to all intents and purposes relieve' the father from liability for the maintenance of the child, creating in the place of such liability an ordinary debt or money obligation. A similar contention was made on behalf of defendant in the case of

People

v.

Schlott,

162 Cal. 347, [122 Pac. 846], and was held to be without merit.

But it is insisted that even if Haskell’s obligation to support the applicant did continue after the divorce, it was an obligation which could -be fulfilled by paying $20 a month, and that, inasmuch as the mother would be under a duty to contribute any additional sum needful to make suitable provision for the child, it necessarily followed that the girl was only partially dependent on the deceased. With this contention as a basis it is argued that the deceased was not legally liable for the maintenance of the child within the meaning of section 14 (a) (2) of the statute. We do not undertake to decide whether or not the deceased would have been legally liable for the maintenance of the child within the meaning of the statute had the sum which he was required to pay been unquestionably insufficient for the entire support of the child.