Grieve v. Mullaly

WASTE, C. J.

On the twenty-first day of August, 1926, the two defendants signed and delivered to plaintiff a writing in the following form:

“Davis, Cal. 8/21/26.

“We the undersigned, known as John Mullaly and Pat Mullaly of Arbuckle, parties of the 1st part and J. D. Grieve of Davis, Cal. party of the second part, to-wit:—We Mullaly Bros, parties of the 1st part agree to lease for a period of 3 years with privilege of one more year, all our land west of Arbuckle about 5000 acres in all for price of 65 cents

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per acre per year to J. D. Grieve of Davis Cal. We also agree to sell to J. D. Grieve all our cattle now pasturing on above described ranch price per head as follows:

Cows 30.00 each Calves 20.00 each

“All yearlings & two year old Heifers & Steers a. 27.50 Each.

“This option will not expire before Sept. 15/1926.

“10 head of cattle to be cut out by party of second and price agreed on by Buyer & Seller.

(Signed) Pat Mullaly.

“John Mullaly.”

In legal effect, the writing was no more than an offer unsupported by consideration.

The evidence shows that on September 1st, fifteen days before the expiration date of the option, and before it was revoked by defendants, it was accepted by Grieve in so far ■ as it applied to the cattle. Before September 1st, Grieve had sold all of his rights under the option to a lease of the realty to one D. Q. Adams, under a proposition, whereby Adams, when he consummated the lease with defendants, was to pay Grieve thirty-five cents an acre profit. The evidence likewise shows that on September first Adams tendered to defendants a check for $500 as part payment on the lease, and likewise tendered to defendants for their signatures a formal lease naming Adams as lessee. The defendants -refused to sell the cattle or to enter into the Adams ’ lease. Grieve thereupon brought this action, framing his complaint in two counts. The first cause of action was for damages sustained by virtue of defendants’ refusal to lease the land, and the second cause of action was for the damages sustained by virtue of defendants’ failure and refusal to sell the cattle. The court, sitting without a jury, after evidence had been adduced substantially as set forth