Ruperich v. Baehr

Officers—Public Employees—Legislative Control—Garnishment— Payment of Salary on Judgment—Public Policy—Constitutional Law.—Although, as a general rule, it is against public policy to apply general statutory provisions for garnishee process to public corporations or bodies politic, yet so much of section 710 of the Code of Civil Procedure as applies to such officers and public employees as are clearly within legislative control, providing for payment out of a salary due of the amount of any unpaid judgment, an authenticated copy of which has been filed as directed with the proper auditing officer, must he accepted by the courts as declaring the legislative policy which is binding upon them. The statute is not unconstitutional as being special legislation, or as not being uniform in its operation.

Id.—Construction of Code—Exemption from Execution—Salaries Subject to Garnishment.—Section 710 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to he liberally construed with a view to effect its objects; and giving effect to the provision that when the money is paid into court “so much thereof as is not exempt from execution shall he paid to the judgment creditor, and the remainder to the judgment debtor,” it is clear that officers and employees engaged in the public service may claim the exemption of “earnings of the judgment debtor for his personal services rendered at any time within thirty days next preceding the levy of the execution or attachment,” under subdivision 1 of section 690 of that code, and that the salaries and wages of public officers and employees are included in the phrases “money owing,” or “money which belongs to or is owing to the judgment debtor,” and “amount so due or owing to such judgment debtor,” used in section 710, and that such officers and employees are classed as “judgment debtors” to whom money is owing, and are subject to the garnishment authorized by that section.

Id.—Application op Law under San Francisco Charter.—The law is to be construed as allowing the auditor to “draw his warrant in favor» of, or to pay into, the court,” the money to apply on the: judgment; and there is no insuperable difficulty in applying the law under the San Francisco charter, which only allows the auditor to draw his warrant upon the treasurer. In such ease he may draw his warrant for the amount necessary to satisfy the judgment in favor of the court or the proper officer authorized to receive money paid into the court.

Id.—Salary op Stenographer—Part Payment on Judgment—Mandamus—-Demand por Full Salary—Excess.—Where the demand upon the auditor was for a warrant for full payment of the salary of a stenographer employed by the city and county, part of which was applied on a judgment against him filed with the auditor, a mandate cannot be issued to compel the payment of the excess, which the auditor may pay upon demand for the correct amount.