Luckenbach v. Krempel

[176]

SHAW, C. J.

The appellants ask for a writ of

supersedeas.

The writ is asked to stay proceedings for the collection of a judgment for $5,955.40 recovered by Luckenbach against Krempel-Preston Company in the superior court of Los Angeles County on January 6, 1919. There are separate appeals, one by the defendant Preston and the other by the three defendants, Chris Krempel, Anna Krempel, and Lucy Hauerwaas. As they both involve the same' question they will be considered together.

On April 15, 1919, on application of the plaintiff the court appointed Willard L. Goodwin receiver of the property of said company. On May 3, 1919, the court made an

ex parte

order purporting to authorize said receiver to sue the above-named appellants or either of them for any amounts due from them or either of them to said company. On May 5, 1919, said Goodwin, as such receiver, began an action in said superior court against said appellants to recover the sum of $164,231.62, alleged to be due from said persons to said company.

On April 8, 1921, Preston moved the court below for an order vacating the two orders of April 15, and May 3, 1919, appointing a receiver and authorizing him to sue, as aforesaid. On April 8, 1921, this motion was denied. On April 26, 1921, the court denied a similar motion by the other appellants to vacate the aforesaid orders.

Prom these orders denying said motions these separate appeals were taken by the respective moving parties.

Upon these appeals, and by the writ of

supersedeas

prayed for, the appellants seek to restrain further proceedings by the receiver and in the court below, pending the appeals, in the prosecution of any action or actions against the appellants or either of them based upon debts claimed to be due from them to said Krempel-Preston Company.

The motions to set aside the order appointing the receiver were each made on matters appearing on the face of the record and on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to appoint the receiver; in other words, that the orde^ was void because of a lack of jurisdiction in the court to make it. If that order was void, the orders purporting to authorize the receiver to sue would also be void.